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10 California opinions name it 2 courts 1939–2007 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Central Delta Water Agency v. State Water Resources Control Boardgreen2 sentences1997Bill No. 326 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 23, 1991.) The deletion of that clause confirms our interpretation that section 2938 was not intended to permit enforcement as to rents collected prior to notice, because “[t]he Legislature’s omission of a provision from the final version of a statute which was included in an earlier version ‘constitutes strong evidence that the act as adopted should not be construed to incorporate the original provision. [Citation.]’ ” ('WDT-Winches ter v. Nilsson (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 516, 534 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 511 ], quoting Central Delta Water Agency v. State Water R 1997Bill No. 326 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 23, 1991.) The deletion of that clause confirms our interpretation that section 2938 was not intended to permit enforcement as to rents collected prior to notice, because “[t]he Legislature’s omission of a provision from the final version of a statute which was included in an earlier version ‘constitutes strong evidence that the act as adopted should not be construed to incorporate the original provision. [Citation.]’ ” ('WDT-Winches ter v. Nilsson (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 516, 534 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 511 ], quoting Central Delta Water Agency v. State Water R | 2 | 2 |
In Re Trombleygreen2 sentences1996I, former § 15) which contained an exception for “cases of fraud.” (See In re Trombley (1948) 31 Cal.2d 801, 804 [ 193 P.2d 734 ] (Trombley); Central Delta Water Agency v. State Water Resources Control *1044 Bd. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 621, 639 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 453 ].) The deletion of the exception had no substantive effect and cases interpreting the earlier version are authority for interpreting the present form of the prohibition. 1996I, former § 15) which contained an exception for “cases of fraud.” (See In re Trombley (1948) 31 Cal.2d 801, 804 [ 193 P.2d 734 ] (Trombley); Central Delta Water Agency v. State Water Resources Control *1044 Bd. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 621, 639 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 453 ].) The deletion of the exception had no substantive effect and cases interpreting the earlier version are authority for interpreting the present form of the prohibition. | 2 | 2 |
Kabehie v. Zolandgreen2 sentences2007Berry also cites Kabehie v. Zoland (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 513, 524 [ 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 721 ], which observed that the Legislature’s deletion of a clause from the draft of a statute, “ ‘without more, does not mean that the polar opposite of the clause was enacted . . . .’ ” Kabehie recognized the general principle that the deletion of specific examples initially listed to illustrate the breadth of the statute did not mean those instances were not covered where the provisions governing the statute’s scope remained unchanged. 2007Berry also cites Kabehie v. Zoland (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 513, 524 [ 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 721 ], which observed that the Legislature’s deletion of a clause from the draft of a statute, “ ‘without more, does not mean that the polar opposite of the clause was enacted . . . .’ ” Kabehie recognized the general principle that the deletion of specific examples initially listed to illustrate the breadth of the statute did not mean those instances were not covered where the provisions governing the statute’s scope remained unchanged. | 1 | 1 |
WDT-WINCHESTER v. Nilssongreen2 sentences1997Bill No. 326 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 23, 1991.) The deletion of that clause confirms our interpretation that section 2938 was not intended to permit enforcement as to rents collected prior to notice, because “[t]he Legislature’s omission of a provision from the final version of a statute which was included in an earlier version ‘constitutes strong evidence that the act as adopted should not be construed to incorporate the original provision. [Citation.]’ ” ('WDT-Winches ter v. Nilsson (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 516, 534 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 511 ], quoting Central Delta Water Agency v. State Water R 1997Bill No. 326 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 23, 1991.) The deletion of that clause confirms our interpretation that section 2938 was not intended to permit enforcement as to rents collected prior to notice, because “[t]he Legislature’s omission of a provision from the final version of a statute which was included in an earlier version ‘constitutes strong evidence that the act as adopted should not be construed to incorporate the original provision. [Citation.]’ ” ('WDT-Winches ter v. Nilsson (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 516, 534 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 511 ], quoting Central Delta Water Agency v. State Water R | 1 | 1 |
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences1993Article I, section 10, of the California Constitution (added Nov. 5, 1974) provides as relevant: “A person may not be imprisoned in a civil action for debt or tort, . . .” This provision derives in part from former article I, section 15 (repealed Nov. 5, 1974), which contained an express exception for “cases of fraud.” (See In re Trombley (1948) 31 Cal.2d 801, 804 [ 193 P.2d 734 ]; People v. Williams (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 394, 397 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 550 ].) The deletion of this exception by the voters’ enactment of Proposition 7 in 1974 had no substantive effect; thus the case law construing the e 1993Article I, section 10, of the California Constitution (added Nov. 5, 1974) provides as relevant: “A person may not be imprisoned in a civil action for debt or tort, . . .” This provision derives in part from former article I, section 15 (repealed Nov. 5, 1974), which contained an express exception for “cases of fraud.” (See In re Trombley (1948) 31 Cal.2d 801, 804 [ 193 P.2d 734 ]; People v. Williams (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 394, 397 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 550 ].) The deletion of this exception by the voters’ enactment of Proposition 7 in 1974 had no substantive effect; thus the case law construing the e | 1 | 1 |
Kash Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences1981All references are to the present version, since “[u]nder settled principles, [that] version ... is the relevant legislation for purposes of this appeal. ‘It is.. .an established rule of law that on appeals from judgments granting or denying injunctions, the law to be applied is that which is current at the time of judgment in the appellate court.’” (Kash Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1977) 19 Cal.3d 294, 306, fn. 6 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 53 , 562 P.2d 1302 ].) 3 The Municipal Code specifies anatomical areas and sexual activities as follows: “‘Specified Anatomical Areas’ include the follo 1981All references are to the present version, since “[u]nder settled principles, [that] version ... is the relevant legislation for purposes of this appeal. ‘It is.. .an established rule of law that on appeals from judgments granting or denying injunctions, the law to be applied is that which is current at the time of judgment in the appellate court.’” (Kash Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1977) 19 Cal.3d 294, 306, fn. 6 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 53 , 562 P.2d 1302 ].) 3 The Municipal Code specifies anatomical areas and sexual activities as follows: “‘Specified Anatomical Areas’ include the follo | 1 | 1 |
People v. Califrogreen2 sentences1957(People v. Califro, 120 Cal.App.2d 504, 514 [ 261 P.2d 332 ], hearing denied, certiorari denied, 347 U.S. 959 [ 74 S.Ct. 708 , 98 L.Ed. 1103 ].) One further matter deserves attention. 1957(People v. Califro, 120 Cal.App.2d 504, 514 [ 261 P.2d 332 ], hearing denied, certiorari denied, 347 U.S. 959 [ 74 S.Ct. 708 , 98 L.Ed. 1103 ].) One further matter deserves attention. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ramseygreen2 sentences1957(People v. Ramsey, 83 Cal.App.2d 707, 723-724 [ 189 P.2d 802 ].) While pregnancy is no longer an issue in an abortion case in Anew of the deletion of such requirement from Penal Code, section 274, by the 1935 amendment, it is a circumstance which may be proved, if it exists. 1957(People v. Ramsey, 83 Cal.App.2d 707, 723-724 [ 189 P.2d 802 ].) While pregnancy is no longer an issue in an abortion case in Anew of the deletion of such requirement from Penal Code, section 274, by the 1935 amendment, it is a circumstance which may be proved, if it exists. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Davis v. Dennis B.
green
1 sentence2002Accordingly, we reject the notion that whether a place is a “public place” within the meaning of subdivision (e)(1), is determinable by some bright-line rule, or that a single factor is dispositive, *105 and look instead to the totality of the facts and circumstances presented in the record, viewed in light of the usual rules on appeal (In re Dennis B., supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 697 ), to determine whether there was sufficient evidence satisfying the “public place” element of subdivision (e)(1), in the present case. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
MDFC Loan Corp. v. Greenbrier Plaza Partners
green
2 sentences1997Bill No. 326 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 23, 1991.) The deletion of that clause confirms our interpretation that section 2938 was not intended to permit enforcement as to rents collected prior to notice, because “[t]he Legislature’s omission of a provision from the final version of a statute which was included in an earlier version ‘constitutes strong evidence that the act as adopted should not be construed to incorporate the original provision. [Citation.]’ ” ('WDT-Winches ter v. Nilsson (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 516, 534 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 511 ], quoting Central Delta Water Agency v. State Water R 1997Bill No. 326 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 23, 1991.) The deletion of that clause confirms our interpretation that section 2938 was not intended to permit enforcement as to rents collected prior to notice, because “[t]he Legislature’s omission of a provision from the final version of a statute which was included in an earlier version ‘constitutes strong evidence that the act as adopted should not be construed to incorporate the original provision. [Citation.]’ ” ('WDT-Winches ter v. Nilsson (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 516, 534 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 511 ], quoting Central Delta Water Agency v. State Water R | 1 | 1997–1997 |
People v. Bishopp
green
2 sentences1993(People v. Bishopp (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d Supp. 8 , 12-15 and fn. 6 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 923 ].) Section 13396.5, subdivision (e), as stated ante, makes “failing to pay a fee established under this section when so requested by the state board” a misdemeanor subject to civil liability. 1993(People v. Bishopp (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d Supp. 8 , 12-15 and fn. 6 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 923 ].) Section 13396.5, subdivision (e), as stated ante, makes “failing to pay a fee established under this section when so requested by the state board” a misdemeanor subject to civil liability. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Kaisa v. Chang
green
2 sentences1984For example, the Kaisa court reviewed the argument that in considering eligibility and the amount of assistance payments due, “income must meet all three requirements: (1) actually available; (2) for current use; and (3) on a regular basis.” The court concluded that “Since a tax refund can be expected, at best, once a year, it is not available on a regular basis and, therefore, cannot be considered as income.” (Italics added, 396 F.Supp. at p. 377 , fn. omitted.) The deletion of the requirement that income be available “on a regular basis” appears related to the broader change effected by Cong 1984For example, the Kaisa court reviewed the argument that in *766 considering eligibility and the amount of assistance payments due, "income must meet all three requirements: (1) actually available; (2) for current use; and (3) on a regular basis." The court concluded that "Since a tax refund can be expected, at best, once a year, it is not available on a regular basis and, therefore, cannot be considered as income." (Italics added, 396 F. Supp. at p. 377 , fn. omitted.) The deletion of the requirement that income be available "on a regular basis" appears related to the broader change effected b | 1 | 1984–1984 |
cluster 301239
green
1 sentence1974I am drawn to the conclusion that nothing less than rewriting the policy would accomplish that result.” *150 Similarly, in Ranger Insurance Company v. Culberson (5th Cir. 1971) 454 F.2d 857 , the court specifically noted the broadening effect on coverage by the deletion of a standard exclusion, and held that a person may be insured against activities otherwise prohibited by the federal air regulations. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp.
green
2 sentences1957(People v. Califro, 120 Cal.App.2d 504, 514 [ 261 P.2d 332 ], hearing denied, certiorari denied, 347 U.S. 959 [ 74 S.Ct. 708 , 98 L.Ed. 1103 ].) One further matter deserves attention. 1957(People v. Califro, 120 Cal.App.2d 504, 514 [ 261 P.2d 332 ], hearing denied, certiorari denied, 347 U.S. 959 [ 74 S.Ct. 708 , 98 L.Ed. 1103 ].) One further matter deserves attention. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Crandall v. Cranor
neutral
1 sentence1957(People v. Califro, 120 Cal.App.2d 504, 514 [ 261 P.2d 332 ], hearing denied, certiorari denied, 347 U.S. 959 [ 74 S.Ct. 708 , 98 L.Ed. 1103 ].) One further matter deserves attention. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Couts v. Sperry Flour Co.
green
2 sentences1939The statutory implied warranty of fitness does not apply to a sale where the seller expressly disclaims liability for the quality of the thing sold. (22 Cal. Jur. 968.) In Couts v. Sperry Flour Co., 85 Cal. App. 156 [ 259 Pac. 108 ], a case involving the alleged warranty of barley' sold for seed purposes, the trial court found that the seller expressly refused to warrant the seed and the reviewing court said that there was “no room for any question of an implied warranty in connection with the sale”. 1939The statutory implied warranty of fitness does not apply to a sale where the seller expressly disclaims liability for the quality of the thing sold. (22 Cal. Jur. 968.) In Couts v. Sperry Flour Co., 85 Cal. App. 156 [ 259 Pac. 108 ], a case involving the alleged warranty of barley' sold for seed purposes, the trial court found that the seller expressly refused to warrant the seed and the reviewing court said that there was “no room for any question of an implied warranty in connection with the sale”. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.