substitution hearing in California

2019(Harrington v. Superior Court (1924) 194 Cal. 185, 188 ; People v. Ainsworth (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 247, 255 .) We will therefore review the court’s decision that Brown had jurisdiction to hold the substitution hearing.

2018(See Black's Law Dict. (10th ed. 2014) p. 980, col. 1 [defining "jurisdiction" as "[a] court's power to decide a case or issue a decree"]; id. , at p. 983, col. 2 [defining "subject-matter jurisdiction" as "[j]urisdiction over the nature of the case and the type of relief sought; the extent to which a court can rule on the conduct of persons or the status of things"].) And a litigant cannot correct a jurisdictional deficiency by failing to object. ( Harrington v. Superior Court (1924) 194 Cal. 185 , 188, 228 P. 15 ; People v. Ainsworth (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 247 , 255, 266 Cal.Rptr. 175 .) We w

2019Therefore, we will “exercise our own judgment” regarding “whether appellant received a fair administrative trial.” (Vollstedt v. City of Stockton (1990) 17 220 Cal.App.3d 265, 273 .) Exercising such judgment, we conclude that JMS received the due process required for a substitution hearing.

2018Therefore, we will "exercise our own judgment" regarding "whether appellant received a fair administrative trial." ( Vollstedt v. City of Stockton (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 265 , 273, 269 Cal.Rptr. 404 .) Exercising such judgment, we conclude that JMS received the due process required for a substitution hearing.

2019What procedural safeguards are necessary to achieve due process “varies according to specific factual contexts” and depends on “a complexity of factors,” including “nature of the alleged right involved, the nature of the proceeding, and the possible burden on that proceeding.” (Hannah, supra, 363 U.S. at p. 442 .) Due process ultimately requires that proceedings “ ‘ “be tailored, in light of the decision to be made, to ‘the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard,’ [citation] . . . to insure that they are given a meaningful opportunity to present their case.” ’ ” (Doe v. Rege

2018What procedural safeguards are necessary to achieve due process "varies according to specific factual contexts" and depends on "a complexity of factors," including "nature of the alleged right involved, the nature of the proceeding, and the possible burden on that proceeding." ( Hannah, supra, 363 U.S. at p. 442 , 80 S.Ct. 1502 .) Due process ultimately requires that proceedings " ' "be tailored, in light of the decision to be made, to 'the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard,' [citation] ... to insure that they are given a meaningful opportunity to present their case." '

2019(Harrington v. Superior Court (1924) 194 Cal. 185, 188 ; People v. Ainsworth (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 247, 255 .) We will therefore review the court’s decision that Brown had jurisdiction to hold the substitution hearing.

2018(See Black's Law Dict. (10th ed. 2014) p. 980, col. 1 [defining "jurisdiction" as "[a] court's power to decide a case or issue a decree"]; id. , at p. 983, col. 2 [defining "subject-matter jurisdiction" as "[j]urisdiction over the nature of the case and the type of relief sought; the extent to which a court can rule on the conduct of persons or the status of things"].) And a litigant cannot correct a jurisdictional deficiency by failing to object. ( Harrington v. Superior Court (1924) 194 Cal. 185 , 188, 228 P. 15 ; People v. Ainsworth (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 247 , 255, 266 Cal.Rptr. 175 .) We w

2018(See Napa Citizens for Honest Government v. Napa County Bd. of Supervisors (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 342 , 357-358, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 579 [recognizing county must have power to modify land use plans].) Allowing future substitutions for equal or more efficient technology to mitigate a project's acknowledged significant effects promotes CEQA's goal of environmental protection and is not an impermissible deferral of mitigation or an abuse of discretion.

2018(See Napa Citizens for Honest Government v. Napa County Bd. of Supervisors (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 342 , 357-358, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 579 [recognizing county must have power to modify land use plans].) Allowing future substitutions for equal or more efficient technology to mitigate a project's acknowledged significant effects promotes CEQA's goal of environmental protection and is not an impermissible deferral of mitigation or an abuse of discretion.

2018Our review is de novo, as this issue presents a pure question of law. ( Nasha v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 470 , 482, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 772 .) *956 JMS argues that the literal language of section 4107 supports its jurisdictional argument, and that any other reading would make section 4114 superfluous.

2018Our review is de novo, as this issue presents a pure question of law. ( Nasha v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 470 , 482, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 772 .) *956 JMS argues that the literal language of section 4107 supports its jurisdictional argument, and that any other reading would make section 4114 superfluous.

2018(See Hannah v. Larche (1960) 363 U.S. 420 , 442, 80 S.Ct. 1502 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1307 ( Hannah ).) Second, whether Brown's Substitution Decision substantially affects a fundamental vested right dictates the standard of review we must apply to JMS's arguments regarding the sufficiency of the evidence. ( Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28 , 32, 112 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 520 P.2d 29 ( Strumsky ); Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130 , 144, 93 Cal.Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ( Bixby ) .) Because the nature and scope of the rights implicated are threshold issues, we discuss

2018(See Hannah v. Larche (1960) 363 U.S. 420 , 442, 80 S.Ct. 1502 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1307 ( Hannah ).) Second, whether Brown's Substitution Decision substantially affects a fundamental vested right dictates the standard of review we must apply to JMS's arguments regarding the sufficiency of the evidence. ( Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28 , 32, 112 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 520 P.2d 29 ( Strumsky ); Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130 , 144, 93 Cal.Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ( Bixby ) .) Because the nature and scope of the rights implicated are threshold issues, we discuss

2018(See Hannah v. Larche (1960) 363 U.S. 420 , 442, 80 S.Ct. 1502 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1307 ( Hannah ).) Second, whether Brown's Substitution Decision substantially affects a fundamental vested right dictates the standard of review we must apply to JMS's arguments regarding the sufficiency of the evidence. ( Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28 , 32, 112 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 520 P.2d 29 ( Strumsky ); Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130 , 144, 93 Cal.Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ( Bixby ) .) Because the nature and scope of the rights implicated are threshold issues, we discuss

2018(See Hannah v. Larche (1960) 363 U.S. 420 , 442, 80 S.Ct. 1502 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1307 ( Hannah ).) Second, whether Brown's Substitution Decision substantially affects a fundamental vested right dictates the standard of review we must apply to JMS's arguments regarding the sufficiency of the evidence. ( Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28 , 32, 112 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 520 P.2d 29 ( Strumsky ); Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130 , 144, 93 Cal.Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ( Bixby ) .) Because the nature and scope of the rights implicated are threshold issues, we discuss

2008Webb Corp. (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 312, 318-319 , 175 Cal.Rptr. 301 .) Thus, a wrongfully-replaced subcontractor has every incentive to demand a substitution hearing in order to pursue its remedy of damages.

2008Webb Corp. (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 312, 318-319 , 175 Cal.Rptr. 301 .) Thus, a wrongfully-replaced subcontractor has every incentive to demand a substitution hearing in order to pursue its remedy of damages.

1992(Todhunter v. Klemmer (1901) 134 Cal. 60, 63 [ 66 P. 75 ]; Martin v. Wagner (1899) 124 Cal. 204, 205 [ 56 P. 1023 ]; Wallace v. Center (1885) 67 Cal. 133, 134 [ 7 P. 441 ]; Tyrrell v. Baldwin (1885) 67 Cal. 1, 4-5 [ 6 P. 867 ]; Phelan v. Tyler (1883) 64 Cal. 80, 82-83 [ 28 P. 114 ]; Machado v. Flores (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 759, 761-763 [ 171 P.2d 440 ]; Garrison v. Blanchard (1932) 127 Cal.App. 616 [ 16 P.2d 273 ]; Hogan v. Superior Court (1925) 74 Cal.App. 704 [ 241 P. 584 ].) 6 Although the decision in Herring appears inconsistent with the decision in Smith v. Bear Valley etc. Co., supra, 26 C

1992(Todhunter v. Klemmer (1901) 134 Cal. 60, 63 [ 66 P. 75 ]; Martin v. Wagner (1899) 124 Cal. 204, 205 [ 56 P. 1023 ]; Wallace v. Center (1885) 67 Cal. 133, 134 [ 7 P. 441 ]; Tyrrell v. Baldwin (1885) 67 Cal. 1, 4-5 [ 6 P. 867 ]; Phelan v. Tyler (1883) 64 Cal. 80, 82-83 [ 28 P. 114 ]; Machado v. Flores (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 759, 761-763 [ 171 P.2d 440 ]; Garrison v. Blanchard (1932) 127 Cal.App. 616 [ 16 P.2d 273 ]; Hogan v. Superior Court (1925) 74 Cal.App. 704 [ 241 P. 584 ].) 6 Although the decision in Herring appears inconsistent with the decision in Smith v. Bear Valley etc. Co., supra, 26 C

1992(Todhunter v. Klemmer (1901) 134 Cal. 60, 63 [ 66 P. 75 ]; Martin v. Wagner (1899) 124 Cal. 204, 205 [ 56 P. 1023 ]; Wallace v. Center (1885) 67 Cal. 133, 134 [ 7 P. 441 ]; Tyrrell v. Baldwin (1885) 67 Cal. 1, 4-5 [ 6 P. 867 ]; Phelan v. Tyler (1883) 64 Cal. 80, 82-83 [ 28 P. 114 ]; Machado v. Flores (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 759, 761-763 [ 171 P.2d 440 ]; Garrison v. Blanchard (1932) 127 Cal.App. 616 [ 16 P.2d 273 ]; Hogan v. Superior Court (1925) 74 Cal.App. 704 [ 241 P. 584 ].) 6 Although the decision in Herring appears inconsistent with the decision in Smith v. Bear Valley etc. Co., supra, 26 C

1992(Todhunter v. Klemmer (1901) 134 Cal. 60, 63 [ 66 P. 75 ]; Martin v. Wagner (1899) 124 Cal. 204, 205 [ 56 P. 1023 ]; Wallace v. Center (1885) 67 Cal. 133, 134 [ 7 P. 441 ]; Tyrrell v. Baldwin (1885) 67 Cal. 1, 4-5 [ 6 P. 867 ]; Phelan v. Tyler (1883) 64 Cal. 80, 82-83 [ 28 P. 114 ]; Machado v. Flores (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 759, 761-763 [ 171 P.2d 440 ]; Garrison v. Blanchard (1932) 127 Cal.App. 616 [ 16 P.2d 273 ]; Hogan v. Superior Court (1925) 74 Cal.App. 704 [ 241 P. 584 ].) 6 Although the decision in Herring appears inconsistent with the decision in Smith v. Bear Valley etc. Co., supra, 26 C

1992(Todhunter v. Klemmer (1901) 134 Cal. 60, 63 [ 66 P. 75 ]; Martin v. Wagner (1899) 124 Cal. 204, 205 [ 56 P. 1023 ]; Wallace v. Center (1885) 67 Cal. 133, 134 [ 7 P. 441 ]; Tyrrell v. Baldwin (1885) 67 Cal. 1, 4-5 [ 6 P. 867 ]; Phelan v. Tyler (1883) 64 Cal. 80, 82-83 [ 28 P. 114 ]; Machado v. Flores (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 759, 761-763 [ 171 P.2d 440 ]; Garrison v. Blanchard (1932) 127 Cal.App. 616 [ 16 P.2d 273 ]; Hogan v. Superior Court (1925) 74 Cal.App. 704 [ 241 P. 584 ].) 6 Although the decision in Herring appears inconsistent with the decision in Smith v. Bear Valley etc. Co., supra, 26 C

1970Superior Court, 13 Cal.2d 368 [ 90 P.2d 63 , 124 A.L.R. 719 ] and deleted from the section in 1967.

1970Superior Court, 13 Cal.2d 368 [ 90 P.2d 63 , 124 A.L.R. 719 ] and deleted from the section in 1967.

1970We find that the authorities support the proposition that the judgment creditor can pay the plaintiff directly and that the latter can give a satisfaction of judgment. 15 (Calvert v. Stoner, 33 Cal.2d 97, 103 [ 199 P.2d 297 ] [contingent fee provision that client cannot compromise without consent of counsel void as against public policy]; Ferrea v. Tubbs, 125 Cal. 687 [ 58 P. 308 ] [tender to client only was valid and stopped running of interest]; 6 Cal.Jur.2d, Rev., Attorneys at Law, § 86, p. 146 [since client can discharge attorney at will he should be able to settle at will]; 26 A.L.R.3d 67

1970We find that the authorities support the proposition that the judgment creditor can pay the plaintiff directly and that the latter can give a satisfaction of judgment. 15 (Calvert v. Stoner, 33 Cal.2d 97, 103 [ 199 P.2d 297 ] [contingent fee provision that client cannot compromise without consent of counsel void as against public policy]; Ferrea v. Tubbs, 125 Cal. 687 [ 58 P. 308 ] [tender to client only was valid and stopped running of interest]; 6 Cal.Jur.2d, Rev., Attorneys at Law, § 86, p. 146 [since client can discharge attorney at will he should be able to settle at will]; 26 A.L.R.3d 67

1963Respondent relies on the Howard case and on People v. Abbott, 47 Cal.2d 362 [ 303 P.2d 730 ], The decisions in each of those cases turned upon the fact that no prejudice had been shown.

1963Respondent relies on the Howard case and on People v. Abbott, 47 Cal.2d 362 [ 303 P.2d 730 ], The decisions in each of those cases turned upon the fact that no prejudice had been shown.

1958Co. (1952), 137 W.Va. 455 [ 72 S.E.2d 520, 521 , 34 A.L.R.2d 933 ].) And the purpose of a substitution clause is not to narrowly limit or defeat coverage, but to make the coverage reasonably definite as to the vehicle the insured intended normally to use, while at the same time permitting him to continue driving should the particular vehicle named be temporarily out of commission, thus enabling the insurer to issue a policy upon a rate fair to both insured and insurer, rather than one at a prohibitive premium for blanket coverage of any and all vehicles which the insured might own or operate.

1958Co. (1952), 137 W.Va. 455 [ 72 S.E.2d 520, 521 , 34 A.L.R.2d 933 ].) And the purpose of a substitution clause is not to narrowly limit or defeat coverage, but to make the coverage reasonably definite as to the vehicle the insured intended normally to use, while at the same time permitting him to continue driving should the particular vehicle named be temporarily out of commission, thus enabling the insurer to issue a policy upon a rate fair to both insured and insurer, rather than one at a prohibitive premium for blanket coverage of any and all vehicles which the insured might own or operate.

1958Co. (1952), 137 W.Va. 455 [ 72 S.E.2d 520, 521 , 34 A.L.R.2d 933 ].) And the purpose of a substitution clause is not to narrowly limit or defeat coverage, but to make the coverage reasonably definite as to the vehicle the insured intended normally to use, while at the same time permitting him to continue driving should the particular vehicle named be temporarily out of commission, thus enabling the insurer to issue a policy upon a rate fair to both insured and insurer, rather than one at a prohibitive premium for blanket coverage of any and all vehicles which the insured might own or operate.

1958Co. (1952), 137 W.Va. 455 [ 72 S.E.2d 520, 521 , 34 A.L.R.2d 933 ].) And the purpose of a substitution clause is not to narrowly limit or defeat coverage, but to make the coverage reasonably definite as to the vehicle the insured intended normally to use, while at the same time permitting him to continue driving should the particular vehicle named be temporarily out of commission, thus enabling the insurer to issue a policy upon a rate fair to both insured and insurer, rather than one at a prohibitive premium for blanket coverage of any and all vehicles which the insured might own or operate.

1958Co. (1952), 137 W.Va. 455 [ 72 S.E.2d 520, 521 , 34 A.L.R.2d 933 ].) And the purpose of a substitution clause is not to narrowly limit or defeat coverage, but to make the coverage reasonably definite as to the vehicle the insured intended normally to use, while at the same time permitting him to continue driving should the particular vehicle named be temporarily out of commission, thus enabling the insurer to issue a policy upon a rate fair to both insured and insurer, rather than one at a prohibitive premium for blanket coverage of any and all vehicles which the insured might own or operate.