efforts challenge in California

2014I trust I have not done that. [¶] If anything I have done or said has seemed to so indicate, you will disregard it and you must reach your own conclusions on your own.” (See CALJIC No. 17.30; People v. Franklin (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 18, 24 [cautionary instruction of CALJIC No. 17.30 sufficiently protects defendant “from any prejudice that may have remotely occurred” as a result of court’s improper conduct].) 11 specific testimony helpful to the prosecution, while repeatedly and independently balking [blocking?] the efforts of defense counsel to elicit testimony helpful or exculpatory to the def

2012(Gilmore, supra, at p. 320 [whether the defendant exercised best efforts under the circumstances was a factual question to be decided by the trier of fact]; accord, Triple-A Baseball Club v. Northeastern Baseball (1st Cir. 1987) 832 F.2d 214 , 225 [best efforts “cannot be defined in terms of a fixed formula . . . [but] varies with the facts and the field of law involved”]; Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp. (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 454 F.Supp. 258, 266 , affd. (2d Cir. 1979) 601 F.2d 609 .) Additionally, a best efforts clause must be reconciled with other clauses in the contract to the extent possible.

2010The courts ruled the denial orders did not prejudice the parents' right or interest to reunify. ( Daniel D ., at p. 1835; Vanessa Z , at p. 261.) Following this same assumption, the appellate court in Cesar V. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1035 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 ] ( Cesar V. ), held a parent lacked appellate standing to challenge a court's ruling on a relative placement issue.

2010The courts ruled the denial orders did not prejudice the parents' right or interest to reunify. ( Daniel D ., at p. 1835; Vanessa Z , at p. 261.) Following this same assumption, the appellate court in Cesar V. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1035 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 ] ( Cesar V. ), held a parent lacked appellate standing to challenge a court's ruling on a relative placement issue.

2010(See In re Daniel D. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1823, 1835 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 245 ]; In re Vanessa Z. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 258, 261 [ 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 313 ].) In these cases, appellate courts rejected the parents' efforts to challenge orders denying relatives de facto parent status when reunification was no longer the *125 goal of the dependency proceedings.

2010(See In re Daniel D. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1823, 1835 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 245 ]; In re Vanessa Z. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 258, 261 [ 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 313 ].) In these cases, appellate courts rejected the parents' efforts to challenge orders denying relatives de facto parent status when reunification was no longer the *125 goal of the dependency proceedings.

2010(See In re Daniel D. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1823, 1835 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 245 ]; In re Vanessa Z. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 258, 261 [ 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 313 ].) In these cases, appellate courts rejected the parents' efforts to challenge orders denying relatives de facto parent status when reunification was no longer the *125 goal of the dependency proceedings.

2010(See In re Daniel D. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1823, 1835 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 245 ]; In re Vanessa Z. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 258, 261 [ 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 313 ].) In these cases, appellate courts rejected the parents' efforts to challenge orders denying relatives de facto parent status when reunification was no longer the *125 goal of the dependency proceedings.

2009Defendant acknowledges that this court long ago recognized that the circumstance that a court “had prepared a written statement of reasons in advance of the hearing” on the automatic motion to modify the verdict “does not mean that the court’s views as expressed in the writing were other than tentative or that the argument was a pointless ritual,” because “[t]o do so does not mean that the court is unalterably bound by the writing or that it will not amend or even discard the writing if counsel’s arguments persuade the court that its tentative views were incorrect.” (People v. Hayes (1990) 52

2009Defendant acknowledges that this court long ago recognized that the circumstance that a court “had prepared a written statement of reasons in advance of the hearing” on the automatic motion to modify the verdict “does not mean that the court’s views as expressed in the writing were other than tentative or that the argument was a pointless ritual,” because “[t]o do so does not mean that the court is unalterably bound by the writing or that it will not amend or even discard the writing if counsel’s arguments persuade the court that its tentative views were incorrect.” (People v. Hayes (1990) 52

2009Defendant acknowledges that this court long ago recognized that the circumstance that a court “had prepared a written statement of reasons in advance of the hearing” on the automatic motion to modify the verdict “does not mean that the court’s views as expressed in the writing were other than tentative or that the argument was a pointless ritual,” because “[t]o do so does not mean that the court is unalterably bound by the writing or that it will not amend or even discard the writing if counsel’s arguments persuade the court that its tentative views were incorrect.” (People v. Hayes (1990) 52

2009Defendant acknowledges that this court long ago recognized that the circumstance that a court “had prepared a written statement of reasons in advance of the hearing” on the automatic motion to modify the verdict “does not mean that the court’s views as expressed in the writing were other than tentative or that the argument was a pointless ritual,” because “[t]o do so does not mean that the court is unalterably bound by the writing or that it will not amend or even discard the writing if counsel’s arguments persuade the court that its tentative views were incorrect.” (People v. Hayes (1990) 52

2002No. 81-54 (Sept. 14, 1981) pp. 7-8; see maj. opn, ante, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 282 , 41 P.3d at p. 98 .) The city attorney's opinion letter, together with the City's concessions, undercut the City's efforts here to claim that the HCO was a critical component of the determination whether tourist use lawfully existed as a permitted conditional use under the City Planning Code.

2002No. 81-54 (Sept. 14, 1981) pp. 7-8; see maj. opn, ante, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 282 , 41 P.3d at p. 98 .) The city attorney's opinion letter, together with the City's concessions, undercut the City's efforts here to claim that the HCO was a critical component of the determination whether tourist use lawfully existed as a permitted conditional use under the City Planning Code.

1968The court held that where such extrinsic evidence is in conflict, any reasonable construction by the trial court will be sustained, citing Collins v. Home Sav. & Loan Assn., 205 Cal.App.2d 86, 101 [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 817 ]. 3 It is worthy oí note that during the period Derman’s “Beat The Odds” program was being telecast weekly by KTLA, but the contract was terminated by plaintiff within a week after it was informed that Derman denied liability under the February 1, 1962, agreement.

1968The court held that where such extrinsic evidence is in conflict, any reasonable construction by the trial court will be sustained, citing Collins v. Home Sav. & Loan Assn., 205 Cal.App.2d 86, 101 [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 817 ]. 3 It is worthy oí note that during the period Derman’s “Beat The Odds” program was being telecast weekly by KTLA, but the contract was terminated by plaintiff within a week after it was informed that Derman denied liability under the February 1, 1962, agreement.