right to an administrative hearing in California

2023(See ibid.) Moraga argues that the trial court correctly concluded that section 800 does not apply here, because it “ ‘appl[ies] only to decisions of administrative law judges, or where the party has been denied the right to an administrative hearing.’ ” (See Kistler v. Redwoods Community College Dist. (1993) 45 15 Cal.App.4th 1326, 1336 .) Although section 800’s scope is somewhat unsettled (see Gustafson v. Zolin (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1361 , 1366–1367), the Bruzzones do not challenge the court’s ruling that the statute is inapplicable.

1997Kistler says that section 800 generally applies where there is a right to an administrative hearing. ( 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 1336 .) Although the DMV acknowledges that Gustafson had a right to an administrative hearing on his acquittal claim, the determinative fact here is that there never was any such hearing to trigger the applicability of section 800.

2023(See ibid.) Moraga argues that the trial court correctly concluded that section 800 does not apply here, because it “ ‘appl[ies] only to decisions of administrative law judges, or where the party has been denied the right to an administrative hearing.’ ” (See Kistler v. Redwoods Community College Dist. (1993) 45 15 Cal.App.4th 1326, 1336 .) Although section 800’s scope is somewhat unsettled (see Gustafson v. Zolin (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1361 , 1366–1367), the Bruzzones do not challenge the court’s ruling that the statute is inapplicable.

2020DISCUSSION Under California’s “administrative per se” law, the DMV must suspend the driving privilege of a person who was driving a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more. (§ 13353.2, subd. (a); McKinney v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 519 , 522–523, 526 (McKinney).) The licensee has a right to an administrative hearing, and the hearing officer’s decision is subject to judicial review. (§§ 13558, 13559; McKinney, at p. 523.) The trial court exercises its independent judgment to determine whether the administrative decision was supported by the wei

2017To conclude otherwise would subvert any reasonable construction of the statutory phrase “action may be commenced.” (See Ventura County Deputy Sheriffs’ Assn. v. Board of Retirement (1997) 16 Cal.4th 483 , 490: “Any ambiguity or uncertainty in the meaning of pension legislation must be resolved in favor of the pensioner, but such construction must be consistent with the clear language and purpose of the statute.”) Moreover, accepting the position that the final audit’s mailing was the commencement of an “action” would permit CalSTRS, in theory, to delay for an indeterminate time taking any acti

2006Probationary employ *1270 ees, for example, but not temporary employees, have the right to an administrative hearing to determine if a PKS layoff is supported by legitimate economic reasons. (§§ 44949, 44955; San Jose Teachers Assn. v. Allen (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 627 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 710 ].) The nonmanagement employees, both probationary and temporary, who received the layoff notices all were members of the Bakersfield Elementary Teachers Association (BETA).

2006Probationary employ *1270 ees, for example, but not temporary employees, have the right to an administrative hearing to determine if a PKS layoff is supported by legitimate economic reasons. (§§ 44949, 44955; San Jose Teachers Assn. v. Allen (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 627 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 710 ].) The nonmanagement employees, both probationary and temporary, who received the layoff notices all were members of the Bakersfield Elementary Teachers Association (BETA).

1997First, in Barnes v. Healy (9th Cir. 1992) 980 F.2d 572 (Barnes), a case cited extensively by appellant, the court said nothing about a right to an administrative hearing or the provisions of section 10950.

1972Thus, “section 13443 extends to probationary employees of all districts, regardless of size, the right to an administrative hearing following receipt of notice that their services will not be required for the ensuing year.” ( 39 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 186 , 191 (1962).) This principle was reaffirmed in Horner v. Board of *747 Trustees, supra, 61 Cal.2d 79 , where the court stated (p. 85): “The obvious purpose of the 1961 amendments of sections 13443 and 13444 was to extend to the probationary teachers of all school districts the requirement of cause for dismissal and the right to a hearing . . . .”