unmeritorious claim in California

2022But the law in this area is clear, “[t]o require the trial court to close its eyes to an unmeritorious claim simply because the operative ground entitling the moving party to summary judgment was not specifically tendered by that party would elevate form over substance and would be inconsistent with the purpose of the summary judgment statute.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 69 .) We therefore conclude the issue was properly before the judge and she was correct to rule on it.

2021The court may deny the motion even if the court recognizes the legal significance of the undisputed material fact and knows it would entitle the party to summary judgment if the issue had been explicitly raised in the moving papers.” (Juge, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 68 .) 14 coupled with the pleadings, establishes the legal significance of the undisputed material fact. [Citation.] Thus, even though the moving party has overlooked the legal significance of a material fact, its existence is nonetheless fatal to the cause of action or defense thereto when the material fact is undisputed and ent

1990Accordingly, "`no enforceable claim accrues against the insurer until the insured's liability is in fact established.'" ( Moradi-Shalal, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 306 , quoting Williams v. Transport Indemnity Co. (1984) 157 Cal. App.3d 953, 960 [ 203 Cal. Rptr. 868 ].) In relation to section 790.03(h) claims, this principle of indemnity compelled that "If the insured is not liable for the claimant's injury, the claimant has no right to damages from the insured, and the claimant cannot be permitted to recover for `unfair conduct' by the insurer in refusing to settle an underlying unmeritorious cla

1990Accordingly, "`no enforceable claim accrues against the insurer until the insured's liability is in fact established.'" ( Moradi-Shalal, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 306 , quoting Williams v. Transport Indemnity Co. (1984) 157 Cal. App.3d 953, 960 [ 203 Cal. Rptr. 868 ].) In relation to section 790.03(h) claims, this principle of indemnity compelled that "If the insured is not liable for the claimant's injury, the claimant has no right to damages from the insured, and the claimant cannot be permitted to recover for `unfair conduct' by the insurer in refusing to settle an underlying unmeritorious cla

1989Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 711, 714 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 464 ], construing Royal Globe's holding that a bad faith claim could “not be brought until the action between the injured party and the insured is concluded” (Ro yal Globe, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 884 ) to mean that “ ‘the injured third party may not institute [a section 790.03] action until a judgment establishing the liability of the insured has been secured.’ ” (Moradi-Shalal, *1443 supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 309 .) In State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.

1989Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 711, 714 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 464 ], which had construed Royal Globe’s holding that a bad faith claim could “not be brought until the action between the injured party and the insured is concluded” (Royal Globe, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 884 ) to mean that “the injured third party may not institute [an Insurance Code section 790.03] action until a judgment establishing the liability of the insured has been secured.” 3 Thus, Moradi-Shalal held that “the insured’s liability must be judicially determined before a Royal Globe action can be brought.” (Moradi-Shala

2026(Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975 , 984–985; Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229 , 1246–1247.) This appeal falls well below these standards in multiple ways.

2026(Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984–985; Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246–1247.) This appeal falls well below these standards in multiple ways.

2026(Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975 , 984–985; Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229 , 1246–1247.) This appeal falls well below these standards in multiple ways.

2026(Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984–985; Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246–1247.) This appeal falls well below these standards in multiple ways.

2014(See, e.g., Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1267-1268, fn. 14 ; Villa v. McFerren (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 733, 751 .) We therefore reject the notion that procedural impropriety occurred and proceed to our de novo review of the court’s summary adjudication rulings. 16 Court Erred in Summary Adjudication of POBRA Claims We turn first to plaintiffs’ POBRA claims.

2013(Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 69-70 .) Consistent with Shapiro, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at pages 1546- 1548, the trial court correctly found that SIRVA fully performed its disclosure obligations under the purchase agreement.

1959Similar provisions have been held reasonable limitations upon the right to sue when applied to stockholder’s derivative suits (Beyerbach v. Juno Oil Co., 42 Cal.2d 11 [ 265 P.2d 1 ]) and to suits to enjoin the issuance of securities to acquire public utility works (Sacramento M.U.

1959Similar provisions have been held reasonable limitations upon the right to sue when applied to stockholder’s derivative suits (Beyerbach v. Juno Oil Co., 42 Cal.2d 11 [ 265 P.2d 1 ]) and to suits to enjoin the issuance of securities to acquire public utility works (Sacramento M.U.