correlative rule in California

2024Proc., § 1086) “establishes a standing requirement for writs of mandate.” (Brown v. Crandall (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1, 8 ; see The Assn. of Deputy Dist.

2024Proc., § 1086) “establishes a standing requirement for writs of mandate.” (Brown v. Crandall (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1, 8 ; see The Assn. of Deputy Dist.

2024Proc., §§ 1085–1086.) A ministerial duty “ ‘is an act that a public officer is required to perform in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority and without regard to his own judgment or opinion concerning such act’s propriety or impropriety, when a given state of facts exists.’ ” (Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union High School Dist. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 916 .) The correlative requirement that the party seeking writ 11 relief must be “beneficially interested” (Code Civ.

2024Proc., §§ 1085–1086.) A ministerial duty “ ‘is an act that a public officer is required to perform in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority and without regard to his own judgment or opinion concerning such act’s propriety or impropriety, when a given state of facts exists.’ ” (Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union High School Dist. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 916 .) The correlative requirement that the party seeking writ 11 relief must be “beneficially interested” (Code Civ.

1990Indeed, the principal function of his investigation is to resolve that very ambiguity and establish whether the activity is in fact illegal—to ‘enable the police to quickly determine whether they should allow the suspect to go about his business or hold him to answer to charges.’ (People v. Manis (1969) supra, 268 Cal.App.2d 653, 665 .) The citizen’s undoubted interest in freedom from abuse of this procedure is protected—so far as it is within the law’s power to do so—by the correlative rule that no stop or detention is permissible when the circumstances are not reasonably ‘consistent with cri

1978Indeed, the principal function of his investigation is to resolve that very ambiguity and establish whether the activity is in fact legal or illegal — to "enable the police to quickly determine whether they should allow the suspect to go about his business or hold him to answer charges." ( People v. Manis (1969) supra, 268 Cal. App.2d 653, 665 .) The citizen's undoubted interest in freedom from abuse of this procedure is protected — so far as it is within the law's power to do so — by the correlative rule that no stop or detention is permissible when the circumstances are not reasonably "consi

2024At the same time, our cases recognize the correlative principle that estoppel will not be applied against the government if to do so would effectively nullify ‘a strong rule of policy, adopted for the benefit of the public.’ [Citation.] In [City of Long Beach v.] Mansell [(1970)] 3 Cal.3d 462 , we adopted a balancing approach to accommodate these concerns: ‘The government may be bound by an equitable estoppel in the same manner as a private party when the elements requisite to such an estoppel against a private party are present and, in the considered view of a court of equity, the injustice w

2024In Lentz, the issue was “whether, in an administrative hearing in which the government seeks recoupment from a welfare recipient for overpayments, the recipient may assert equitable estoppel as a defense.” (Lentz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 396 .) In analyzing the issue, the high court drew a distinction between the application of estoppel when purely procedural policy considerations are impacted as opposed to substantive policy considerations.

2024At the same time, our cases recognize the correlative principle that estoppel will not be applied against the government if to do so would effectively nullify ‘a strong rule of policy, adopted for the benefit of the public.’ [Citation.] In [City of Long Beach v.] Mansell [(1970)] 3 Cal.3d 462 , we adopted a balancing approach to accommodate these concerns: ‘The government may be bound by an equitable estoppel in the same manner as a private party when the elements requisite to such an estoppel against a private party are present and, in the considered view of a court of equity, the injustice w

2021(See, e.g., People v. Valenzuela (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 817, 830 .) “[P]ossible innocent explanations for an officer’s observations do not preclude the conclusion that it was reasonable for the officer to suspect that criminal activity was afoot. ‘ “Indeed, the principal function of [police] investigation is to resolve that very ambiguity and establish whether the activity is in fact legal or illegal . . . .” [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 148 .) “The citizen’s undoubted interest in freedom from abuse of this procedure is protected—so far as it is within the la

2021(See, e.g., People v. Valenzuela (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 817, 830 .) “[P]ossible innocent explanations for an officer’s observations do not preclude the conclusion that it was reasonable for the officer to suspect that criminal activity was afoot. ‘ “Indeed, the principal function of [police] investigation is to resolve that very ambiguity and establish whether the activity is in fact legal or illegal . . . .” [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 148 .) “The citizen’s undoubted interest in freedom from abuse of this procedure is protected—so far as it is within the la

2021(See, e.g., People v. Valenzuela (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 817, 830 .) “[P]ossible innocent explanations for an officer’s observations do not preclude the conclusion that it was reasonable for the officer to suspect that criminal activity was afoot. ‘ “Indeed, the principal function of [police] investigation is to resolve that very ambiguity and establish whether the activity is in fact legal or illegal . . . .” [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 148 .) “The citizen’s undoubted interest in freedom from abuse of this procedure is protected—so far as it is within the la

2021In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment.” ’ ” (Suff, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1053 .) Here, the trial court denied defendant’s suppression motion concurrent with the preliminary hearing determination.

1980This principle was observed in People v. Tillery (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 975 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 650 ], in which police officers having reasonable and probable cause to arrest a defendant, arrested him in the driveway of a home after asking him to step outside.

1980This principle was observed in People v. Tillery (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 975 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 650 ], in which police officers having reasonable and probable cause to arrest a defendant, arrested him in the driveway of a home after asking him to step outside.

1962(Shaw v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 50 Cal.2d 153 [ 323 P.2d 391 ].) In any event the impropriety of such an instruction is obvious; “the family relationship standing alone is not sufficient to convert family activities into joint enterprises for the purposes of imputing negligence.” (Flores v. Brown, 39 Cal.2d 622, 630 [ 248 P.2d 922 ].) Appellants also complain that the trial judge instructed on the duty of a supplier of chattels without giving the correlative instruction on the duty of a user of chattels.

1962(Shaw v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 50 Cal.2d 153 [ 323 P.2d 391 ].) In any event the impropriety of such an instruction is obvious; “the family relationship standing alone is not sufficient to convert family activities into joint enterprises for the purposes of imputing negligence.” (Flores v. Brown, 39 Cal.2d 622, 630 [ 248 P.2d 922 ].) Appellants also complain that the trial judge instructed on the duty of a supplier of chattels without giving the correlative instruction on the duty of a user of chattels.

1962(Shaw v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 50 Cal.2d 153 [ 323 P.2d 391 ].) In any event the impropriety of such an instruction is obvious; “the family relationship standing alone is not sufficient to convert family activities into joint enterprises for the purposes of imputing negligence.” (Flores v. Brown, 39 Cal.2d 622, 630 [ 248 P.2d 922 ].) Appellants also complain that the trial judge instructed on the duty of a supplier of chattels without giving the correlative instruction on the duty of a user of chattels.