8 Texas opinions name it 1 courts 1929–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Herrmann Holdings Ltd. v. Lucent Technologies Inc.green2 sentences2015See id. 2015Thus, Chrysler, citing Herrmann Holdings, 302 F.3d at 559 , argues that the “analysis ends” and that whether Chrysler used its best efforts is irrelevant. | 4 | 4 |
T. CO METALS, LLC v. Dempsey Pipe & Supply, Inc.green2 sentences2015See, e.g., T.Co Metals, L.L.C. v. Dempsey Pipe & Supply, Inc., 592 F.3d 329, 341 (2nd Cir.2010) (citing White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 10–2 (5th ed. 2006) (noting “reasonable persons often differ whether an item of damage is ‘consequential’ ”); Applied Data Processing, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 394 F.Supp. 504, 508 (D.Conn.1975) (discussing Michigan law and stating neither in Michigan nor elsewhere does the term “consequential damages” have a clearly established meaning); see also Glenn D. 2012See, e.g. , T.Co Metals, L.L.C. v. Dempsey Pipe & Supply, Inc. , 592 F.3d 329, 341 (2nd Cir. 2010) (citing White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 10-2 (5th ed. 2006) (noting “reasonable persons often differ whether an item of damage is ‘consequential’”); Applied Data Processing, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp. , 394 F. Supp. 504, 508 (D. | 2 | 2 |
Applied Data Processing, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp.green2 sentences2015See, e.g., T.Co Metals, L.L.C. v. Dempsey Pipe & Supply, Inc., 592 F.3d 329, 341 (2nd Cir.2010) (citing White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 10–2 (5th ed. 2006) (noting “reasonable persons often differ whether an item of damage is ‘consequential’ ”); Applied Data Processing, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 394 F.Supp. 504, 508 (D.Conn.1975) (discussing Michigan law and stating neither in Michigan nor elsewhere does the term “consequential damages” have a clearly established meaning); see also Glenn D. 2012See, e.g. , T.Co Metals, L.L.C. v. Dempsey Pipe & Supply, Inc. , 592 F.3d 329, 341 (2nd Cir. 2010) (citing White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 10-2 (5th ed. 2006) (noting “reasonable persons often differ whether an item of damage is ‘consequential’”); Applied Data Processing, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp. , 394 F. Supp. 504, 508 (D. | 2 | 2 |
Siderius, Inc. v. Wallace Co., Inc.green2 sentences2015See Siderius, Inc. v. Wallace Co., 583 S.W.2d 852, 864 (Tex.Civ.App.- Tyler 1979, no writ). 17 The decision of the federal district court to return the proceedings regarding validity of the protest waiver to the Commission seems prescient, considering that it predated by less than a year the legislature's amendment of the TMVC to give the Commission original, exclusive jurisdiction over issues regarding sale and distribution and other issues governed by the Code and to require abatement of a suit seeking DTPA and other damages pending an administrative determination of Code-based issues that w 2012See Siderius, Inc. v. Wallace Co. , 583 S.W.2d 852, 864 (Tex. Civ. | 2 | 2 |
Aquila Southwest Pipeline, Inc. v. Harmony Exploration, Inc.green2 sentences2015Pipeline, Inc. v. Harmony Exploration, Inc., 48 S.W.3d 225 , 233–34 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. denied) (interpreting Section 2.306(b) of UCC, which expressly imposes a best efforts standard upon the parties to a contract for exclusive dealing in goods). 16 That Chrysler agreed to an extension of time for Manuel to establish and open the dealership when Meador's protest was not resolved by that time is further indication that time was of the essence. 2012Pipeline, Inc. v. Harmony Exploration, Inc., 48 S.W.3d 225, 233-34 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. denied) (interpreting Section 2.306(b) of UCC, which expressly imposes a best efforts standard upon the parties to a contract for exclusive dealing in goods). 16 . | 1 | 4 |
Foley v. Parliergreen2 sentences2015Laws 313 , 327). 18 As mentioned above, the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law do not expressly state that Chrysler breached the AESSA (as opposed to the Settlement Agreement), but only the AESSA contains a best efforts clause. 19 Out-of-pocket expenses are reliance damages designed “to reimburse the plaintiff for expenditures made toward execution of the contract, in order to restore the status quo before the contract.” See Foley v. Parlier, 68 S.W.3d 870 , 884–85 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (contrasting reliance or out-of-pocket damages with expectancy or benefit-o 2012Laws 313 , 327). [18] As mentioned above, the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law do not expressly state that Chrysler breached the AESSA (as opposed to the Settlement Agreement), but only the AESSA contains a best efforts clause. [19] Out-of-pocket expenses are reliance damages designed “to reimburse the plaintiff for expenditures made toward execution of the contract, in order to restore the status quo before the contract.” See Foley v. Parlier , 68 S.W.3d 870 , 884–85 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (contrasting reliance or out-of-pocket damages with expectancy or ben | 1 | 3 |
Malatt v. C & R REFRIGERATIONgreen1 sentence2012See, e.g., Malatt v. C&R Refrigeration, 179 S.W.3d 152, 158 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005, no pet.) (holding best efforts clause did not require actual sale of machine but implying reasonable time); Aquila Sw. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
CKB & Associates, Inc. v. Moore McCormack Petroleum, Inc.
green
2 sentences2022The court ultimately concluded that CKB breached the best efforts clause because it made no efforts to meet the production standards specified in the contract, stating: “As a matter of law, no efforts cannot be best efforts.” Id. 2015Chrysler, quoting from the Dallas court of appeals opinion in CKB, specifically complains that the best efforts clause in this case lacks measurable goals and guidelines. 809 S.W.2d at 580 . | 5 | 2012–2022 |
Maness v. Meyers
green
2 sentences2016To the extent Simon is accusing the District Attorney’s office of having violated the disqualification order merely by seeking reconsideration of it, we note that his disqualification motion (and, in turn, the prior order granting 22 Id. 23 Id. at 459 . 24 Id. 8 it) was addressed to the office’s “prosecuting [of] the case,” not the district attorney’s efforts to challenge the order itself.25 But Simon’s argument also fails for a more fundamental reason—even if the District Attorney’s office lacked “standing” or proper authority to file its motion requesting reconsideration of the disqualificat 2016To the extent Simon is accusing the District Attorney’s office of having violated the disqualification order merely by seeking reconsideration of it, we note that his disqualification motion (and, in turn, the prior order granting 22 Id. 23 Id. at 459 . 24 Id. 8 it) was addressed to the office’s “prosecuting [of] the case,” not the district attorney’s efforts to challenge the order itself.25 But Simon’s argument also fails for a more fundamental reason—even if the District Attorney’s office lacked “standing” or proper authority to file its motion requesting reconsideration of the disqualificat | 1 | 2016–2016 |
DaimlerChrysler Motors Co., LLC v. Manuel
green
1 sentence2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 18 DaimlerChrysler Motors Co., LLC v. Manuel, 362 S.W.3d 160 (2012) The trial court granted summary judgments to Chrysler on most of Manuel's causes of action, including breach of contract, but on the morning of trial on damages, the trial judge announced during opening statements that he would hear evidence regarding breach of the best efforts clause by Chrysler. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Montgomery v. State
green
1 sentence2010Id. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Cooley v. Miller
neutral
1 sentence1929The decision is broad enough to include all defenses of the husband of the homestead, although in previous eases by the Supreme Court the rule had been qualified as stated in the case of Cooley v. Miller, 228 S. W. 1085 , by the Commission of Appeals, as follows: “In determining whether the wife’s homestead interest alone renders her a necessary party to an action affecting property impressed with the homestead exemption, the test laid down by our Supreme Court is whether the plea of homestead would in itself be a defense to the suit”—citing Jergens v. Schiele, 61 Tex. 255 ; City of San Antoni | 1 | 1929–1929 |
City of San Antonio v. Berry
green
2 sentences1929The decision is broad enough to include all defenses of the husband of the homestead, although in previous eases by the Supreme Court the rule had been qualified as stated in the case of Cooley v. Miller, 228 S. W. 1085 , by the Commission of Appeals, as follows: “In determining whether the wife’s homestead interest alone renders her a necessary party to an action affecting property impressed with the homestead exemption, the test laid down by our Supreme Court is whether the plea of homestead would in itself be a defense to the suit”—citing Jergens v. Schiele, 61 Tex. 255 ; City of San Antoni 1929The decision is broad enough to include all defenses of the husband of the homestead, although in previous eases by the Supreme Court the rule had been qualified as stated in the case of Cooley v. Miller, 228 S. W. 1085 , by the Commission of Appeals, as follows: “In determining whether the wife’s homestead interest alone renders her a necessary party to an action affecting property impressed with the homestead exemption, the test laid down by our Supreme Court is whether the plea of homestead would in itself be a defense to the suit”—citing Jergens v. Schiele, 61 Tex. 255 ; City of San Antoni | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Jergens v. Schiele
green
1 sentence1929The decision is broad enough to include all defenses of the husband of the homestead, although in previous eases by the Supreme Court the rule had been qualified as stated in the case of Cooley v. Miller, 228 S. W. 1085 , by the Commission of Appeals, as follows: “In determining whether the wife’s homestead interest alone renders her a necessary party to an action affecting property impressed with the homestead exemption, the test laid down by our Supreme Court is whether the plea of homestead would in itself be a defense to the suit”—citing Jergens v. Schiele, 61 Tex. 255 ; City of San Antoni | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.