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10 Arizona opinions name it 1 courts 1936–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
City of Tucson v. Walkergreen2 sentences2021Sess.) (implementing the home rule charter provision and providing, in relevant part, that upon a charter’s approval, its provisions prevail over conflicting state laws “relating to cities,” if the charter does not conflict with laws involving initiatives and referenda “and other general laws of the State not relative to such cities”); § 9-284 (repeating the substance of the 1912 Act’s treatment of conflicts between a charter and state law); Clayton v. State, 38 Ariz. 466, 468 (1931) (on motion for rehearing) (stating “[if] the subject [over which a charter city exercises authority] is of stat 2017See, e.g., Clayton, 38 Ariz. at 468 (on motion for rehearing) (stating that where “the subject is of state-wide concern, and the legislature has appropriated the field and declared the rule, its declaration is binding throughout the state” and controls over conflicting local laws); Luhrs, 52 Ariz. at 442 (same, and recognizing this as “the general rule”); Walker, 60 Ariz. at 239 (quoting Axberg, 2 N.W.2d at 614 ) (noting that if a state statute addresses a matter of purely local concern it does not apply to a charter city’s law on that subject). ¶44 The unarticulated but obvious take away from | 3 | 3 |
City of Tucson v. Tucson Sunshine Climate Clubgreen2 sentences2021Sess.) (implementing the home rule charter provision and providing, in relevant part, that upon a charter’s approval, its provisions prevail over conflicting state laws “relating to cities,” if the charter does not conflict with laws involving initiatives and referenda “and other general laws of the State not relative to such cities”); § 9-284 (repeating the substance of the 1912 Act’s treatment of conflicts between a charter and state law); Clayton v. State, 38 Ariz. 466, 468 (1931) (on motion for rehearing) (stating “[if] the subject [over which a charter city exercises authority] is of stat 2017See, e.g., Tucson II, 229 Ariz. at 174 ¶ 9; Strode, 72 Ariz. at 364 (observing that a charter city does not have “carte blanche authority or plenary power to adopt any legislation that it might desire”); Tucson Sunshine Climate Club, 64 Ariz. at 4, 6 (a charter city’s powers extend “not only in matters of local concern, but also in matters of state-wide concern, within its territorial limits, unless the Legislature has appropriated the field, and directly or by necessary implication established a rule, beyond which the city may not go”); Luhrs, 52 Ariz. at 442 (recognizing the “general rule” t | 2 | 4 |
City of Tucson v. Stategreen2 sentences2021Sess.) (implementing the home rule charter provision and providing, in relevant part, that upon a charter’s approval, its provisions prevail over conflicting state laws “relating to cities,” if the charter does not conflict with laws involving initiatives and referenda “and other general laws of the State not relative to such cities”); § 9-284 (repeating the substance of the 1912 Act’s treatment of conflicts between a charter and state law); Clayton v. State, 38 Ariz. 466, 468 (1931) (on motion for rehearing) (stating “[if] the subject [over which a charter city exercises authority] is of stat 2017See, e.g., Tucson II, 229 Ariz. at 174 ¶ 9; Strode, 72 Ariz. at 364 (observing that a charter city does not have “carte blanche authority or plenary power to adopt any legislation that it might desire”); Tucson Sunshine Climate Club, 64 Ariz. at 4, 6 (a charter city’s powers extend “not only in matters of local concern, but also in matters of state-wide concern, within its territorial limits, unless the Legislature has appropriated the field, and directly or by necessary implication established a rule, beyond which the city may not go”); Luhrs, 52 Ariz. at 442 (recognizing the “general rule” t | 2 | 3 |
Clayton v. Stategreen2 sentences2021Sess.) (implementing the home rule charter provision and providing, in relevant part, that upon a charter’s approval, its provisions prevail over conflicting state laws “relating to cities,” if the charter does not conflict with laws involving initiatives and referenda “and other general laws of the State not relative to such cities”); § 9-284 (repeating the substance of the 1912 Act’s treatment of conflicts between a charter and state law); Clayton v. State, 38 Ariz. 466, 468 (1931) (on motion for rehearing) (stating “[if] the subject [over which a charter city exercises authority] is of stat 2017See, e.g., Clayton v. State, 38 Ariz. 466, 468 , 300 P. 1010 (1931) (on motion for rehearing) (stating that where “the subject is of state-wide concern, and the legislature has appropriated the field and declared the rule, its declaration is binding throughout the state” and controls over conflicting local laws); Luhrs, 52 Ariz. at 442 , 83 P.2d 283 (same, and recognizing this as “the general rule”); Walker, 60 Ariz. at 239 , 135 P.2d 223 (quoting Axberg, 2 N.W.2d at 614 ) (noting that if a state statute addresses a matter of purely local concern it does not apply to a charter city’s law on th | 2 | 2 |
Strode v. Sullivangreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., Tucson II, 229 Ariz. at 174 ¶ 9; Strode, 72 Ariz. at 364 (observing that a charter city does not have “carte blanche authority or plenary power to adopt any legislation that it might desire”); Tucson Sunshine Climate Club, 64 Ariz. at 4, 6 (a charter city’s powers extend “not only in matters of local concern, but also in matters of state-wide concern, within its territorial limits, unless the Legislature has appropriated the field, and directly or by necessary implication established a rule, beyond which the city may not go”); Luhrs, 52 Ariz. at 442 (recognizing the “general rule” t 2017See, e.g., Tucson II, 229 Ariz. at 174 ¶ 9; Strode, 72 Ariz. at 364 (observing that a charter city does not have “carte blanche authority or plenary power to adopt any legislation that it might desire”); Tucson Sunshine Climate Club, 64 Ariz. at 4, 6 (a charter city’s powers extend “not only in matters of local concern, but also in matters of state-wide concern, within its territorial limits, unless the Legislature has appropriated the field, and directly or by necessary implication established a rule, beyond which the city may not go”); Luhrs, 52 Ariz. at 442 (recognizing the “general rule” t | 2 | 2 |
Clayton v. Stategreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., Tucson II, 229 Ariz. at 174 ¶ 9; Strode, 72 Ariz. at 364 (observing that a charter city does not have “carte blanche authority or plenary power to adopt any legislation that it might desire”); Tucson Sunshine Climate Club, 64 Ariz. at 4, 6 (a charter city’s powers extend “not only in matters of local concern, but also in matters of state-wide concern, within its territorial limits, unless the Legislature has appropriated the field, and directly or by necessary implication established a rule, beyond which the city may not go”); Luhrs, 52 Ariz. at 442 (recognizing the “general rule” t 2017See, e.g., Clayton, 38 Ariz. at 468 (on motion for rehearing) (stating that where “the subject is of state-wide concern, and the legislature has appropriated the field and declared the rule, its declaration is binding throughout the state” and controls over conflicting local laws); Luhrs, 52 Ariz. at 442 (same, and recognizing this as “the general rule”); Walker, 60 Ariz. at 239 (quoting Axberg, 2 N.W.2d at 614 ) (noting that if a state statute addresses a matter of purely local concern it does not apply to a charter city’s law on that subject). ¶44 The unarticulated but obvious take away from | 2 | 2 |
Luhrs v. City of Phoenixgreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., Tucson II, 229 Ariz. at 174 ¶ 9; Strode, 72 Ariz. at 364 (observing that a charter city does not have “carte blanche authority or plenary power to adopt any legislation that it might desire”); Tucson Sunshine Climate Club, 64 Ariz. at 4, 6 (a charter city’s powers extend “not only in matters of local concern, but also in matters of state-wide concern, within its territorial limits, unless the Legislature has appropriated the field, and directly or by necessary implication established a rule, beyond which the city may not go”); Luhrs, 52 Ariz. at 442 (recognizing the “general rule” t 2017See, e.g., Clayton, 38 Ariz. at 468 (on motion for rehearing) (stating that where “the subject is of state-wide concern, and the legislature has appropriated the field and declared the rule, its declaration is binding throughout the state” and controls over conflicting local laws); Luhrs, 52 Ariz. at 442 (same, and recognizing this as “the general rule”); Walker, 60 Ariz. at 239 (quoting Axberg, 2 N.W.2d at 614 ) (noting that if a state statute addresses a matter of purely local concern it does not apply to a charter city’s law on that subject). ¶44 The unarticulated but obvious take away from | 2 | 2 |
Mayor Common Council of City of Prescott v. Randallgreen1 sentence2021Sess.) (implementing the home rule charter provision and providing, in relevant part, that upon a charter’s approval, its provisions prevail over conflicting state laws “relating to cities,” if the charter does not conflict with laws involving initiatives and referenda “and other general laws of the State not relative to such cities”); § 9-284 (repeating the substance of the 1912 Act’s treatment of conflicts between a charter and state law); Clayton v. State, 38 Ariz. 466, 468 (1931) (on motion for rehearing) (stating “[if] the subject [over which a charter city exercises authority] is of stat | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City of Phoenix v. Breuninger
green
2 sentences1948In City of Phoenix v. Breuninger, 50 Ariz. 372 , 72 P.2d 580 , it was held that the act óf the -legislature relating to dairy and- dairy products and *336 creating the office of dairy commissioner was an enactment of a general law not relating to cities in that it was of state-wide concern and that the legislature had occupied. the field and declared the rule. 1948In City of Phoenix v. Breuninger, 50 Ariz. 372 , 72 P.2d 580 , it was held that the act óf the -legislature relating to dairy and- dairy products and *336 creating the office of dairy commissioner was an enactment of a general law not relating to cities in that it was of state-wide concern and that the legislature had occupied. the field and declared the rule. | 4 | 1939–1948 |
Axberg v. City of Lincoln
green
2 sentences2017See, e.g., Clayton, 38 Ariz. at 468 (on motion for rehearing) (stating that where “the subject is of state-wide concern, and the legislature has appropriated the field and declared the rule, its declaration is binding throughout the state” and controls over conflicting local laws); Luhrs, 52 Ariz. at 442 (same, and recognizing this as “the general rule”); Walker, 60 Ariz. at 239 (quoting Axberg, 2 N.W.2d at 614 ) (noting that if a state statute addresses a matter of purely local concern it does not apply to a charter city’s law on that subject). 16 STATE V. 2017See, e.g., Clayton, 38 Ariz. at 468 (on motion for rehearing) (stating that where “the subject is of state-wide concern, and the legislature has appropriated the field and declared the rule, its declaration is binding throughout the state” and controls over conflicting local laws); Luhrs, 52 Ariz. at 442 (same, and recognizing this as “the general rule”); Walker, 60 Ariz. at 239 (quoting Axberg, 2 N.W.2d at 614 ) (noting that if a state statute addresses a matter of purely local concern it does not apply to a charter city’s law on that subject). ¶44 The unarticulated but obvious take away from | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Hislop v. Rodgers
green
2 sentences1948Where, however, the subject is of stated-wide concern, and the Legislature has appropriated the field and declared the rule, its declaration is binding throughout the state." (Emphasis supplied.) In Hislop v. Rodgers, supra, [ 54 Ariz. 101 , 92 P.2d 533 ] we had occasion to comment on the rule laid down in the Clayton case, as follows: “We have followed this rule in City of Phoenix v. Breuninger, 50 Ariz. 372 , 72 P.2d 580, 583 , holding in substance that where municipalities are given express power to legislate upon a certain subject, they.may do so even though the same subject is covered by 1945Where, however, the subject is of state-wide concern, and the Legislature has appropriated the field and declared the rule, its declaration is binding throughout the state.” Again, in Hislop v. Rodgers, 54 Ariz. 101, 115 , 92 P.2d 527, 533 , the following appears, in commenting on the rule of the Clayton case:- “We have followed this rule in City of Phœnix v. Breuninger, 50 Ariz. 372 , 72 P.2d 580, 583 , holding in substance that where municipalities are given express power to legislate upon a certain subject, they may do so even though the same subject is covered by statewide law, * * * provi | 2 | 1945–1948 |
American-La France & Foamite Corp. v. City of Phoenix
green
2 sentences1937Where, however, the subject is of statewide concern, and the Legislature has appropriated the field and declared the rule, its declaration is binding throughout the state.” (Italics ours.) We have reaffirmed this principle in American-La France & Foamite Corp. v. Phoenix, 47 Ariz. 133 , 54 Pac. (2d) 258 , Northeast Rapid Transit Co. v. Phoenix, 41 Ariz. 71 , 15 Pac. (2d) 951 , and State v. Jaastad, 43 Ariz. 458 , 32 Pac. (2d) 799 . 1937Where, however, the subject is of statewide concern, and the Legislature has appropriated the field and declared the rule, its declaration is binding throughout the state.” (Italics ours.) We have reaffirmed this principle in American-La France & Foamite Corp. v. Phoenix, 47 Ariz. 133 , 54 Pac. (2d) 258 , Northeast Rapid Transit Co. v. Phoenix, 41 Ariz. 71 , 15 Pac. (2d) 951 , and State v. Jaastad, 43 Ariz. 458 , 32 Pac. (2d) 799 . | 2 | 1937–1948 |
Northeast Rapid Transit Co. v. City of Phoenix
green
2 sentences1937Where, however, the subject is of statewide concern, and the Legislature has appropriated the field and declared the rule, its declaration is binding throughout the state.” (Italics ours.) We have reaffirmed this principle in American-La France & Foamite Corp. v. Phoenix, 47 Ariz. 133 , 54 Pac. (2d) 258 , Northeast Rapid Transit Co. v. Phoenix, 41 Ariz. 71 , 15 Pac. (2d) 951 , and State v. Jaastad, 43 Ariz. 458 , 32 Pac. (2d) 799 . 1937Where, however, the subject is of statewide concern, and the Legislature has appropriated the field and declared the rule, its declaration is binding throughout the state.” (Italics ours.) We have reaffirmed this principle in American-La France & Foamite Corp. v. Phoenix, 47 Ariz. 133 , 54 Pac. (2d) 258 , Northeast Rapid Transit Co. v. Phoenix, 41 Ariz. 71 , 15 Pac. (2d) 951 , and State v. Jaastad, 43 Ariz. 458 , 32 Pac. (2d) 799 . | 2 | 1936–1937 |
State v. Jaastad
green
2 sentences1937Where, however, the subject is of statewide concern, and the Legislature has appropriated the field and declared the rule, its declaration is binding throughout the state.” (Italics ours.) We have reaffirmed this principle in American-La France & Foamite Corp. v. Phoenix, 47 Ariz. 133 , 54 Pac. (2d) 258 , Northeast Rapid Transit Co. v. Phoenix, 41 Ariz. 71 , 15 Pac. (2d) 951 , and State v. Jaastad, 43 Ariz. 458 , 32 Pac. (2d) 799 . 1937Where, however, the subject is of statewide concern, and the Legislature has appropriated the field and declared the rule, its declaration is binding throughout the state.” (Italics ours.) We have reaffirmed this principle in American-La France & Foamite Corp. v. Phoenix, 47 Ariz. 133 , 54 Pac. (2d) 258 , Northeast Rapid Transit Co. v. Phoenix, 41 Ariz. 71 , 15 Pac. (2d) 951 , and State v. Jaastad, 43 Ariz. 458 , 32 Pac. (2d) 799 . | 2 | 1936–1937 |
State Ex Rel Brnovich v. City of tucson/dewit
green
1 sentence2021See infra ¶¶ 56-59; Tucson IV, 242 Ariz. at 606-07 ¶¶ 76-78, 80 (Bolick, J., concurring in part and in the result). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Keller v. State of Arizona
green
2 sentences1949Where, however, the subject is one of state-wide concern, and the Legislature has appropriated the field and declared the rule, its declaration is binding throughout the state.” (Emphasis supplied.) We reaffirmed this rule in the case of Keller v. State, 46 Ariz. 106 , 47 P.2d 442 . 1949Where, however, the subject is one of state-wide concern, and the Legislature has appropriated the field and declared the rule, its declaration is binding throughout the state.” (Emphasis supplied.) We reaffirmed this rule in the case of Keller v. State, 46 Ariz. 106 , 47 P.2d 442 . | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.