scope of the statutory immunity in California

10 California opinions name it 2 courts 1935–2012 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (4)

Case	Followed	Cited
Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocerygreen cal · 1998 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1999–2001 2 sentences 2001The Supreme Court granted review to determine “the scope of the statutory immunity, and in particular to consider whether [Civil Code] section 847 protects the intentional use of deadly force when a statutorily enumerated felony has been committed.” (Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocery, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 718 .) The Supreme Court held that immunity is available to one who acts in self-defense but agreed with the Court of Appeal that there were triable issues of material fact concerning the reasonableness of the landowner’s conduct. 1999(Ibid.) *534 The Supreme Court based its holding that section 847 extends to justifiable use of intentional force, in part, on the absence of any indication the Legislature intended to limit the immunity to negligent acts of property owners. “[I]f the Legislature had actually wanted to categorically exclude all ‘intentional’ or ‘purposeful’ conduct from the scope of the statutory immunity, it could easily have used such phraseology instead of declaring that the statute ‘does not limit the liability . . . which otherwise exists’ for conduct that has long been understood to imply wrongfulness as	1	2
Estate of Pryorgreen calctapp · 2009 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012 2 sentences 2012Code, div. 11, pt. 3.5, § 21350 et seq. (hereafter, Part 3.5).) “[T]he restrictions on donative transfers currently codified in sections 21350 and 21351 supplement the common law on menace, duress, fraud and undue influence. ‘A gift that does not fall within the scope of the statutory presumption can still be challenged under the common law.’ [Citation.]” (Estate of Pryor (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1476 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 895 ].) 7 Section 21350, subdivision (a)(2) presumptively disqualifies donative transfers to the drafters of wills and their relatives. 2012Code, div. 11, pt. 3.5, § 21350 et seq. (hereafter, Part 3.5).) “[T]he restrictions on donative transfers currently codified in sections 21350 and 21351 supplement the common law on menace, duress, fraud and undue influence. ‘A gift that does not fall within the scope of the statutory presumption can still be challenged under the common law.’ [Citation.]” (Estate of Pryor (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1476 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 895 ].) 7 Section 21350, subdivision (a)(2) presumptively disqualifies donative transfers to the drafters of wills and their relatives.	1	1
Kovich v. Paseo Del Mar Homeowners' Ass'ngreen calctapp · 1996 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009 2 sentences 2009While we observe that Samuelson’s interpretation of his disclosure obligations finds no support in the language of Civil Code section 1102.6, resolution of the scope of the statutory requirement is 165 unnecessary to our determination. 2 Samuelson owed a common law “duty to disclose information materially affecting the value or the desirabil[i]ty of the property.” (Kovich v. Paseo Del Mar Homeowners’ Assn. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 863, 866 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 758 ].) The evidence presented in connection with the summary judgment motion established a triable issue of fact as to whether the existence 2009While we observe that Samuelson’s interpretation of his disclosure obligations finds no support in the language of Civil Code section 1102.6, resolution of the scope of the statutory requirement is 165 unnecessary to our determination. 2 Samuelson owed a common law “duty to disclose information materially affecting the value or the desirabil[i]ty of the property.” (Kovich v. Paseo Del Mar Homeowners’ Assn. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 863, 866 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 758 ].) The evidence presented in connection with the summary judgment motion established a triable issue of fact as to whether the existence	1	1
Reuther v. Viallgreen cal · 1965 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998 2 sentences 1998(See Reuther v. Viall, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 475 , 42 Cal.Rptr. 456 , 398 P.2d 792 [describing willful misconduct as "intentional wrongful conduct, done either with a knowledge that serious injury to [another] probably will result, or with a wanton and reckless disregard of the possible results" (italics added) ]; Colich & Sons v. Pacific Bell, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 1242 , 244 Cal.Rptr. 714 ; Charpentier v. Von Geldern, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d at p. 113 , 236 Cal.Rptr. 233 ; Nazar v. Rodeffer, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 552 , 229 Cal.Rptr. 209 .) In any event, even if we were to accept t 1998(See Reuther v. Viall, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 475 , 42 Cal.Rptr. 456 , 398 P.2d 792 [describing willful misconduct as "intentional wrongful conduct, done either with a knowledge that serious injury to [another] probably will result, or with a wanton and reckless disregard of the possible results" (italics added) ]; Colich & Sons v. Pacific Bell, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 1242 , 244 Cal.Rptr. 714 ; Charpentier v. Von Geldern, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d at p. 113 , 236 Cal.Rptr. 233 ; Nazar v. Rodeffer, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 552 , 229 Cal.Rptr. 209 .) In any event, even if we were to accept t	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (10)

Case	Cited	Years
McDermott, Will & Emery v. Superior Court green calctapp · 2000 1 sentence 2009In McDermott, the court held that dismissal was proper in a case in which the plaintiff brought a claim that, by its very nature, *793 necessitated that the defendant disclose privileged or confidential information in order to present “a[] meaningful defense.” ( McDermott, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 381 ; see also id. at p. 383 [noting that “attorney-client privilege issues [are] necessarily raised by a derivative malpractice action against corporate outside counsel” (italics added)].) In Solin , the court noted that the confidential information pertained to the “central disputed issues in th	1	2009–2009
Charpentier v. Von Geldern green calctapp · 1987 2 sentences 1998(See Reuther v. Viall, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 475 , 42 Cal.Rptr. 456 , 398 P.2d 792 [describing willful misconduct as "intentional wrongful conduct, done either with a knowledge that serious injury to [another] probably will result, or with a wanton and reckless disregard of the possible results" (italics added) ]; Colich & Sons v. Pacific Bell, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 1242 , 244 Cal.Rptr. 714 ; Charpentier v. Von Geldern, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d at p. 113 , 236 Cal.Rptr. 233 ; Nazar v. Rodeffer, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 552 , 229 Cal.Rptr. 209 .) In any event, even if we were to accept t 1998(See Reuther v. Viall, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 475 , 42 Cal.Rptr. 456 , 398 P.2d 792 [describing willful misconduct as "intentional wrongful conduct, done either with a knowledge that serious injury to [another] probably will result, or with a wanton and reckless disregard of the possible results" (italics added) ]; Colich & Sons v. Pacific Bell, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 1242 , 244 Cal.Rptr. 714 ; Charpentier v. Von Geldern, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d at p. 113 , 236 Cal.Rptr. 233 ; Nazar v. Rodeffer, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 552 , 229 Cal.Rptr. 209 .) In any event, even if we were to accept t	1	1998–1998
Nazar v. Rodeffer green calctapp · 1986 2 sentences 1998(See Reuther v. Viall, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 475 , 42 Cal.Rptr. 456 , 398 P.2d 792 [describing willful misconduct as "intentional wrongful conduct, done either with a knowledge that serious injury to [another] probably will result, or with a wanton and reckless disregard of the possible results" (italics added) ]; Colich & Sons v. Pacific Bell, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 1242 , 244 Cal.Rptr. 714 ; Charpentier v. Von Geldern, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d at p. 113 , 236 Cal.Rptr. 233 ; Nazar v. Rodeffer, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 552 , 229 Cal.Rptr. 209 .) In any event, even if we were to accept t 1998(See Reuther v. Viall, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 475 , 42 Cal.Rptr. 456 , 398 P.2d 792 [describing willful misconduct as "intentional wrongful conduct, done either with a knowledge that serious injury to [another] probably will result, or with a wanton and reckless disregard of the possible results" (italics added) ]; Colich & Sons v. Pacific Bell, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 1242 , 244 Cal.Rptr. 714 ; Charpentier v. Von Geldern, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d at p. 113 , 236 Cal.Rptr. 233 ; Nazar v. Rodeffer, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 552 , 229 Cal.Rptr. 209 .) In any event, even if we were to accept t	1	1998–1998
Colich & Sons v. Pacific Bell green calctapp · 1988 2 sentences 1998(See Reuther v. Viall, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 475 , 42 Cal.Rptr. 456 , 398 P.2d 792 [describing willful misconduct as "intentional wrongful conduct, done either with a knowledge that serious injury to [another] probably will result, or with a wanton and reckless disregard of the possible results" (italics added) ]; Colich & Sons v. Pacific Bell, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 1242 , 244 Cal.Rptr. 714 ; Charpentier v. Von Geldern, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d at p. 113 , 236 Cal.Rptr. 233 ; Nazar v. Rodeffer, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 552 , 229 Cal.Rptr. 209 .) In any event, even if we were to accept t 1998(See Reuther v. Viall, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 475 , 42 Cal.Rptr. 456 , 398 P.2d 792 [describing willful misconduct as "intentional wrongful conduct, done either with a knowledge that serious injury to [another] probably will result, or with a wanton and reckless disregard of the possible results" (italics added) ]; Colich & Sons v. Pacific Bell, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 1242 , 244 Cal.Rptr. 714 ; Charpentier v. Von Geldern, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d at p. 113 , 236 Cal.Rptr. 233 ; Nazar v. Rodeffer, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 552 , 229 Cal.Rptr. 209 .) In any event, even if we were to accept t	1	1998–1998
Mathews v. City of Cerritos green calctapp · 1992 1 sentence 1994The analysis in Mathews v. City of Cerritos, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th 1380, regarding the *1387 definition of “dangerous condition” (§ 830, subd. (a)), is analogous and instructive.	1	1994–1994
In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated September 15, 1983 Marc Rich & Co. A.G., Intervenor-Appellant v. United States green ca2 · 1984 1 sentence 1994(See, e.g., Marc Rich & Co. v. United States (2d Cir. 1984) 731 F.2d 1032 ; People v. Pic’l (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 824 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 106 ]; Glade v. Superior Court (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 738 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 119 ]; Evid.	1	1994–1994
People v. Richard green calctapp · 1981 2 sentences 1994(See, e.g., Marc Rich & Co. v. United States (2d Cir. 1984) 731 F.2d 1032 ; People v. Pic’l (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 824 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 106 ]; Glade v. Superior Court (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 738 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 119 ]; Evid. 1994(See, e.g., Marc Rich & Co. v. United States (2d Cir. 1984) 731 F.2d 1032 ; People v. Pic’l (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 824 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 106 ]; Glade v. Superior Court (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 738 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 119 ]; Evid.	1	1994–1994
Glade v. Superior Court green calctapp · 1978 2 sentences 1994(See, e.g., Marc Rich & Co. v. United States (2d Cir. 1984) 731 F.2d 1032 ; People v. Pic’l (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 824 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 106 ]; Glade v. Superior Court (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 738 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 119 ]; Evid. 1994(See, e.g., Marc Rich & Co. v. United States (2d Cir. 1984) 731 F.2d 1032 ; People v. Pic’l (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 824 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 106 ]; Glade v. Superior Court (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 738 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 119 ]; Evid.	1	1994–1994
Tiedemann v. Superior Court green calctapp · 1978 1 sentence 1984In Tiedemann v. Superior Court, supra, 83 Cal.App.3d 918 , we examined the scope of the statutory privilege in the context of a publication made during an “official proceeding authorized by law.” (Civ.	1	1984–1984
McRae v. Erickson green calctapp · 1905 1 sentence 1935We are satisfied on the facts and in view of the law as enunciated in the case of McRae v. Erickson, supra, that all of the information received, and to which the motion to strike was directed, is within the scope of the statutory privilege.	1	1935–1935

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CA § Cal. Penal Code § 245 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 10 (1935–2012) TX 9 (1992–2015) WV 6 (2015–2020) CT 4 (2002–2017) SC 3 (1992–2021) MI 3 (1991–2003) NJ 2 (1963–1988) OR 2 (2007–2007) OK 2 (2014–2014) KS 2 (1998–2026)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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