fair opportunity challenge in California

2006Having done so, the [taxing authority] may retain the tax appropriately levied upon [the taxpayer] pursuant to this reformulated scheme because this retention would deprive [the taxpayer] of its property pursuant to a tax scheme that is valid under the Commerce Clause.” (Id. at pp. 39-40.) “More specifically, the [taxing authority] may cure the invalidity of the [tax] by refunding to [the taxpayer] the difference between the tax it paid and the tax it would have been assessed were it extended the same [preferential treatment] that its competitors actually received.” 9 (Id. at p. 40; accord, Fu

2006Having done so, the [taxing authority] may retain the tax appropriately levied upon [the taxpayer] pursuant to this reformulated scheme because this retention would deprive [the taxpayer] of its property pursuant to a tax scheme that is valid under the Commerce Clause.” (Id. at pp. 39-40.) “More specifically, the [taxing authority] may cure the invalidity of the [tax] by refunding to [the taxpayer] the difference between the tax it paid and the tax it would have been assessed were it extended the same [preferential treatment] that its competitors actually received.” 9 (Id. at p. 40; accord, Fu

2006(See, e.g., Tyler Pipe Industries v. Dept. of Revenue (1987) 483 U.S. 232, 252-253 [ 97 L.Ed.2d 199 , 107 S.Ct. 2810 ].) The parameters of state-afforded relief were made clear in McKesson, (1990) 496 U.S. 18 [ 110 L.Ed.2d 17 , 110 S.Ct. 2238 ] (McKesson), where the Supreme Court held: “To satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause,... the State must provide taxpayers with, not only a fair opportunity to challenge the accuracy and legal validity of their tax obligation, but also a ‘clear and certain remedy,’ [citation], for any erroneous or unlawful tax collection to ensure that the op

2006(See, e.g., Tyler Pipe Industries v. Dept. of Revenue (1987) 483 U.S. 232, 252-253 [ 97 L.Ed.2d 199 , 107 S.Ct. 2810 ].) The parameters of state-afforded relief were made clear in McKesson, (1990) 496 U.S. 18 [ 110 L.Ed.2d 17 , 110 S.Ct. 2238 ] (McKesson), where the Supreme Court held: “To satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause,... the State must provide taxpayers with, not only a fair opportunity to challenge the accuracy and legal validity of their tax obligation, but also a ‘clear and certain remedy,’ [citation], for any erroneous or unlawful tax collection to ensure that the op

2003(Cf. Henley Drilling Co. v. McGee (1st Cir. 1994) 36 F.3d 143, 146, fn. 5 [declining to address the question whether the fair opportunity doctrine ought to apply under any circumstances to Carriage of Goods by Sea Act litigation]; Carman Tool & Abrasives, Inc. v. Evergreen Lines, supra, 871 F.2d at p. 900, fn. 6 [questioning whether the fair opportunity requirement ought to apply at all in Carriage of Goods by Sea Act lawsuits involving commercially knowledgeable litigants].) The inconsistent application of federal law arises as to whether a mere reference in the bill of lading to the Carriage

2003(Cf. Henley Drilling Co. v. McGee (1st Cir. 1994) 36 F.3d 143, 146, fn. 5 [declining to address the question whether the fair opportunity doctrine ought to apply under any circumstances to Carriage of Goods by Sea Act litigation]; Carman Tool & Abrasives, Inc. v. Evergreen Lines, supra, 871 F.2d at p. 900, fn. 6 [questioning whether the fair opportunity requirement ought to apply at all in Carriage of Goods by Sea Act lawsuits involving commercially knowledgeable litigants].) The inconsistent application of federal law arises as to whether a mere reference in the bill of lading to the Carriage

2003Services, Inc. v. Gateway Freight Services (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 486, 492 [ 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 893 ].) The fair opportunity doctrine was explained by the Second Circuit as follows: “Under the ‘fair opportunity’ doctrine, a shipper must have had a ‘fair opportunity’ to declare a higher liability value for its cargo in order for a carrier to limit its liability under COGSA.

2003Services, Inc. v. Gateway Freight Services (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 486, 492 [ 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 893 ].) The fair opportunity doctrine was explained by the Second Circuit as follows: “Under the ‘fair opportunity’ doctrine, a shipper must have had a ‘fair opportunity’ to declare a higher liability value for its cargo in order for a carrier to limit its liability under COGSA.

2003Co. v. Nothnagle (1953) 346 U.S. 128, 135-136 [ 73 S.Ct. 986, 990 , 97 L.Ed. 1500 ].

2003Co. v. Nothnagle (1953) 346 U.S. 128, 135-136 [ 73 S.Ct. 986, 990 , 97 L.Ed. 1500 ].

2003Co. v. MV Nedlloyd, 817 F.2d 1022, 1028 (2d Cir. 1987).” (Hartford Fire v. Orient Overseas Containers Lines, supra, 230 F.3d at p. 553.) No federal circuit has expressly held that the fair opportunity doctrine is inapplicable to a bill of lading subject to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.

2003(Cf. Henley Drilling Co. v. McGee (1st Cir. 1994) 36 F.3d 143, 146, fn. 5 [declining to address the question whether the fair opportunity doctrine ought to apply under any circumstances to Carriage of Goods by Sea Act litigation]; Carman Tool & Abrasives, Inc. v. Evergreen Lines, supra, 871 F.2d at p. 900, fn. 6 [questioning whether the fair opportunity requirement ought to apply at all in Carriage of Goods by Sea Act lawsuits involving commercially knowledgeable litigants].) The inconsistent application of federal law arises as to whether a mere reference in the bill of lading to the Carriage

2003(Cf. Henley Drilling Co. v. McGee (1st Cir. 1994) 36 F.3d 143, 146, fn. 5 [declining to address the question whether the fair opportunity doctrine ought to apply under any circumstances to Carriage of Goods by Sea Act litigation]; Carman Tool & Abrasives, Inc. v. Evergreen Lines, supra, 871 F.2d at p. 900, fn. 6 [questioning whether the fair opportunity requirement ought to apply at all in Carriage of Goods by Sea Act lawsuits involving commercially knowledgeable litigants].) The inconsistent application of federal law arises as to whether a mere reference in the bill of lading to the Carriage

2003Co. v. MV Nedlloyd, 817 F.2d 1022, 1028 (2d Cir. 1987).” (Hartford Fire v. Orient Overseas Containers Lines, supra, 230 F.3d at p. 553.) No federal circuit has expressly held that the fair opportunity doctrine is inapplicable to a bill of lading subject to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.

1995Co. v. O’Conner (1912) 223 U.S. 280, 285 [ 56 L.Ed. 436, 438 , 32 S.Ct. 216 ].) The state may, consistent with constitutional demands, ensure its “exceedingly strong interest in financial stability” by enacting a variety of procedural protections in tax refund cases, including, but not limited to, limiting refunds “only to those taxpayers paying under protest or providing some other timely notice of complaint” or providing “relatively short statutes of limitations.” Thus, contrary to Neecke’s contention, it is clear that federal due process concerns do not require that the state provide class

1995Co. v. O’Conner (1912) 223 U.S. 280, 285 [ 56 L.Ed. 436, 438 , 32 S.Ct. 216 ].) The state may, consistent with constitutional demands, ensure its “exceedingly strong interest in financial stability” by enacting a variety of procedural protections in tax refund cases, including, but not limited to, limiting refunds “only to those taxpayers paying under protest or providing some other timely notice of complaint” or providing “relatively short statutes of limitations.” Thus, contrary to Neecke’s contention, it is clear that federal due process concerns do not require that the state provide class

1989Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied June 1, 1989. 1 In an unpublished portion we consider and reject defendant’s contentions that (1) he did not have a fair opportunity to challenge the veracity of the prior prison terms; (2) no substantial evidence shows he served the prison terms; and (3) rule 439(b) of the California Rules of Court is unconstitutional. 2 “Although the terms of a plea bargain agreement may be ascertained with reference to principles of contract law [citing Alvarez], plea bargains are specifically enforced by the courts on due process grounds (see

1989Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied June 1, 1989. 1 In an unpublished portion we consider and reject defendant’s contentions that (1) he did not have a fair opportunity to challenge the veracity of the prior prison terms; (2) no substantial evidence shows he served the prison terms; and (3) rule 439(b) of the California Rules of Court is unconstitutional. 2 “Although the terms of a plea bargain agreement may be ascertained with reference to principles of contract law [citing Alvarez], plea bargains are specifically enforced by the courts on due process grounds (see

1989Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied June 1, 1989. 1 In an unpublished portion we consider and reject defendant’s contentions that (1) he did not have a fair opportunity to challenge the veracity of the prior prison terms; (2) no substantial evidence shows he served the prison terms; and (3) rule 439(b) of the California Rules of Court is unconstitutional. 2 “Although the terms of a plea bargain agreement may be ascertained with reference to principles of contract law [citing Alvarez], plea bargains are specifically enforced by the courts on due process grounds (see

1989Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied June 1, 1989. 1 In an unpublished portion we consider and reject defendant’s contentions that (1) he did not have a fair opportunity to challenge the veracity of the prior prison terms; (2) no substantial evidence shows he served the prison terms; and (3) rule 439(b) of the California Rules of Court is unconstitutional. 2 “Although the terms of a plea bargain agreement may be ascertained with reference to principles of contract law [citing Alvarez], plea bargains are specifically enforced by the courts on due process grounds (see

1989Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied June 1, 1989. 1 In an unpublished portion we consider and reject defendant’s contentions that (1) he did not have a fair opportunity to challenge the veracity of the prior prison terms; (2) no substantial evidence shows he served the prison terms; and (3) rule 439(b) of the California Rules of Court is unconstitutional. 2 “Although the terms of a plea bargain agreement may be ascertained with reference to principles of contract law [citing Alvarez], plea bargains are specifically enforced by the courts on due process grounds (see

1989Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied June 1, 1989. 1 In an unpublished portion we consider and reject defendant’s contentions that (1) he did not have a fair opportunity to challenge the veracity of the prior prison terms; (2) no substantial evidence shows he served the prison terms; and (3) rule 439(b) of the California Rules of Court is unconstitutional. 2 “Although the terms of a plea bargain agreement may be ascertained with reference to principles of contract law [citing Alvarez], plea bargains are specifically enforced by the courts on due process grounds (see

1971If he is guilty, the law may still be vindicated, and the State will have an opportunity to establish that guilt under a plea of not guilty. [Citations.]" ( People v. McGarvy, 61 Cal. App.2d 557, 564 [ 142 P.2d 92 ]; People v. Singh, 156 Cal. App.2d 363, 366 [ 319 P.2d 697 ]; People v. Young, 138 Cal. App.2d 425, 426-427 [ 291 P.2d 980 ]; see also People v. Wadkins, supra, 63 Cal.2d 110, 114 ; People v. Campos, 3 Cal.2d 15, 17 [ 43 P.2d 274 ].) The crucial question upon appeal after denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is whether the trial court in denying the motion has abused its dis

1971If he is guilty, the law may still be vindicated, and the State will have an opportunity to establish that guilt under a plea of not guilty. [Citations.]" ( People v. McGarvy, 61 Cal. App.2d 557, 564 [ 142 P.2d 92 ]; People v. Singh, 156 Cal. App.2d 363, 366 [ 319 P.2d 697 ]; People v. Young, 138 Cal. App.2d 425, 426-427 [ 291 P.2d 980 ]; see also People v. Wadkins, supra, 63 Cal.2d 110, 114 ; People v. Campos, 3 Cal.2d 15, 17 [ 43 P.2d 274 ].) The crucial question upon appeal after denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is whether the trial court in denying the motion has abused its dis

1971If he is guilty, the law may still be vindicated, and the State will have an opportunity to establish that guilt under a plea of not guilty. [Citations.]" ( People v. McGarvy, 61 Cal. App.2d 557, 564 [ 142 P.2d 92 ]; People v. Singh, 156 Cal. App.2d 363, 366 [ 319 P.2d 697 ]; People v. Young, 138 Cal. App.2d 425, 426-427 [ 291 P.2d 980 ]; see also People v. Wadkins, supra, 63 Cal.2d 110, 114 ; People v. Campos, 3 Cal.2d 15, 17 [ 43 P.2d 274 ].) The crucial question upon appeal after denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is whether the trial court in denying the motion has abused its dis

1971If he is guilty, the law may still be vindicated, and the State will have an opportunity to establish that guilt under a plea of not guilty. [Citations.]" ( People v. McGarvy, 61 Cal. App.2d 557, 564 [ 142 P.2d 92 ]; People v. Singh, 156 Cal. App.2d 363, 366 [ 319 P.2d 697 ]; People v. Young, 138 Cal. App.2d 425, 426-427 [ 291 P.2d 980 ]; see also People v. Wadkins, supra, 63 Cal.2d 110, 114 ; People v. Campos, 3 Cal.2d 15, 17 [ 43 P.2d 274 ].) The crucial question upon appeal after denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is whether the trial court in denying the motion has abused its dis

1971If he is guilty, the law may still be vindicated, and the State will have an opportunity to establish that guilt under a plea of not guilty. [Citations.]" ( People v. McGarvy, 61 Cal. App.2d 557, 564 [ 142 P.2d 92 ]; People v. Singh, 156 Cal. App.2d 363, 366 [ 319 P.2d 697 ]; People v. Young, 138 Cal. App.2d 425, 426-427 [ 291 P.2d 980 ]; see also People v. Wadkins, supra, 63 Cal.2d 110, 114 ; People v. Campos, 3 Cal.2d 15, 17 [ 43 P.2d 274 ].) The crucial question upon appeal after denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is whether the trial court in denying the motion has abused its dis

1971If he is guilty, the law may still be vindicated, and the State will have an opportunity to establish that guilt under a plea of not guilty. [Citations.]" ( People v. McGarvy, 61 Cal. App.2d 557, 564 [ 142 P.2d 92 ]; People v. Singh, 156 Cal. App.2d 363, 366 [ 319 P.2d 697 ]; People v. Young, 138 Cal. App.2d 425, 426-427 [ 291 P.2d 980 ]; see also People v. Wadkins, supra, 63 Cal.2d 110, 114 ; People v. Campos, 3 Cal.2d 15, 17 [ 43 P.2d 274 ].) The crucial question upon appeal after denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is whether the trial court in denying the motion has abused its dis

1971If he is guilty, the law may still be vindicated, and the State will have an opportunity to establish that guilt under a plea of not guilty. [Citations.]" ( People v. McGarvy, 61 Cal. App.2d 557, 564 [ 142 P.2d 92 ]; People v. Singh, 156 Cal. App.2d 363, 366 [ 319 P.2d 697 ]; People v. Young, 138 Cal. App.2d 425, 426-427 [ 291 P.2d 980 ]; see also People v. Wadkins, supra, 63 Cal.2d 110, 114 ; People v. Campos, 3 Cal.2d 15, 17 [ 43 P.2d 274 ].) The crucial question upon appeal after denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is whether the trial court in denying the motion has abused its dis

1971If he is guilty, the law may still be vindicated, and the State will have an opportunity to establish that guilt under a plea of not guilty. [Citations.]" ( People v. McGarvy, 61 Cal. App.2d 557, 564 [ 142 P.2d 92 ]; People v. Singh, 156 Cal. App.2d 363, 366 [ 319 P.2d 697 ]; People v. Young, 138 Cal. App.2d 425, 426-427 [ 291 P.2d 980 ]; see also People v. Wadkins, supra, 63 Cal.2d 110, 114 ; People v. Campos, 3 Cal.2d 15, 17 [ 43 P.2d 274 ].) The crucial question upon appeal after denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is whether the trial court in denying the motion has abused its dis

1971If he is guilty, the law may still be vindicated, and the State will have an opportunity to establish that guilt under a plea of not guilty. [Citations.]" ( People v. McGarvy, 61 Cal. App.2d 557, 564 [ 142 P.2d 92 ]; People v. Singh, 156 Cal. App.2d 363, 366 [ 319 P.2d 697 ]; People v. Young, 138 Cal. App.2d 425, 426-427 [ 291 P.2d 980 ]; see also People v. Wadkins, supra, 63 Cal.2d 110, 114 ; People v. Campos, 3 Cal.2d 15, 17 [ 43 P.2d 274 ].) The crucial question upon appeal after denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is whether the trial court in denying the motion has abused its dis

1971If he is guilty, the law may still be vindicated, and the State will have an opportunity to establish that guilt under a plea of not guilty. [Citations.]" ( People v. McGarvy, 61 Cal. App.2d 557, 564 [ 142 P.2d 92 ]; People v. Singh, 156 Cal. App.2d 363, 366 [ 319 P.2d 697 ]; People v. Young, 138 Cal. App.2d 425, 426-427 [ 291 P.2d 980 ]; see also People v. Wadkins, supra, 63 Cal.2d 110, 114 ; People v. Campos, 3 Cal.2d 15, 17 [ 43 P.2d 274 ].) The crucial question upon appeal after denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is whether the trial court in denying the motion has abused its dis

1968(See In re Lambert (1901) 134 Cal. 626, 629 [ 66 P. 851 , 86 Am.St.Rep. 296 , 55 L.R.A. 856 ].) Moreover, “The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. ’’ (Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287 U.S. 45, 68 [ 77 L.Ed. 158, 170 , 53 S.Ct. 55 , 84 A.L.R. 527 ] ; Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335, 344 [ 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 805 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 93 A.L.R.2d 733 ] ; Specht v. Patterson (1967) 386 U.S. 605, 608-609 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 326, 329-330 , 87 S.Ct. 1209 ] ; In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 36 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 551 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 ]

1968(See In re Lambert (1901) 134 Cal. 626, 629 [ 66 P. 851 , 86 Am.St.Rep. 296 , 55 L.R.A. 856 ].) Moreover, “The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. ’’ (Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287 U.S. 45, 68 [ 77 L.Ed. 158, 170 , 53 S.Ct. 55 , 84 A.L.R. 527 ] ; Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335, 344 [ 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 805 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 93 A.L.R.2d 733 ] ; Specht v. Patterson (1967) 386 U.S. 605, 608-609 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 326, 329-330 , 87 S.Ct. 1209 ] ; In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 36 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 551 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 ]

1968(See In re Lambert (1901) 134 Cal. 626, 629 [ 66 P. 851 , 86 Am.St.Rep. 296 , 55 L.R.A. 856 ].) Moreover, “The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. ’’ (Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287 U.S. 45, 68 [ 77 L.Ed. 158, 170 , 53 S.Ct. 55 , 84 A.L.R. 527 ] ; Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335, 344 [ 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 805 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 93 A.L.R.2d 733 ] ; Specht v. Patterson (1967) 386 U.S. 605, 608-609 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 326, 329-330 , 87 S.Ct. 1209 ] ; In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 36 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 551 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 ]

1968(See In re Lambert (1901) 134 Cal. 626, 629 [ 66 P. 851 , 86 Am.St.Rep. 296 , 55 L.R.A. 856 ].) Moreover, “The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. ’’ (Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287 U.S. 45, 68 [ 77 L.Ed. 158, 170 , 53 S.Ct. 55 , 84 A.L.R. 527 ] ; Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335, 344 [ 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 805 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 93 A.L.R.2d 733 ] ; Specht v. Patterson (1967) 386 U.S. 605, 608-609 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 326, 329-330 , 87 S.Ct. 1209 ] ; In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 36 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 551 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 ]

1968(See In re Lambert (1901) 134 Cal. 626, 629 [ 66 P. 851 , 86 Am.St.Rep. 296 , 55 L.R.A. 856 ].) Moreover, “The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. ’’ (Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287 U.S. 45, 68 [ 77 L.Ed. 158, 170 , 53 S.Ct. 55 , 84 A.L.R. 527 ] ; Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335, 344 [ 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 805 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 93 A.L.R.2d 733 ] ; Specht v. Patterson (1967) 386 U.S. 605, 608-609 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 326, 329-330 , 87 S.Ct. 1209 ] ; In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 36 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 551 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 ]

1968(See In re Lambert (1901) 134 Cal. 626, 629 [ 66 P. 851 , 86 Am.St.Rep. 296 , 55 L.R.A. 856 ].) Moreover, “The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. ’’ (Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287 U.S. 45, 68 [ 77 L.Ed. 158, 170 , 53 S.Ct. 55 , 84 A.L.R. 527 ] ; Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335, 344 [ 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 805 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 93 A.L.R.2d 733 ] ; Specht v. Patterson (1967) 386 U.S. 605, 608-609 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 326, 329-330 , 87 S.Ct. 1209 ] ; In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 36 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 551 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 ]

1968(See In re Lambert (1901) 134 Cal. 626, 629 [ 66 P. 851 , 86 Am.St.Rep. 296 , 55 L.R.A. 856 ].) Moreover, “The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. ’’ (Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287 U.S. 45, 68 [ 77 L.Ed. 158, 170 , 53 S.Ct. 55 , 84 A.L.R. 527 ] ; Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335, 344 [ 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 805 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 93 A.L.R.2d 733 ] ; Specht v. Patterson (1967) 386 U.S. 605, 608-609 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 326, 329-330 , 87 S.Ct. 1209 ] ; In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 36 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 551 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 ]

1968(See In re Lambert (1901) 134 Cal. 626, 629 [ 66 P. 851 , 86 Am.St.Rep. 296 , 55 L.R.A. 856 ].) Moreover, “The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. ’’ (Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287 U.S. 45, 68 [ 77 L.Ed. 158, 170 , 53 S.Ct. 55 , 84 A.L.R. 527 ] ; Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335, 344 [ 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 805 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 93 A.L.R.2d 733 ] ; Specht v. Patterson (1967) 386 U.S. 605, 608-609 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 326, 329-330 , 87 S.Ct. 1209 ] ; In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 36 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 551 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 ]

1968(See In re Lambert (1901) 134 Cal. 626, 629 [ 66 P. 851 , 86 Am.St.Rep. 296 , 55 L.R.A. 856 ].) Moreover, “The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. ’’ (Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287 U.S. 45, 68 [ 77 L.Ed. 158, 170 , 53 S.Ct. 55 , 84 A.L.R. 527 ] ; Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335, 344 [ 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 805 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 93 A.L.R.2d 733 ] ; Specht v. Patterson (1967) 386 U.S. 605, 608-609 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 326, 329-330 , 87 S.Ct. 1209 ] ; In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 36 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 551 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 ]

1968(See In re Lambert (1901) 134 Cal. 626, 629 [ 66 P. 851 , 86 Am.St.Rep. 296 , 55 L.R.A. 856 ].) Moreover, “The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. ’’ (Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287 U.S. 45, 68 [ 77 L.Ed. 158, 170 , 53 S.Ct. 55 , 84 A.L.R. 527 ] ; Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335, 344 [ 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 805 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 93 A.L.R.2d 733 ] ; Specht v. Patterson (1967) 386 U.S. 605, 608-609 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 326, 329-330 , 87 S.Ct. 1209 ] ; In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 36 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 551 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 ]

1960“This procedural requirement does not place upon an indigent prisoner who seeks to raise questions of the denial of fundamental rights in proprio persona any burden of complying with technicalities; it simply demands of him a measure of frankness in disclosing his factual situation.” (In re Swain, 34 Cal.2d 300, 304 [ 209 P.2d 793 ].) Our reluctance to consider even constitutional questions on habeas corpus if they could have been raised on appeal (see In re Dixon, 41 Cal.2d 756, 759-761 [ 264 P.2d 513 ]) makes it all the more important to afford defendants a fair opportunity to challenge thei

1960“This procedural requirement does not place upon an indigent prisoner who seeks to raise questions of the denial of fundamental rights in proprio persona any burden of complying with technicalities; it simply demands of him a measure of frankness in disclosing his factual situation.” (In re Swain, 34 Cal.2d 300, 304 [ 209 P.2d 793 ].) Our reluctance to consider even constitutional questions on habeas corpus if they could have been raised on appeal (see In re Dixon, 41 Cal.2d 756, 759-761 [ 264 P.2d 513 ]) makes it all the more important to afford defendants a fair opportunity to challenge thei

1960“This procedural requirement does not place upon an indigent prisoner who seeks to raise questions of the denial of fundamental rights in proprio persona any burden of complying with technicalities; it simply demands of him a measure of frankness in disclosing his factual situation.” (In re Swain, 34 Cal.2d 300, 304 [ 209 P.2d 793 ].) Our reluctance to consider even constitutional questions on habeas corpus if they could have been raised on appeal (see In re Dixon, 41 Cal.2d 756, 759-761 [ 264 P.2d 513 ]) makes it all the more important to afford defendants a fair opportunity to challenge thei

1960“This procedural requirement does not place upon an indigent prisoner who seeks to raise questions of the denial of fundamental rights in proprio persona any burden of complying with technicalities; it simply demands of him a measure of frankness in disclosing his factual situation.” (In re Swain, 34 Cal.2d 300, 304 [ 209 P.2d 793 ].) Our reluctance to consider even constitutional questions on habeas corpus if they could have been raised on appeal (see In re Dixon, 41 Cal.2d 756, 759-761 [ 264 P.2d 513 ]) makes it all the more important to afford defendants a fair opportunity to challenge thei