due process-based bar in California

2020(Hicks, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 326, rev. granted.) The first strand, starting with Griffin, supra, 351 U.S. 12, 17 [ 100 L.Ed. 891 ], “secures a due process-based right of access to the courts.” (Hicks, p. 325.) This strand of precedent, however, “does not dictate Dueñas’s bar on imposing fees because the imposition of assessments, fines and fees does not deny a criminal defendant access to the courts.” (Id. at p. 326.) The second strand of due process precedent relied upon by the Dueñas court “erects a due process-based bar to incarceration based on the failure to pay criminal penalties

2020(Id. at p. 325.) The first, the court explained, concerned a line of precedent involving “a due process-based right of access to the courts.” (Ibid.; see Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1166 .) And the second, the court went on, concerned case precedent involving “a due process-based bar to incarceration based on the failure to pay criminal penalties when that failure is due to a criminal defendant’s indigence rather than contumaciousness.” (Hicks, at p. 325; see Dueñas, at p. 1167.) But the court found neither of these “two strands of due process precedent . . . dictate Dueñas’s rule.” (H

2017Second, redesignating the Aranda / Bruton doctrine-at least as applied to nontestimonial statements-as a due process-based doctrine instead of a confrontation clause-based doctrine would run afoul of the general maxim of constitutional jurisprudence that "[w]here a particular Amendment 'provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, 'that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of 'substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." ( Albright v. Oliver (1994) 510 U.S. 266 , 273, 114 S.Ct. 807 , 127 L.

2017Second, redesignating the Aranda / Bruton doctrine-at least as applied to nontestimonial statements-as a due process-based doctrine instead of a confrontation clause-based doctrine would run afoul of the general maxim of constitutional jurisprudence that "[w]here a particular Amendment 'provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, 'that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of 'substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." ( Albright v. Oliver (1994) 510 U.S. 266 , 273, 114 S.Ct. 807 , 127 L.

2020(Hicks, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 326, rev. granted.) The first strand, starting with Griffin, supra, 351 U.S. 12, 17 [ 100 L.Ed. 891 ], “secures a due process-based right of access to the courts.” (Hicks, p. 325.) This strand of precedent, however, “does not dictate Dueñas’s bar on imposing fees because the imposition of assessments, fines and fees does not deny a criminal defendant access to the courts.” (Id. at p. 326.) The second strand of due process precedent relied upon by the Dueñas court “erects a due process-based bar to incarceration based on the failure to pay criminal penalties

2019(See People v. Caceres (2019) ___ Cal.App.5th ___ [declining to apply Dueñas’s “broad holding” beyond its “unique facts”].) “To reach its holding, Dueñas wove together two distinct strands of due process precedent. [¶] The first strand secures a due process-based right of access to the courts . . . . requir[ing] courts to waive court costs and fees that would otherwise preclude criminal and civil litigants from prosecuting or defending lawsuits or from having an appellate court review the propriety of any judgment. . . . [¶] The second strand erects a due process-based bar to incarceration bas

2020(Hicks, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 326, rev. granted.) The first strand, starting with Griffin, supra, 351 U.S. 12, 17 [ 100 L.Ed. 891 ], “secures a due process-based right of access to the courts.” (Hicks, p. 325.) This strand of precedent, however, “does not dictate Dueñas’s bar on imposing fees because the imposition of assessments, fines and fees does not deny a criminal defendant access to the courts.” (Id. at p. 326.) The second strand of due process precedent relied upon by the Dueñas court “erects a due process-based bar to incarceration based on the failure to pay criminal penalties

2020(Id. at p. 325.) The first, the court explained, concerned a line of precedent involving “a due process-based right of access to the courts.” (Ibid.; see Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1166 .) And the second, the court went on, concerned case precedent involving “a due process-based bar to incarceration based on the failure to pay criminal penalties when that failure is due to a criminal defendant’s indigence rather than contumaciousness.” (Hicks, at p. 325; see Dueñas, at p. 1167.) But the court found neither of these “two strands of due process precedent . . . dictate Dueñas’s rule.” (H

2020(Id. at p. 325.) The first, the court explained, concerned a line of precedent involving “a due process-based right of access to the courts.” (Ibid.; see Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1166 .) And the second, the court went on, concerned case precedent involving “a due process-based bar to incarceration based on the failure to pay criminal penalties when that failure is due to a criminal defendant’s indigence rather than contumaciousness.” (Hicks, at p. 325; see Dueñas, at p. 1167.) But the court found neither of these “two strands of due process precedent . . . dictate Dueñas’s rule.” (H

2019(In re Antazo (1970) 3 Cal.3d 100, 103-104, 113-114 (Antazo); Williams v. Ill. (1970) 399 U.S. 235, 241 (Williams); Tate v. Short (1971) 401 U.S. 395, 396-397 ; Bearden v. Georgia (1983) 461 U.S. 660, 661-662 (Bearden).) B.

1992He concedes that a due process-based claim was considered and rejected in People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 204-205 [ 222 Cal. Rptr. 184 , 711 P.2d 480 ], in which we found no support in decisions of the United States Supreme Court for the suggestion that due process requires impanelment of a separate jury to determine the penalty in a capital case.

1992He concedes that a due process-based claim was considered and rejected in People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 204-205 [ 222 Cal. Rptr. 184 , 711 P.2d 480 ], in which we found no support in decisions of the United States Supreme Court for the suggestion that due process requires impanelment of a separate jury to determine the penalty in a capital case.