Sierra Club standard in California

2020An “actual controversy” for purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section 1060 includes “a probable future controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the parties” provided that the controversy is “ripe.” (Environmental Defense Project of Sierra County v. County of Sierra (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 877, 885 (Sierra).) The ripeness requirement is satisfied when the dispute has reached the point where the facts have sufficiently congealed to allow the court to make an intelligent and useful decision.

2020An “actual controversy” for purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section 1060 includes “a probable future controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the parties” provided that the controversy is “ripe.” (Environmental Defense Project of Sierra County v. County of Sierra (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 877, 885 (Sierra).) The ripeness requirement is satisfied when the dispute has reached the point where the facts have sufficiently congealed to allow the court to make an intelligent and useful decision.

2013That conclusion, which would be reviewed for abuse of discretion, "lies at the core of the lead agency's discretionary responsibility under CEQA and is, for that reason, not lightly to be overturned." (City of Marina v. Board of Trustees of the California State University, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 368 ; see also San Diego Citizenry Group v. County of San Diego (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1, 13 [a county's decision to approve a project despite its significant environmental impacts "is a discretionary policy decision" that "will be upheld as long as it is based on findings of overriding considerations

2008Rominger v. County of Trinity (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 655, 662 [ 195 Cal.Rptr. 186 ] [rejecting Sierra Club's claim that its strong interest in the enforcement of county's environmental laws was itself sufficient to afford it standing to intervene in action challenging the validity of an ordinance prohibiting the spraying of a specified chemical].) For similar reasons, we agree with the Court of Appeal that, absent a showing by the Fund that it possesses a direct legal interest that will be injured or adversely affected (which the Fund acknowledges has not been established here), [8] the Fund's

2008Rominger v. County of Trinity (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 655, 662 [ 195 Cal.Rptr. 186 ] [rejecting Sierra Club's claim that its strong interest in the enforcement of county's environmental laws was itself sufficient to afford it standing to intervene in action challenging the validity of an ordinance prohibiting the spraying of a specified chemical].) For similar reasons, we agree with the Court of Appeal that, absent a showing by the Fund that it possesses a direct legal interest that will be injured or adversely affected (which the Fund acknowledges has not been established here), [8] the Fund's

2008(See, e.g., Newland v. Kizer (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 647, 657 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 450 ]; Zetterberg v. State Dept. of Public Health (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 657, 662-663 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 100 ].) In this respect, the Fund is in a position no different from that of any other member of the public having a strong ideological or philosophical disagreement with a legal position advanced by a public entity that, through judicial compulsion or otherwise, continues to comply with a contested measure. [9] The Campaign argues alternatively that the superior court, in permitting these two actions to go forward notwi

2008(See, e.g., Newland v. Kizer (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 647, 657 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 450 ]; Zetterberg v. State Dept. of Public Health (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 657, 662-663 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 100 ].) In this respect, the Fund is in a position no different from that of any other member of the public having a strong ideological or philosophical disagreement with a legal position advanced by a public entity that, through judicial compulsion or otherwise, continues to comply with a contested measure. [9] The Campaign argues alternatively that the superior court, in permitting these two actions to go forward notwi

2008(See, e.g., Newland v. Kizer (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 647, 657 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 450 ]; Zetterberg v. State Dept. of Public Health (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 657, 662-663 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 100 ].) In this respect, the Fund is in a position no different from that of any other member of the public having a strong ideological or philosophical disagreement with a legal position advanced by a public entity that, through judicial compulsion or otherwise, continues to comply with a contested measure. [9] The Campaign argues alternatively that the superior court, in permitting these two actions to go forward notwi

2008(See, e.g., Newland v. Kizer (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 647, 657 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 450 ]; Zetterberg v. State Dept. of Public Health (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 657, 662-663 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 100 ].) In this respect, the Fund is in a position no different from that of any other member of the public having a strong ideological or philosophical disagreement with a legal position advanced by a public entity that, through judicial compulsion or otherwise, continues to comply with a contested measure. [9] The Campaign argues alternatively that the superior court, in permitting these two actions to go forward notwi

2006In criticizing the Freidberg court’s severability analysis, the Crowley court outlined a much simpler analysis to be applied, stating that a plaintiff in a malicious prosecution must establish “ ‘a favorable termination of the entire [underlying] action’ ” and that the other elements of the tort, such as probable cause, will only be reached after “ ‘judgment ha[s] been reached in the plaintiff’s favor in the prior action as a whole.’ ” (Crowley, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 686 , quoting Jenkins v. Pope (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1292, 1300 [ 266 Cal.Rptr. 557 ] (Jenkins); 14 Casa Herrera, supra, 32 Cal.

2006In criticizing the Freidberg court’s severability analysis, the Crowley court outlined a much simpler analysis to be applied, stating that a plaintiff in a malicious prosecution must establish “ ‘a favorable termination of the entire [underlying] action’ ” and that the other elements of the tort, such as probable cause, will only be reached after “ ‘judgment ha[s] been reached in the plaintiff’s favor in the prior action as a whole.’ ” (Crowley, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 686 , quoting Jenkins v. Pope (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1292, 1300 [ 266 Cal.Rptr. 557 ] (Jenkins); 14 Casa Herrera, supra, 32 Cal.

2006In criticizing the Freidberg court’s severability analysis, the Crowley court outlined a much simpler analysis to be applied, stating that a plaintiff in a malicious prosecution must establish “ ‘a favorable termination of the entire [underlying] action’ ” and that the other elements of the tort, such as probable cause, will only be reached after “ ‘judgment ha[s] been reached in the plaintiff’s favor in the prior action as a whole.’ ” (Crowley, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 686 , quoting Jenkins v. Pope (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1292, 1300 [ 266 Cal.Rptr. 557 ] (Jenkins); 14 Casa Herrera, supra, 32 Cal.

1998We agree with and adopt the First District’s Sierra Club standard of review as quoted above.” (Quail Botanical Gardens, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1601-1602, fn. omitted.) In a footnote, we further explained in Quail Botanical Gardens that “[o]ur task on appeal is ‘the same as the trial court’s.’ (Fund for Environmental Defense v. County of Orange (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1538, 1545 [ 252 Cal.Rptr. 79 ].) Thus, we conduct our review independent of the trial court’s findings.” (Quail Botanical Gardens, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1602, fn. 3 .) With these principles in mind, we now review the Co

1998We agree with and adopt the First District’s Sierra Club standard of review as quoted above.” (Quail Botanical Gardens, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1601-1602, fn. omitted.) In a footnote, we further explained in Quail Botanical Gardens that “[o]ur task on appeal is ‘the same as the trial court’s.’ (Fund for Environmental Defense v. County of Orange (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1538, 1545 [ 252 Cal.Rptr. 79 ].) Thus, we conduct our review independent of the trial court’s findings.” (Quail Botanical Gardens, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1602, fn. 3 .) With these principles in mind, we now review the Co

1998We agree with and adopt the First District’s Sierra Club standard of review as quoted above.” (Quail Botanical Gardens, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1601-1602, fn. omitted.) In a footnote, we further explained in Quail Botanical Gardens that “[o]ur task on appeal is ‘the same as the trial court’s.’ (Fund for Environmental Defense v. County of Orange (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1538, 1545 [ 252 Cal.Rptr. 79 ].) Thus, we conduct our review independent of the trial court’s findings.” (Quail Botanical Gardens, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1602, fn. 3 .) With these principles in mind, we now review the Co

1998We agree with and adopt the First District’s Sierra Club standard of review as quoted above.” (Quail Botanical Gardens, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1601-1602, fn. omitted.) In a footnote, we further explained in Quail Botanical Gardens that “[o]ur task on appeal is ‘the same as the trial court’s.’ (Fund for Environmental Defense v. County of Orange (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1538, 1545 [ 252 Cal.Rptr. 79 ].) Thus, we conduct our review independent of the trial court’s findings.” (Quail Botanical Gardens, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1602, fn. 3 .) With these principles in mind, we now review the Co

1994We agree with and adopt the First District's Sierra Club standard of review as quoted above. *1603 We decline to adopt the contrary minority view expressed in Newberry Springs Water Assn. v. County of San Bernardino (1984) 150 Cal. App.3d 740, 747-749 [ 198 Cal. Rptr. 100 ], in which the court ostensibly adopted the standard of review set forth in Friends of "B" Street v. City of Hayward, supra, 106 Cal. App.3d at page 1002 , but proceeded to apply it in the forgiving, deferential manner typifying the substantial evidence standard.

1994We agree with and adopt the First District's Sierra Club standard of review as quoted above. *1603 We decline to adopt the contrary minority view expressed in Newberry Springs Water Assn. v. County of San Bernardino (1984) 150 Cal. App.3d 740, 747-749 [ 198 Cal. Rptr. 100 ], in which the court ostensibly adopted the standard of review set forth in Friends of "B" Street v. City of Hayward, supra, 106 Cal. App.3d at page 1002 , but proceeded to apply it in the forgiving, deferential manner typifying the substantial evidence standard.

1994In any event, that case is inapposite and its deferential approach may be dicta, as the court concluded there was "no real evidence in the record, other than plaintiffs' opinion" that a 900-cow dairy farm would have a significant effect on the environment. ( Newberry Springs Water Assn. v. County of San Bernadino, supra, 150 Cal. App.3d at p. 749 .) Further, that same court may have abandoned its deferential approach when it later restated the generally accepted standard of review and concluded, "... if it is clear that considerable evidence was presented and that the evidence was not properly

1994In any event, that case is inapposite and its deferential approach may be dicta, as the court concluded there was "no real evidence in the record, other than plaintiffs' opinion" that a 900-cow dairy farm would have a significant effect on the environment. ( Newberry Springs Water Assn. v. County of San Bernadino, supra, 150 Cal. App.3d at p. 749 .) Further, that same court may have abandoned its deferential approach when it later restated the generally accepted standard of review and concluded, "... if it is clear that considerable evidence was presented and that the evidence was not properly

1989In deBottari v. City Council (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 1204, 1212 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 790 ], the Sierra Club rule of “invalid when passed” was also stated.

1989In deBottari v. City Council (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 1204, 1212 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 790 ], the Sierra Club rule of “invalid when passed” was also stated.

1973The Supreme Court stated, “[w]here the party does not rely on any specific statute authorizing invocation of the judicial process, the question of standing depends upon whether the party has alleged such a ‘personal stake in the outcome of the controversy,’ [citation omitted] as to ensure that ‘the dispute sought to be adjudicated will' be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution.” [Citation omitted.] Where, however, Congress . . . has provided by statute for judicial review . . . under certain circumstances, the inquiry as to standi

1973The Supreme Court stated, “[w]here the party does not rely on any specific statute authorizing invocation of the judicial process, the question of standing depends upon whether the party has alleged such a ‘personal stake in the outcome of the controversy,’ [citation omitted] as to ensure that ‘the dispute sought to be adjudicated will' be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution.” [Citation omitted.] Where, however, Congress . . . has provided by statute for judicial review . . . under certain circumstances, the inquiry as to standi