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11 Alabama opinions name it 3 courts 1897–1972 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Vickers v. Howardgreen2 sentences1972Although the extent and course of the examination is largely within the discretion of the court, the inquiry permitted under this section should be liberal and extend to any and all matters touching the interest, bias or qualifications of the prospective juror. “ * * * gives to parties having respective peremptory challenges or the right to a struck jury, the right within the limits of propriety and pertinence to reasonably propound questions to jurors to enable such party or his counsel to intelligently exercise that right, though the matters of which inquiry is made are not a disqualificatio 1972Although the extent and course of the examination is largely within the discretion of the court, the inquiry permitted under this section should be liberal and extend to any and all matters touching the interest, bias or qualifications of the prospective juror. “ * * * gives to parties having respective peremptory challenges or the right to a struck jury, the right within the limits of propriety and pertinence to reasonably propound questions to jurors to enable such party or his counsel to intelligently exercise that right, though the matters of which inquiry is made are not a disqualificatio | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dyer v. State
neutral
2 sentences1972Although the extent and course of the examination is largely within the discretion of the court, the inquiry permitted under this section should be liberal and extend to any and all matters touching the interest, bias or qualifications of the prospective juror. “ * * * gives to parties having respective peremptory challenges or the right to a struck jury, the right within the limits of propriety and pertinence to reasonably propound questions to jurors to enable such party or his counsel to intelligently exercise that right, though the matters of which inquiry is made are not a disqualificatio 1972Although the extent and course of the examination is largely within the discretion of the court, the inquiry permitted under this section should be liberal and extend to any and all matters touching the interest, bias or qualifications of the prospective juror. “ * * * gives to parties having respective peremptory challenges or the right to a struck jury, the right within the limits of propriety and pertinence to reasonably propound questions to jurors to enable such party or his counsel to intelligently exercise that right, though the matters of which inquiry is made are not a disqualificatio | 2 | 1959–1972 |
Rose v. Magro
green
2 sentences1959This code section “gives to parties having respective peremptory challenges or the right to a struck jury, the right within the limits of propriety and pertinence to reasonably propound questions to jurors to enable such party or his counsel to intelligently exercise that right, though the matters of which inquiry is made are not a disqualification.” Dyer v. State, 241 Ala. 679 , 4 So.2d 311, 313 ; Cox v. Bennett, 250 Ala. 698 , 36 So.2d 86 ; Redus v. State, 243 Ala. 320 , 9 So.2d 914 ; Rose v. Magro, 220 Ala. 120 , 124 So. 296 . 1959This code section “gives to parties having respective peremptory challenges or the right to a struck jury, the right within the limits of propriety and pertinence to reasonably propound questions to jurors to enable such party or his counsel to intelligently exercise that right, though the matters of which inquiry is made are not a disqualification.” Dyer v. State, 241 Ala. 679 , 4 So.2d 311, 313 ; Cox v. Bennett, 250 Ala. 698 , 36 So.2d 86 ; Redus v. State, 243 Ala. 320 , 9 So.2d 914 ; Rose v. Magro, 220 Ala. 120 , 124 So. 296 . | 2 | 1942–1959 |
Southern Indemnity Ass'n v. Hoffman
neutral
2 sentences1962Southern Indemnity Ass’n v. Hoffman, 16 Ala.App. 274 , 77 So. 424 . 1962Southern Indemnity Ass’n v. Hoffman, 16 Ala.App. 274 , 77 So. 424 . | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Cox v. Bennett
neutral
2 sentences1959This code section “gives to parties having respective peremptory challenges or the right to a struck jury, the right within the limits of propriety and pertinence to reasonably propound questions to jurors to enable such party or his counsel to intelligently exercise that right, though the matters of which inquiry is made are not a disqualification.” Dyer v. State, 241 Ala. 679 , 4 So.2d 311, 313 ; Cox v. Bennett, 250 Ala. 698 , 36 So.2d 86 ; Redus v. State, 243 Ala. 320 , 9 So.2d 914 ; Rose v. Magro, 220 Ala. 120 , 124 So. 296 . 1959This code section “gives to parties having respective peremptory challenges or the right to a struck jury, the right within the limits of propriety and pertinence to reasonably propound questions to jurors to enable such party or his counsel to intelligently exercise that right, though the matters of which inquiry is made are not a disqualification.” Dyer v. State, 241 Ala. 679 , 4 So.2d 311, 313 ; Cox v. Bennett, 250 Ala. 698 , 36 So.2d 86 ; Redus v. State, 243 Ala. 320 , 9 So.2d 914 ; Rose v. Magro, 220 Ala. 120 , 124 So. 296 . | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Redus v. State
green
2 sentences1959This code section “gives to parties having respective peremptory challenges or the right to a struck jury, the right within the limits of propriety and pertinence to reasonably propound questions to jurors to enable such party or his counsel to intelligently exercise that right, though the matters of which inquiry is made are not a disqualification.” Dyer v. State, 241 Ala. 679 , 4 So.2d 311, 313 ; Cox v. Bennett, 250 Ala. 698 , 36 So.2d 86 ; Redus v. State, 243 Ala. 320 , 9 So.2d 914 ; Rose v. Magro, 220 Ala. 120 , 124 So. 296 . 1959This code section “gives to parties having respective peremptory challenges or the right to a struck jury, the right within the limits of propriety and pertinence to reasonably propound questions to jurors to enable such party or his counsel to intelligently exercise that right, though the matters of which inquiry is made are not a disqualification.” Dyer v. State, 241 Ala. 679 , 4 So.2d 311, 313 ; Cox v. Bennett, 250 Ala. 698 , 36 So.2d 86 ; Redus v. State, 243 Ala. 320 , 9 So.2d 914 ; Rose v. Magro, 220 Ala. 120 , 124 So. 296 . | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Duke v. Gaines
green
2 sentences1959“The right of inquiry under the statute is a broad right just so it is not exercised in bad faith or merely designed to prejudice the case.” Cox v. Bennett, supra [ 250 Ala. 698 , 36 So.2d 88 ]; Duke v. Gaines, 224 Ala. 519 , 140 So. 600 . 1959“The right of inquiry under the statute is a broad right just so it is not exercised in bad faith or merely designed to prejudice the case.” Cox v. Bennett, supra [ 250 Ala. 698 , 36 So.2d 88 ]; Duke v. Gaines, 224 Ala. 519 , 140 So. 600 . | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Stone v. Monticello Construction Co.
green
2 sentences1929Such are the general authorities: Stone v. Monticello Const. Co., 135 Ky. 659 , 117 S. W. 369 , 40 L. 1929Such are the general authorities: Stone v. Monticello Const. Co., 135 Ky. 659 , 117 S. W. 369 , 40 L. | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Burton v. Driggs
green
2 sentences1917In Burton v. Driggs, 20 Wall. 125, 136 , 22 L. 1917In Burton v. Driggs, 20 Wall. 125, 136 , 22 L. | 1 | 1917–1917 |
Jones v. Adkins
neutral
2 sentences1914Pl. & Pr. p. 921; 2 Cyc. pp. 980, 986, 987; Jones v. Adkins, 151 Ala. 316 , 44 South. 53 . 1914Pl. & Pr. p. 921; 2 Cyc. pp. 980, 986, 987; Jones v. Adkins, 151 Ala. 316 , 44 South. 53 . | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Ryan v. Young
green
2 sentences1913“In trover, not guilty puts in issue every matter which might be pleaded in bar, except a release.” —Ryan, et al. v. Young, 147 Ala. 660 , 41 South. 954 ; Barrett v. City of Mobile, 129 Ala. 179 ; 39 South. 36 , 87 Am. 1913“In trover, not guilty puts in issue every matter which might be pleaded in bar, except a release.” —Ryan, et al. v. Young, 147 Ala. 660 , 41 South. 954 ; Barrett v. City of Mobile, 129 Ala. 179 ; 39 South. 36 , 87 Am. | 1 | 1913–1913 |
Barrett v. City of Mobile
green
1 sentence1913“In trover, not guilty puts in issue every matter which might be pleaded in bar, except a release.” —Ryan, et al. v. Young, 147 Ala. 660 , 41 South. 954 ; Barrett v. City of Mobile, 129 Ala. 179 ; 39 South. 36 , 87 Am. | 1 | 1913–1913 |
First National Bank v. Chandler
green
2 sentences1911The principle seems to he settled on reason and authority that, where a demurrer is improperly sustained to a plea, the error is harmless and will not work a reversal when there are other pleas not demurred to, which set up substantially the same matters of defense as did the plea demurred to, and the party has the benefit of a trial on such other pleas. —Holmes v. Bank, 120 Ala. 493 , 24 South. 959 ; First National Bank v. Chandler, 144 Ala. 286 , 39 South, 822 , 113 Am. 1911The principle seems to he settled on reason and authority that, where a demurrer is improperly sustained to a plea, the error is harmless and will not work a reversal when there are other pleas not demurred to, which set up substantially the same matters of defense as did the plea demurred to, and the party has the benefit of a trial on such other pleas. —Holmes v. Bank, 120 Ala. 493 , 24 South. 959 ; First National Bank v. Chandler, 144 Ala. 286 , 39 South, 822 , 113 Am. | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Holmes v. Bank of Fort Gaines
neutral
1 sentence1911The principle seems to he settled on reason and authority that, where a demurrer is improperly sustained to a plea, the error is harmless and will not work a reversal when there are other pleas not demurred to, which set up substantially the same matters of defense as did the plea demurred to, and the party has the benefit of a trial on such other pleas. —Holmes v. Bank, 120 Ala. 493 , 24 South. 959 ; First National Bank v. Chandler, 144 Ala. 286 , 39 South, 822 , 113 Am. | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Coleman v. Roberts
neutral
1 sentence1907The matters set up in the pleas constituted a complete defense to the action, and the pleas were not subject to any of the other grounds set forth in the demurrers The law is too well settled in this state to admit of controversy that a judicial officer cannot he held liable for damages in a civil action for his judicial acts, no matter how mistaken or erroneous they may be — Coleman v. Roberts, 113 Ala. 323 , 21 South. 449 , 36 L. | 1 | 1907–1907 |
Binford's Adm'r v. Dement
neutral
1 sentence1897Parties in chancery, must reduce to writing objections to the admissibility of evidence, incorporating them in the note of submission, or otherwise calling them directly to the attention of the chancellor, or the presumption arises, that all such objections are waived. — Seals v. Robinson, 75 Ala. 363 ; Binford v. Dement, 72 Ala. 491 . •We conclude, that no one of the matters of defense preferred.by the answer, is availing, and that the evidence entitled the complainant to relief. | 1 | 1897–1897 |
Seals v. Robinson & Co.
green
1 sentence1897Parties in chancery, must reduce to writing objections to the admissibility of evidence, incorporating them in the note of submission, or otherwise calling them directly to the attention of the chancellor, or the presumption arises, that all such objections are waived. — Seals v. Robinson, 75 Ala. 363 ; Binford v. Dement, 72 Ala. 491 . •We conclude, that no one of the matters of defense preferred.by the answer, is availing, and that the evidence entitled the complainant to relief. | 1 | 1897–1897 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.