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10 California opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Ruizgreen2 sentences2013“It is now settled that psychological opinions based upon personal examination and an analysis of accepted psychological tests . . . may be admitted as character evidence tending to show that an individual was or was not likely to have committed a particular act. . . .” (People v. Ruiz (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1241, 1243-1244 [ 272 Cal.Rptr. 368 ]; see Stoll, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1153 ; Evid. 2013“It is now settled that psychological opinions based upon personal examination and an analysis of accepted psychological tests . . . may be admitted as character evidence tending to show that an individual was or was not likely to have committed a particular act. . . .” (People v. Ruiz (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1241, 1243-1244 [ 272 Cal.Rptr. 368 ]; see Stoll, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1153 ; Evid. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Stollgreen1 sentence2013“It is now settled that psychological opinions based upon personal examination and an analysis of accepted psychological tests . . . may be admitted as character evidence tending to show that an individual was or was not likely to have committed a particular act. . . .” (People v. Ruiz (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1241, 1243-1244 [ 272 Cal.Rptr. 368 ]; see Stoll, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1153 ; Evid. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Echolsgreen2 sentences2001(See People v. Property Listed in Exhibit One, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 9 ; People v. Echols (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 838, 842 [ 188 Cal.Rptr. 328 ].) Such considerations are not apposite here, however, because the County Board based its ruling strictly on the loss of jurisdiction caused by exceeding the statutory time limit, and there is no claim of actual prejudice as the result of the time lapse in rendering the decision. 2001(See People v. Property Listed in Exhibit One, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 9 ; People v. Echols (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 838, 842 [ 188 Cal.Rptr. 328 ].) Such considerations are not apposite here, however, because the County Board based its ruling strictly on the loss of jurisdiction caused by exceeding the statutory time limit, and there is no claim of actual prejudice as the result of the time lapse in rendering the decision. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Bagleygreen2 sentences1998As outlined above, this “favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” (Kyles, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 435 [ 115 S.Ct. at p. 1566 ], fn. omitted; see Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at p. 678 [ 105 S.Ct. at p. 3381 ].) III. 1998As outlined above, this “favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” (Kyles, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 435 [ 115 S.Ct. at p. 1566 ], fn. omitted; see Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at p. 678 [ 105 S.Ct. at p. 3381 ].) III. | 1 | 1 |
Kyles v. Whitleygreen2 sentences1998As outlined above, this “favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” (Kyles, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 435 [ 115 S.Ct. at p. 1566 ], fn. omitted; see Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at p. 678 [ 105 S.Ct. at p. 3381 ].) III. 1998As outlined above, this “favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” (Kyles, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 435 [ 115 S.Ct. at p. 1566 ], fn. omitted; see Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at p. 678 [ 105 S.Ct. at p. 3381 ].) III. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Uhlemanngreen2 sentences1985“Probable cause” is defined as “ ‘such a state of facts as would lead a [person] of ordinary caution or prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused.’ ” (People v. Uhlemann (1973) 9 Cal.3d 662, 667 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 657 , 511 P.2d 609 ].) A charge will not be dismissed for lack of probable cause “if there is some rational ground for assuming the possibility that an offense has been committed and the accused is guilty of it.” (Rideout v. Superior Court (1967) 67 Cal.2d 471, 474 [ 62 Cal.Rptr. 581 , 432 P.2d 197 ].) The parties dispute whether th 1985“Probable cause” is defined as “ ‘such a state of facts as would lead a [person] of ordinary caution or prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused.’ ” (People v. Uhlemann (1973) 9 Cal.3d 662, 667 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 657 , 511 P.2d 609 ].) A charge will not be dismissed for lack of probable cause “if there is some rational ground for assuming the possibility that an offense has been committed and the accused is guilty of it.” (Rideout v. Superior Court (1967) 67 Cal.2d 471, 474 [ 62 Cal.Rptr. 581 , 432 P.2d 197 ].) The parties dispute whether th | 1 | 1 |
Rideout v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1985“Probable cause” is defined as “ ‘such a state of facts as would lead a [person] of ordinary caution or prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused.’ ” (People v. Uhlemann (1973) 9 Cal.3d 662, 667 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 657 , 511 P.2d 609 ].) A charge will not be dismissed for lack of probable cause “if there is some rational ground for assuming the possibility that an offense has been committed and the accused is guilty of it.” (Rideout v. Superior Court (1967) 67 Cal.2d 471, 474 [ 62 Cal.Rptr. 581 , 432 P.2d 197 ].) The parties dispute whether th 1985“Probable cause” is defined as “ ‘such a state of facts as would lead a [person] of ordinary caution or prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused.’ ” (People v. Uhlemann (1973) 9 Cal.3d 662, 667 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 657 , 511 P.2d 609 ].) A charge will not be dismissed for lack of probable cause “if there is some rational ground for assuming the possibility that an offense has been committed and the accused is guilty of it.” (Rideout v. Superior Court (1967) 67 Cal.2d 471, 474 [ 62 Cal.Rptr. 581 , 432 P.2d 197 ].) The parties dispute whether th | 1 | 1 |
Kudokas v. Balkusgreen2 sentences1982(Kosloff v. Castle (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 369, 376 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 308 ]; *920 Kudokas v. Balkus (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 744, 753 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 318 ].) However, the present case is different, since Eldridge had a credible claim to title to 241 acres of the parcel. 1982(Kosloff v. Castle (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 369, 376 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 308 ]; *920 Kudokas v. Balkus (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 744, 753 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 318 ].) However, the present case is different, since Eldridge had a credible claim to title to 241 acres of the parcel. | 1 | 1 |
Kosloff v. Castlegreen2 sentences1982(Kosloff v. Castle (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 369, 376 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 308 ]; *920 Kudokas v. Balkus (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 744, 753 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 318 ].) However, the present case is different, since Eldridge had a credible claim to title to 241 acres of the parcel. 1982(Kosloff v. Castle (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 369, 376 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 308 ]; *920 Kudokas v. Balkus (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 744, 753 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 318 ].) However, the present case is different, since Eldridge had a credible claim to title to 241 acres of the parcel. | 1 | 1 |
Eldridge v. Burnsgreen1 sentence1982We held that the release clause upon which Eldridge relied was valid (Eldridge v. Burns, supra, 76 Cal.App.3d, at p. 426) and that “In view of the state of the law at the time the release clause was prepared we cannot fault the buyer for attempting to enforce the clause according to its literal terms.” (Id., at p. 437, fn. omitted.) Eldridge was not viewed, simply by virtue of his making his claim, as a wrongdoer. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Oregon v. Elstad
green
1 sentence2022And had the detectives continued to resort to these same tactics in their second interview, we would have agreed that these tactics would have continued to “undermine [Yokoi’s] will to invoke his [Miranda] rights.” (Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 317 .) Under that set of facts, Yokoi could have made a credible claim that he hesitated to invoke his Miranda rights for fear of subjecting his sister to arrest and potential harm. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Elvira M. Jimenez v. Madison Area Technical College, Jackye Thomas, Carol Bassett, and William Strycker
green
1 sentence2015College (7th Cir.) 321 F.3d 652, 658 ; Peerless 9 Respondents contend that the causes of action alleged against the Isoms and the Trust in the Second Gamut Suit also lacked merit because they were barred by the statute of limitations, Mark failed to establish a credible claim for damages, Mischelynn did not consent to the actions taken by Mark on Gamut’s behalf, and the complaint did not plead compliance with the statutory prerequisites for bringing a derivative suit. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Montoya
green
1 sentence2014(People v. Montoya (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1139 . 1147-1148.) Kovach reasonably believed, as a matter of trial tactics, that the most credible defense was misidentification. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Fraser
green
1 sentence2008Finally, we consider “the dignitary interest in informing individuals of the nature, grounds, and consequences of the action and in enabling them to present their side of the story before a responsible government official. [Citation.]” (Otto, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 210 .) Considering the question of a defendant’s right to self-representation in proceedings under the SVPA, the appellate court in Fraser, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th 1430 , stated: “[t]he SVPA contains built-in procedural safeguards to protect the dignitary interest, which include the commencement of the proceedings by a petition supp | 1 | 2008–2008 |
People v. Otto
green
1 sentence2008Finally, we consider “the dignitary interest in informing individuals of the nature, grounds, and consequences of the action and in enabling them to present their side of the story before a responsible government official. [Citation.]” (Otto, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 210 .) Considering the question of a defendant’s right to self-representation in proceedings under the SVPA, the appellate court in Fraser, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th 1430 , stated: “[t]he SVPA contains built-in procedural safeguards to protect the dignitary interest, which include the commencement of the proceedings by a petition supp | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Venetsanos v. Zucker, Facher & Zucker
green
2 sentences2007(See Venetsanos v. Zucker, Facher & Zucker (1994) 271 N.J.Super. 459 , 638 A.2d 1333 .) [9] Here, however, plaintiffs have not made a credible claim that a fronting arrangement exists. 2007(See Venetsanos v. Zucker, Facher & Zucker (1994) 271 N.J.Super. 459 , 638 A.2d 1333 .) [9] Here, however, plaintiffs have not made a credible claim that a fronting arrangement exists. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Property Listed in Exhibit One
green
1 sentence2001(See People v. Property Listed in Exhibit One, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 9 ; People v. Echols (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 838, 842 [ 188 Cal.Rptr. 328 ].) Such considerations are not apposite here, however, because the County Board based its ruling strictly on the loss of jurisdiction caused by exceeding the statutory time limit, and there is no claim of actual prejudice as the result of the time lapse in rendering the decision. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Rideout v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence1985“Probable cause” is defined as “ ‘such a state of facts as would lead a [person] of ordinary caution or prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused.’ ” (People v. Uhlemann (1973) 9 Cal.3d 662, 667 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 657 , 511 P.2d 609 ].) A charge will not be dismissed for lack of probable cause “if there is some rational ground for assuming the possibility that an offense has been committed and the accused is guilty of it.” (Rideout v. Superior Court (1967) 67 Cal.2d 471, 474 [ 62 Cal.Rptr. 581 , 432 P.2d 197 ].) The parties dispute whether th | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.