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10 California opinions name it 1 courts 1965–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chappell v. Palmergreen2 sentences1971We attribute a malicious state of mind to the actor irrespective of any actual specific intent.’ In Chappell v. Palmer (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 34, 37 [ 45 Cal.Rptr. 686 ], the court concludes that a pragmatic test has evolved: ‘. . . whether a reasonable man under the same or similar circumstances as those faced by the actor would be aware of the dangerous character of his conduct.’ “The existence of willful misconduct is essentially a question of fact, and the driver’s entire course of conduct is to be considered. [Citation.] The element of intent is usually inferred from objective or external 1971We attribute a malicious state of mind to the actor irrespective of any actual specific intent.’ In Chappell v. Palmer (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 34, 37 [ 45 Cal.Rptr. 686 ], the court concludes that a pragmatic test has evolved: ‘. . . whether a reasonable man under the same or similar circumstances as those faced by the actor would be aware of the dangerous character of his conduct.’ “The existence of willful misconduct is essentially a question of fact, and the driver’s entire course of conduct is to be considered. [Citation.] The element of intent is usually inferred from objective or external | 2 | 2 |
Reuther v. Viallgreen2 sentences1969(Reuther v. Viall, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 475 .) The element of intent is usually inferred from objective or external circumstantial evidence. 1965Professor Prosser, in discussing factual proof of wilful misconduct, suggests that in practice a finding of wilful misconduct will be sustained “. . . in any case where it is clear from the facts that the defendant, whatever his state of mind, has proceeded in disregard of a high degree of danger, either known to him or apparent to a reasonable man in his position.” (Prosser on Torts (3d ed.) § 34, p. 189.) Recent Supreme Court eases, Goncalves v. Los Banos Mining Co., 58 Cal.2d 916, 918 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 769 , 376 P.2d 833 ]; Meyer v. Blackman, 59 Cal.2d 668, 677 [ 31 Cal.Rptr. 3 , 381 P.2d 916 | 1 | 2 |
People v. Gonzales and Solizgreen1 sentence2013(People v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 291-292 (Gonzales).) The effectiveness of admonitions and instructions generally is a pragmatic presumption essential to the system of trial by jury, without which we court judicial anarchy because there would not be any point either in instructing a jury or reversing for improper instructions. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Coronadogreen2 sentences1998(Cf. People v. Coronado (1995) 12 Cal.4th 145, 153-154 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 77 , 906 P.2d 1232 ].) Under the Swann-Gilbert rule, prosecution under the generalized statutes is barred when a specific law is intended by the Legislature for a given factual situation. 1998(Cf. People v. Coronado (1995) 12 Cal.4th 145, 153-154 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 77 , 906 P.2d 1232 ].) Under the Swann-Gilbert rule, prosecution under the generalized statutes is barred when a specific law is intended by the Legislature for a given factual situation. | 1 | 1 |
Stanley v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1983(Stanley v. Superior Court (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 460, 465 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 878 ].) 7 We see no problems with voluntary dismissals without prejudice before a judicially ordered arbitration begins. 8 Section 581, subdivision 3 permits dismissal “[b]y the court. . . when, after a demurrer to the complaint has been sustained with leave to amend, the plaintiff fails to amend it within the time allowed by the court, and either party moves for such dismissal.” 1983(Stanley v. Superior Court (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 460, 465 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 878 ].) 7 We see no problems with voluntary dismissals without prejudice before a judicially ordered arbitration begins. 8 Section 581, subdivision 3 permits dismissal “[b]y the court. . . when, after a demurrer to the complaint has been sustained with leave to amend, the plaintiff fails to amend it within the time allowed by the court, and either party moves for such dismissal.” | 1 | 1 |
Meyer v. Blackmangreen2 sentences1965Professor Prosser, in discussing factual proof of wilful misconduct, suggests that in practice a finding of wilful misconduct will be sustained “. . . in any case where it is clear from the facts that the defendant, whatever his state of mind, has proceeded in disregard of a high degree of danger, either known to him or apparent to a reasonable man in his position.” (Prosser on Torts (3d ed.) § 34, p. 189.) Recent Supreme Court eases, Goncalves v. Los Banos Mining Co., 58 Cal.2d 916, 918 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 769 , 376 P.2d 833 ]; Meyer v. Blackman, 59 Cal.2d 668, 677 [ 31 Cal.Rptr. 3 , 381 P.2d 916 1965Professor Prosser, in discussing factual proof of wilful misconduct, suggests that in practice a finding of wilful misconduct will be sustained “. . . in any case where it is clear from the facts that the defendant, whatever his state of mind, has proceeded in disregard of a high degree of danger, either known to him or apparent to a reasonable man in his position.” (Prosser on Torts (3d ed.) § 34, p. 189.) Recent Supreme Court eases, Goncalves v. Los Banos Mining Co., 58 Cal.2d 916, 918 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 769 , 376 P.2d 833 ]; Meyer v. Blackman, 59 Cal.2d 668, 677 [ 31 Cal.Rptr. 3 , 381 P.2d 916 | 1 | 1 |
Goncalves v. Los Banos Mining Co.green2 sentences1965Professor Prosser, in discussing factual proof of wilful misconduct, suggests that in practice a finding of wilful misconduct will be sustained “. . . in any case where it is clear from the facts that the defendant, whatever his state of mind, has proceeded in disregard of a high degree of danger, either known to him or apparent to a reasonable man in his position.” (Prosser on Torts (3d ed.) § 34, p. 189.) Recent Supreme Court eases, Goncalves v. Los Banos Mining Co., 58 Cal.2d 916, 918 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 769 , 376 P.2d 833 ]; Meyer v. Blackman, 59 Cal.2d 668, 677 [ 31 Cal.Rptr. 3 , 381 P.2d 916 1965Professor Prosser, in discussing factual proof of wilful misconduct, suggests that in practice a finding of wilful misconduct will be sustained “. . . in any case where it is clear from the facts that the defendant, whatever his state of mind, has proceeded in disregard of a high degree of danger, either known to him or apparent to a reasonable man in his position.” (Prosser on Torts (3d ed.) § 34, p. 189.) Recent Supreme Court eases, Goncalves v. Los Banos Mining Co., 58 Cal.2d 916, 918 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 769 , 376 P.2d 833 ]; Meyer v. Blackman, 59 Cal.2d 668, 677 [ 31 Cal.Rptr. 3 , 381 P.2d 916 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Coltrain v. Shewalter
green
2 sentences2021Proc. § 1032, subd. (a)(4).) But “the premise for this argument, that a litigant who prevails under the cost statute is necessarily the prevailing party for purposes of attorney fees, has been uniformly rejected by the courts of this state.” (Heather Farms, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 1572 .) And as noted by the Heather Farms court, “Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (a) only defines ‘ “[p]revailing party” ’ as the term is used ‘in [that] section.’ It does not purport to define the term for purposes of other statutes.” (Ibid.) Moreover, elsewhere in its opening brief,5 citing H 2021Proc. § 1032, subd. (a)(4).) But “the premise for this argument, that a litigant who prevails under the cost statute is necessarily the prevailing party for purposes of attorney fees, has been uniformly rejected by the courts of this state.” (Heather Farms, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 1572 .) And as noted by the Heather Farms court, “Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (a) only defines ‘ “[p]revailing party” ’ as the term is used ‘in [that] section.’ It does not purport to define the term for purposes of other statutes.” (Ibid.) Moreover, elsewhere in its opening brief,5 citing H | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Heather Farms Homeowners Assn. v. Robinson
green
2 sentences2021Proc. § 1032, subd. (a)(4).) But “the premise for this argument, that a litigant who prevails under the cost statute is necessarily the prevailing party for purposes of attorney fees, has been uniformly rejected by the courts of this state.” (Heather Farms, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 1572 .) And as noted by the Heather Farms court, “Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (a) only defines ‘ “[p]revailing party” ’ as the term is used ‘in [that] section.’ It does not purport to define the term for purposes of other statutes.” (Ibid.) Moreover, elsewhere in its opening brief,5 citing H 2021Proc. § 1032, subd. (a)(4).) But “the premise for this argument, that a litigant who prevails under the cost statute is necessarily the prevailing party for purposes of attorney fees, has been uniformly rejected by the courts of this state.” (Heather Farms, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 1572 .) And as noted by the Heather Farms court, “Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (a) only defines ‘ “[p]revailing party” ’ as the term is used ‘in [that] section.’ It does not purport to define the term for purposes of other statutes.” (Ibid.) Moreover, elsewhere in its opening brief,5 citing H | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Winick Corp. v. Safeco Insursnce Co. of America
green
1 sentence2013Proc., § 1021.5), where “a defendant, who obtains a dismissal with prejudice because the plaintiff fails to timely serve the complaint, has . . . prevail[ed] and is entitled to attorney fees.” (Heather Farms, at p. 1573, citing Winick Corp. v. Safeco Insurance Co. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1502 (Winick).) Unlike Salehi or Winick, this case does not involve such an error, but more closely resembles Heather Farms and Donald where a circumstance outside the litigation essentially mooted the underlying controversy, and therefore mooted the prevailing party question. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Donald v. Cafe Royale, Inc.
green
2 sentences1994Noting the court in that case conducted a “ ‘pragmatic inquiry’ ” into whether a party prevailed, the Winick court conducted a similar pragmatic inquiry and concluded a defendant, who obtains a dismissal with prejudice because the plaintiff fails to timely serve the complaint, has also prevailed and is entitled to attorney fees. (187 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1506-1508.) In Donald v. Cafe Royale, Inc. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 168 [ 266 Cal.Rptr. 804 ], the plaintiff, a physically disabled man, filed suit against a restaurant alleging it had violated the Civil Code by failing to provide him adequate acces 1994Noting the court in that case conducted a “ ‘pragmatic inquiry’ ” into whether a party prevailed, the Winick court conducted a similar pragmatic inquiry and concluded a defendant, who obtains a dismissal with prejudice because the plaintiff fails to timely serve the complaint, has also prevailed and is entitled to attorney fees. (187 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1506-1508.) In Donald v. Cafe Royale, Inc. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 168 [ 266 Cal.Rptr. 804 ], the plaintiff, a physically disabled man, filed suit against a restaurant alleging it had violated the Civil Code by failing to provide him adequate acces | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Hebert v. Harn
green
1 sentence1983The award expressly provides that all “[p]laintiffs shall take nothing by way of their complaint. ” 3 All references to rules are to the Orange County Superior Court Rules unless otherwise specified. 4 All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified. 5 The Orange County Superior Court enacted rule 31, section 17(7) by authority of Government Code section 68070, allowing adoption of “local rules to implement the judicial arbitration statutes and the Judicial Council rules provided the local rules are not inconsistent with the law and the rules prescribed b | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Fairfield v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence1965Professor Prosser, in discussing factual proof of wilful misconduct, suggests that in practice a finding of wilful misconduct will be sustained “. . . in any case where it is clear from the facts that the defendant, whatever his state of mind, has proceeded in disregard of a high degree of danger, either known to him or apparent to a reasonable man in his position.” (Prosser on Torts (3d ed.) § 34, p. 189.) Recent Supreme Court eases, Goncalves v. Los Banos Mining Co., 58 Cal.2d 916, 918 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 769 , 376 P.2d 833 ]; Meyer v. Blackman, 59 Cal.2d 668, 677 [ 31 Cal.Rptr. 3 , 381 P.2d 916 | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board
green
2 sentences1965Co., 152 Cal. 574 [ 93 P. 377 ]; Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 197 [ 59 S.Ct. 206 , 83 L.Ed. 126 ].) The substantial evidence rule indicates to us the pragmatic test that has evolved, sub silentio, in wilful misconduct cases is whether a reasonable man under the same or similar circumstances as those faced by the actor would be aware of the dangerous character of his conduct. 1965Co., 152 Cal. 574 [ 93 P. 377 ]; Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 197 [ 59 S.Ct. 206 , 83 L.Ed. 126 ].) The substantial evidence rule indicates to us the pragmatic test that has evolved, sub silentio, in wilful misconduct cases is whether a reasonable man under the same or similar circumstances as those faced by the actor would be aware of the dangerous character of his conduct. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Houghton v. Loma Prieta Lumber Co.
green
2 sentences1965Co., 152 Cal. 574 [ 93 P. 377 ]; Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 197 [ 59 S.Ct. 206 , 83 L.Ed. 126 ].) The substantial evidence rule indicates to us the pragmatic test that has evolved, sub silentio, in wilful misconduct cases is whether a reasonable man under the same or similar circumstances as those faced by the actor would be aware of the dangerous character of his conduct. 1965Co., 152 Cal. 574 [ 93 P. 377 ]; Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 197 [ 59 S.Ct. 206 , 83 L.Ed. 126 ].) The substantial evidence rule indicates to us the pragmatic test that has evolved, sub silentio, in wilful misconduct cases is whether a reasonable man under the same or similar circumstances as those faced by the actor would be aware of the dangerous character of his conduct. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.