unsuitability factors in California

2010Circumstances which taken alone may not firmly establish unsuitability for parole may contribute to a pattern which results in a finding of unsuitability.” (Regs., § 2402, subd. (b); see Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1202, fn. 6 [summarizing Regs., § 2281, subd. (b)].) Unsuitability factors stated in Regulations section 2402, subdivision (c), are (1) a commitment offense carried out in an “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner”; (2) a “Previous Record of Violence”; (3) “a history of unstable or tumultuous relationships with others”; (4) “Sadistic Sexual Offenses”; (5) “a lengthy hi

2010Circumstances which taken alone may not firmly establish unsuitability for parole may contribute to a pattern which results in a finding of unsuitability.” (Regs., § 2402, subd. (b); see Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1202, fn. 6 [summarizing Regs., § 2281, subd. (b)].) Unsuitability factors stated in Regulations section 2402, subdivision (c), are (1) a commitment offense carried out in an “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner”; (2) a “Previous Record of Violence”; (3) “a history of unstable or tumultuous relationships with others”; (4) “Sadistic Sexual Offenses”; (5) “a lengthy hi

2009As long as the [Board’s] decision reflects due consideration of the specified factors as applied to the individual prisoner in accordance with applicable legal standards, the court’s review is limited to ascertaining whether there is some evidence in the record that supports the [Board’s] decision.” (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 677.) However, the deferential review accorded the Board’s decision does not mean that courts simply mbber-stamp its determination as long as there is *1504 some evidence to support any of the unsuitability factors; the “standard is unquestionably deferential,

2009As long as the [Board’s] decision reflects due consideration of the specified factors as applied to the individual prisoner in accordance with applicable legal standards, the court’s review is limited to ascertaining whether there is some evidence in the record that supports the [Board’s] decision.” (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 677.) However, the deferential review accorded the Board’s decision does not mean that courts simply mbber-stamp its determination as long as there is *1504 some evidence to support any of the unsuitability factors; the “standard is unquestionably deferential,

2009As long as the [Board’s] decision reflects due consideration of the specified factors as applied to the individual prisoner in accordance with applicable legal standards, the court’s review is limited to ascertaining whether there is some evidence in the record that supports the [Board’s] decision.” (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 677.) However, the deferential review accorded the Board’s decision does not mean that courts simply mbber-stamp its determination as long as there is *1504 some evidence to support any of the unsuitability factors; the “standard is unquestionably deferential,

2009As long as the [Board’s] decision reflects due consideration of the specified factors as applied to the individual prisoner in accordance with applicable legal standards, the court’s review is limited to ascertaining whether there is some evidence in the record that supports the [Board’s] decision.” (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 677.) However, the deferential review accorded the Board’s decision does not mean that courts simply mbber-stamp its determination as long as there is *1504 some evidence to support any of the unsuitability factors; the “standard is unquestionably deferential,

2009As long as the [Board’s] decision reflects due consideration of the specified factors as applied to the individual prisoner in accordance with applicable legal standards, the court’s review is limited to ascertaining whether there is some evidence in the record that supports the [Board’s] decision.” (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 677 .) However, the deferential review accorded the Board’s decision does not mean that courts simply rubberstamp its determination as long as there is some evidence to support any of the unsuitability factors; the “standard is unquestionably deferential, but c

2009As long as the [Board’s] decision reflects due consideration of the specified factors as applied to the individual prisoner in accordance with applicable legal standards, the court’s review is limited to ascertaining whether there is some evidence in the record that supports the [Board’s] decision.” (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 677.) However, the deferential review accorded the Board’s decision does not mean that courts simply mbber-stamp its determination as long as there is *1504 some evidence to support any of the unsuitability factors; the “standard is unquestionably deferential,

2014(See, e.g., In re DeLuna (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 585, 597 [BPH concluded, contrary to psychological evaluations, that inmate needed therapy, and faulted inmate facing deportation for failing to learn English]; In re Scott (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 573, 597-603 ) [Governor misconceived inmate's history of violent crime and nature of the commitment offense]; In re Lee, at pp. 1411-1414 [Governor overstated seriousness of commitment offense and improperly faulted inmate for late acceptance of responsibility].) 13 IV ANALYSIS A. Analysis of Merits The Governor's decision here did not dispute that the

2012To the contrary, Lawrence called, instead, for reasoning.” (In re Criscione (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1461 [ 103 Cal.Rptr.3d 549 ].) However, as we will discuss, the application of reasoned analysis is not apparent from the reasons given by the Board for denying parole.

2012To the contrary, Lawrence called, instead, for reasoning.” (In re Criscione (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1461 [ 103 Cal.Rptr.3d 549 ].) However, as we will discuss, the application of reasoned analysis is not apparent from the reasons given by the Board for denying parole.

2010(See In re Smith (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 343, 366 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 655 ] [referring to these indicators in rejecting an argument that a defendant who murdered his wife by shooting her in the head acted with “ ‘exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering’ ”].) *1343 The Board, rather than discuss Juarez’s substance abuse, his years of sobriety and participation in recovery programs, and his plans to remain sober upon release, engaged in a rote recitation of the unsuitability factors listed in Regulations section 2402, subdivision (c)(1), that made little sense under the circumstances and

2010(See In re Smith (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 343, 366 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 655 ] [referring to these indicators in rejecting an argument that a defendant who murdered his wife by shooting her in the head acted with “ ‘exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering’ ”].) *1343 The Board, rather than discuss Juarez’s substance abuse, his years of sobriety and participation in recovery programs, and his plans to remain sober upon release, engaged in a rote recitation of the unsuitability factors listed in Regulations section 2402, subdivision (c)(1), that made little sense under the circumstances and

1989(Wylie v. Gresch (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 412, 417 [ 236 Cal.Rptr. 552 ]; Uccello v. Laudenslayer (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 504, 510 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 741 , 81 A.L.R.3d 628 ].) Dissatisfaction with the common law arbitrary classifications, the harsh results which left injured parties without effective remedies, and the unsuitability of the rule to the modern urban environment, led courts to develop numerous exceptions to the general rule effectively swallowing up the rule.

1989(Wylie v. Gresch (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 412, 417 [ 236 Cal.Rptr. 552 ]; Uccello v. Laudenslayer (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 504, 510 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 741 , 81 A.L.R.3d 628 ].) Dissatisfaction with the common law arbitrary classifications, the harsh results which left injured parties without effective remedies, and the unsuitability of the rule to the modern urban environment, led courts to develop numerous exceptions to the general rule effectively swallowing up the rule.

1989(Wylie v. Gresch (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 412, 417 [ 236 Cal.Rptr. 552 ]; Uccello v. Laudenslayer (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 504, 510 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 741 , 81 A.L.R.3d 628 ].) Dissatisfaction with the common law arbitrary classifications, the harsh results which left injured parties without effective remedies, and the unsuitability of the rule to the modern urban environment, led courts to develop numerous exceptions to the general rule effectively swallowing up the rule.

1989(Wylie v. Gresch (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 412, 417 [ 236 Cal.Rptr. 552 ]; Uccello v. Laudenslayer (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 504, 510 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 741 , 81 A.L.R.3d 628 ].) Dissatisfaction with the common law arbitrary classifications, the harsh results which left injured parties without effective remedies, and the unsuitability of the rule to the modern urban environment, led courts to develop numerous exceptions to the general rule effectively swallowing up the rule.

1989(Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 116-118 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 443 P.2d 561 , 32 A.L.R.3d 496 ]; Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts, (5th ed. 1984) § 63, pp. 434, 434-435.) 5 *779 In the landmark case of Rowland v. Christian, supra, 69 Cal.2d 108, the Supreme Court rejected the distinctions made by the common law as to invitees, licensees, and trespassers, and held that an owner or occupier of land owed the same standard of care as others.

1989(Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 116-118 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 443 P.2d 561 , 32 A.L.R.3d 496 ]; Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts, (5th ed. 1984) § 63, pp. 434, 434-435.) 5 *779 In the landmark case of Rowland v. Christian, supra, 69 Cal.2d 108, the Supreme Court rejected the distinctions made by the common law as to invitees, licensees, and trespassers, and held that an owner or occupier of land owed the same standard of care as others.