subject constitutes exception in California

2008(McLaughlin v. State Bd. of Education (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 196, 224-225 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 295 ] (McLaughlin); see also Tapia v. Pohlmann (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1133 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 ]; Conservatorship of Ivey (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1559, 1565 [ 231 Cal.Rptr. 376 ].) “ ‘ “[A] special statute dealing with a particular subject constitutes an exception so as to control and take precedence over a conflicting general statute on the same subject. [Citations.] . . . [N]otwithstanding that the general provision, standing alone, would be broad enough to include the subject to which the more partic

2008(McLaughlin v. State Bd. of Education (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 196, 224-225 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 295 ] (McLaughlin); see also Tapia v. Pohlmann (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1133 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 ]; Conservatorship of Ivey (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1559, 1565 [ 231 Cal.Rptr. 376 ].) “ ‘ “[A] special statute dealing with a particular subject constitutes an exception so as to control and take precedence over a conflicting general statute on the same subject. [Citations.] . . . [N]otwithstanding that the general provision, standing alone, would be broad enough to include the subject to which the more partic

2011Specific Versus General Statutes Turning to the principles of statutory interpretation that do not rely on an express indication of legislative intent, most straightforward is the principle that where there is a conflict between a general statute and a more specific one, the specific statute controls and will be treated as an exception to the general statute. ( McLaughlin, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at pp. 223-224.) As courts have explained, “ ‘Unless repealed expressly or by necessary implication, a special statute dealing with a particular subject constitutes an exception so as to control and tak

2011Specific Versus General Statutes Turning to the principles of statutory interpretation that do not rely on an express indication of legislative intent, most straightforward is the principle that where there is a conflict between a general statute and a more specific one, the specific statute controls and will be treated as an exception to the general statute. ( McLaughlin, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at pp. 223-224.) As courts have explained, “ ‘Unless repealed expressly or by necessary implication, a special statute dealing with a particular subject constitutes an exception so as to control and tak

1988(Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 392 , 420 . . . .) This is the case . . . notwithstanding that the general provision, standing alone, would be broad enough to include the subject to which the more particular one relates. [Citations.]” (Conservatorship of Ivey (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1559, 1565 [ 231 Cal.Rptr. 376 ]; see also People v. Gilbert (1969) 1 Cal.3d 475, 479 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 724 , 462 P.2d 580 ].) Thus, on its face, section 4000.4—as a later enacted special statute—appears to limit the more general provisions of section 4000, subdivision (a).

1986(Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 392, 420 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 183 , 546 P.2d 687 ]; 58 Cal.Jur.3d, Statutes, § 109, pp. 488-489.) This is the case regardless of whether the special provision is enacted before or after the general one (Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 420 ), and notwithstanding that the general provision, standing alone, would be broad enough to include the subject to which the more particular one relates.

2012He cannot assert error and thus shift to the state the burden to justify the tax ... .’ ” (Honeywell, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 739, 744 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 479 ]; see Apple, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1, 22 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 401 ].) While acknowledging this background law, Dicon argues that it is superseded by section 23622.7 because “ ‘a special statute dealing with a particular subject constitutes an exception so as to control and take precedence over a conflicting general statute on the same subject.’ ” (Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. Hetrick (1

2012He cannot assert error and thus shift to the state the burden to justify the tax ... .’ ” (Honeywell, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 739, 744 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 479 ]; see Apple, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1, 22 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 401 ].) While acknowledging this background law, Dicon argues that it is superseded by section 23622.7 because “ ‘a special statute dealing with a particular subject constitutes an exception so as to control and take precedence over a conflicting general statute on the same subject.’ ” (Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. Hetrick (1

2012He cannot assert error and thus shift to the state the burden to justify the tax ... .’ ” (Honeywell, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 739, 744 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 479 ]; see Apple, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1, 22 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 401 ].) While acknowledging this background law, Dicon argues that it is superseded by section 23622.7 because “ ‘a special statute dealing with a particular subject constitutes an exception so as to control and take precedence over a conflicting general statute on the same subject.’ ” (Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. Hetrick (1

2012He cannot assert error and thus shift to the state the burden to justify the tax ... .’ ” (Honeywell, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 739, 744 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 479 ]; see Apple, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1, 22 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 401 ].) While acknowledging this background law, Dicon argues that it is superseded by section 23622.7 because “ ‘a special statute dealing with a particular subject constitutes an exception so as to control and take precedence over a conflicting general statute on the same subject.’ ” (Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. Hetrick (1

2012He cannot assert error and thus shift to the state the burden to justify the tax ... .’ ” (Honeywell, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 739, 744 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 479 ]; see Apple, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1, 22 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 401 ].) While acknowledging this background law, Dicon argues that it is superseded by section 23622.7 because “ ‘a special statute dealing with a particular subject constitutes an exception so as to control and take precedence over a conflicting general statute on the same subject.’ ” (Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. Hetrick (1

2012He cannot assert error and thus shift to the state the burden to justify the tax ... .’ ” (Honeywell, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 739, 744 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 479 ]; see Apple, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1, 22 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 401 ].) While acknowledging this background law, Dicon argues that it is superseded by section 23622.7 because “ ‘a special statute dealing with a particular subject constitutes an exception so as to control and take precedence over a conflicting general statute on the same subject.’ ” (Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. Hetrick (1

2011Specific Versus General Statutes Turning to the principles of statutory interpretation that do not rely on an express indication of legislative intent, most straightforward is the principle that where there is a conflict between a general statute and a more specific one, the specific statute controls and will be treated as an exception to the general statute. ( McLaughlin, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at pp. 223-224.) As courts have explained, “ ‘Unless repealed expressly or by necessary implication, a special statute dealing with a particular subject constitutes an exception so as to control and tak

2011Specific Versus General Statutes Turning to the principles of statutory interpretation that do not rely on an express indication of legislative intent, most straightforward is the principle that where there is a conflict between a general statute and a more specific one, the specific statute controls and will be treated as an exception to the general statute. ( McLaughlin, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at pp. 223-224.) As courts have explained, “ ‘Unless repealed expressly or by necessary implication, a special statute dealing with a particular subject constitutes an exception so as to control and tak

2011(Mejia, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 666 [“Neither statute appears to be significantly more specific than the other.”].) The present case is not one in which it can be said that one of the applicable statutory provisions is more specific than the other.

2008(McLaughlin v. State Bd. of Education (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 196, 224-225 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 295 ] (McLaughlin); see also Tapia v. Pohlmann (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1133 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 ]; Conservatorship of Ivey (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1559, 1565 [ 231 Cal.Rptr. 376 ].) “ ‘ “[A] special statute dealing with a particular subject constitutes an exception so as to control and take precedence over a conflicting general statute on the same subject. [Citations.] . . . [N]otwithstanding that the general provision, standing alone, would be broad enough to include the subject to which the more partic

2008(McLaughlin v. State Bd. of Education (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 196, 224-225 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 295 ] (McLaughlin); see also Tapia v. Pohlmann (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1133 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 ]; Conservatorship of Ivey (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1559, 1565 [ 231 Cal.Rptr. 376 ].) “ ‘ “[A] special statute dealing with a particular subject constitutes an exception so as to control and take precedence over a conflicting general statute on the same subject. [Citations.] . . . [N]otwithstanding that the general provision, standing alone, would be broad enough to include the subject to which the more partic

1999“Unless repealed expressly or by necessary implication, a special statute dealing with a particular subject constitutes an exception so as to control and take precedence over a conflicting general statute on the same subject. [Citations.] This is the case regardless of whether the special provision is enacted before or after the general one [citation], and notwithstanding that the general provision, standing alone, would be broad enough to include the subject to which the more particular one relates.” (Conservatorship of Ivey (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1559, 1565 [ 231 Cal.Rptr. 376 ]; People v. Ta

1999“Unless repealed expressly or by necessary implication, a special statute dealing with a particular subject constitutes an exception so as to control and take precedence over a conflicting general statute on the same subject. [Citations.] This is the case regardless of whether the special provision is enacted before or after the general one [citation], and notwithstanding that the general provision, standing alone, would be broad enough to include the subject to which the more particular one relates.” (Conservatorship of Ivey (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1559, 1565 [ 231 Cal.Rptr. 376 ]; People v. Ta

1999“Where ‘a general statute conflicts with a specific statute the specific statute controls the general one. [Citations.] The referent of ‘general’ and ‘specific’ is subject matter.’ (People v. Weatherill (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1569 , 1577-1578 . . . ; see also Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 168 , 178-179 . . . ; Yoffie v. Marin Hospital Dist. (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 743 , 748 . . . ; Conservatorship of Ivey (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1559 , 1565 . . . .” (Tapia, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1133 , fn. omitted.) The court explained, “ ‘Unless repealed ex

1988(Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 392 , 420 . . . .) This is the case . . . notwithstanding that the general provision, standing alone, would be broad enough to include the subject to which the more particular one relates. [Citations.]” (Conservatorship of Ivey (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1559, 1565 [ 231 Cal.Rptr. 376 ]; see also People v. Gilbert (1969) 1 Cal.3d 475, 479 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 724 , 462 P.2d 580 ].) Thus, on its face, section 4000.4—as a later enacted special statute—appears to limit the more general provisions of section 4000, subdivision (a).

1988(Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 392 , 420 . . . .) This is the case . . . notwithstanding that the general provision, standing alone, would be broad enough to include the subject to which the more particular one relates. [Citations.]” (Conservatorship of Ivey (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1559, 1565 [ 231 Cal.Rptr. 376 ]; see also People v. Gilbert (1969) 1 Cal.3d 475, 479 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 724 , 462 P.2d 580 ].) Thus, on its face, section 4000.4—as a later enacted special statute—appears to limit the more general provisions of section 4000, subdivision (a).

1937Co., 142 Cal. 383, 387 [ 77 Pac. 939 ]; Castagnino v. Balletta, 82 Cal. 250 [ 23 Pac. 127 ]), where the only instruction requested by the defendant on the subject constitutes a waiver of the plea, and said instruction is given, the defense cannot be reinstated thereafter on motion for new trial.

1937Co., 142 Cal. 383, 387 [ 77 Pac. 939 ]; Castagnino v. Balletta, 82 Cal. 250 [ 23 Pac. 127 ]), where the only instruction requested by the defendant on the subject constitutes a waiver of the plea, and said instruction is given, the defense cannot be reinstated thereafter on motion for new trial.