considerations waiver in Illinois

2023Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill. 2d 223, 225 (1967) (noting “the responsibility of a reviewing court for a just result and for the maintenance of a sound and uniform body of precedent may sometimes override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversary character of our system”); see People v. Lang, 346 Ill.

2023See Hux, 38 Ill. 2d at 225 (“the responsibility of a reviewing court for a just result and for the maintenance of a sound and uniform body of precedent may sometimes override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversary character of our system”). ¶ 120 The issue is whether Milan harbors an “actual conflict of interest” requiring his - 40 - 1-22-0372 disqualification under section 5/3-9008, given his admitted involvement in Muhammad’s prosecution.

2004This court “is not precluded from considering issues not properly preserved by the parties, and indeed has ‘the responsibility *** for a just result and for the maintenance of a sound and uniform body of precedent [that] may sometimes override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversary character of our system.’ ” Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Ley dig, Voit & Mayer, 158 Ill. 2d 240, 251 (1994), quoting Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill. 2d 223, 225 (1967).

2004This court "is not precluded from considering issues not properly preserved by the parties, and indeed has `the responsibility * * * for a just result and for the maintenance of a sound and uniform body of precedent [that] may sometimes override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversary character of our system.'" Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Leydig, Voit & Mayer, 158 Ill.2d 240, 251 , 198 Ill.Dec. 786 , 633 N.E.2d 627 (1994), quoting Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill.2d 223, 225 , 230 N.E.2d 831 (1967).

2020It is further in line with our supreme court’s recognition that the “ ‘responsibility of a reviewing court for a just result and for the maintenance of a sound and uniform body of precedent may sometimes override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversarial nature of our system.’ ” People v. Wilson, 155 Ill. 2d 374, 379 (1993) (quoting American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Council 31 v. County of Cook, 145 Ill. 2d 475, 480 (1991)). ¶ 38 Whether defendant’s act of walking in the street was an alternate basis for denying the motion to suppress was a question

2002We do not believe that a plaintiff “waives” at summary judgment a “method of proof.” “The rule of waiver is, of course, a limitation on the parties and not the courts.” Geise v. Phoenix Co. of Chicago, Inc., 159 Ill. 2d 507, 514 , 639 N.E.2d 1273 (1994). “[T]his court is not precluded from considering issues not properly preserved by the parties, and indeed has ‘the responsibility *** for a just result and for the maintenance of a sound and uniform body of precedent [that] may sometimes override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversary character of our system.’ [Citation.]” (E

2011Only the supreme court has authority to disregard forfeiture to maintain "a sound and uniform body of precedent which may sometimes `"override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversary character of our system."'" People v. Jones, 211 Ill.2d 140, 145 , 284 Ill.Dec. 287 , 809 N.E.2d 1233 (2004) (quoting People v. De La Paz, 204 Ill.2d 426, 432-33 , 274 Ill.Dec. 397 , 791 N.E.2d 489 (2003), quoting Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill.2d 223, 225 , 230 N.E.2d 831 (1967)). "[T]he appellate court [does] not possess [the supreme] court's supervisory authority to recognize procedurally defaulted clai

2011Only the supreme court has authority to disregard forfeiture to maintain "a sound and uniform body of precedent which may sometimes `"override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversary character of our system."'" People v. Jones, 211 Ill.2d 140, 145 , 284 Ill.Dec. 287 , 809 N.E.2d 1233 (2004) (quoting People v. De La Paz, 204 Ill.2d 426, 432-33 , 274 Ill.Dec. 397 , 791 N.E.2d 489 (2003), quoting Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill.2d 223, 225 , 230 N.E.2d 831 (1967)). "[T]he appellate court [does] not possess [the supreme] court's supervisory authority to recognize procedurally defaulted clai

2002We do not believe that a plaintiff “waives” at summary judgment a “method of proof.” “The rule of waiver is, of course, a limitation on the parties and not the courts.” Geise v. Phoenix Co. of Chicago, Inc., 159 Ill. 2d 507, 514 , 639 N.E.2d 1273 (1994). “[T]his court is not precluded from considering issues not properly preserved by the parties, and indeed has ‘the responsibility *** for a just result and for the maintenance of a sound and uniform body of precedent [that] may sometimes override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversary character of our system.’ [Citation.]” (E

2002We do not believe that a plaintiff “waives” at summary judgment a “method of proof.” “The rule of waiver is, of course, a limitation on the parties and not the courts.” Geise v. Phoenix Co. of Chicago, Inc., 159 Ill. 2d 507, 514 , 639 N.E.2d 1273 (1994). “[T]his court is not precluded from considering issues not properly preserved by the parties, and indeed has ‘the responsibility *** for a just result and for the maintenance of a sound and uniform body of precedent [that] may sometimes override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversary character of our system.’ [Citation.]” (E

2020Defendant asserts the State waived this argument by stating in its memorandum of law in opposition to his motion for discharge, “[d]efendant objected to two continuances—from September 19 to October 31, and October 31 to November 1.” Without addressing the merits of defendant’s assertion of waiver, we note the “long-recognized” legal principle that “the responsibility of a reviewing court for a just result *** may sometimes override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversarial nature of our system.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Wilson, 155 Ill. 2d 374, 379 , 614

2020It is further in line with our supreme court’s recognition that the “ ‘responsibility of a reviewing court for a just result and for the maintenance of a sound and uniform body of precedent may sometimes override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversarial nature of our system.’ ” People v. Wilson, 155 Ill. 2d 374, 379 (1993) (quoting American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Council 31 v. County of Cook, 145 Ill. 2d 475, 480 (1991)). ¶ 38 Whether defendant’s act of walking in the street was an alternate basis for denying the motion to suppress was a question

2021Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill. 2d 223, 224-25 (1967); Wagner Excello Foods, Inc. v. Fearn International, Inc., 235 Ill.

2020Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill. 2d 223, 224-25 (1967); Wagner Excello Foods, Inc. v. Fearn International, Inc., 235 Ill.

2003See also Flynn v. Ryan, 199 Ill. 2d 430 , 438 n.l (2002) (waiver is an admonition to the parties, not a limitation upon the powers of this court); Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill. 2d 223, 225 (1967) (this court has “the responsibility *** for a just result and for the maintenance of a sound and uniform body of precedent [that] may sometimes override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversary character of our system”). “ ‘Where statutes are enacted after judicial opinions are published, it must be presumed that the legislature acted with knowledge of the prevailing case law.’ ” Burrell v. S

2003See also Flynn v. Ryan, 199 Ill.2d 430 , 438 n. 1, 264 Ill.Dec. 710 , 771 N.E.2d 414 (2002) (waiver is an admonition to the parties, not a limitation upon the powers of this court); Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill.2d 223, 225 , 230 N.E.2d 831 (1967) (this court has "the responsibility * * * for a just result and for the maintenance of a sound and uniform body of precedent [that] may sometimes override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversary character of our system"). "`Where statutes are enacted after judicial opinions are published, it must be presumed that the legislature acted with k

2003See also Flynn v. Ryan, 199 Ill. 2d 430 , 438 n.l (2002) (waiver is an admonition to the parties, not a limitation upon the powers of this court); Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill. 2d 223, 225 (1967) (this court has “the responsibility *** for a just result and for the maintenance of a sound and uniform body of precedent [that] may sometimes override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversary character of our system”). “ ‘Where statutes are enacted after judicial opinions are published, it must be presumed that the legislature acted with knowledge of the prevailing case law.’ ” Burrell v. S

2003See also Flynn v. Ryan, 199 Ill.2d 430 , 438 n. 1, 264 Ill.Dec. 710 , 771 N.E.2d 414 (2002) (waiver is an admonition to the parties, not a limitation upon the powers of this court); Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill.2d 223, 225 , 230 N.E.2d 831 (1967) (this court has "the responsibility * * * for a just result and for the maintenance of a sound and uniform body of precedent [that] may sometimes override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversary character of our system"). "`Where statutes are enacted after judicial opinions are published, it must be presumed that the legislature acted with k

2003See also Flynn v. Ryan, 199 Ill. 2d 430 , 438 n.l (2002) (waiver is an admonition to the parties, not a limitation upon the powers of this court); Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill. 2d 223, 225 (1967) (this court has “the responsibility *** for a just result and for the maintenance of a sound and uniform body of precedent [that] may sometimes override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversary character of our system”). “ ‘Where statutes are enacted after judicial opinions are published, it must be presumed that the legislature acted with knowledge of the prevailing case law.’ ” Burrell v. S

2003See also Flynn v. Ryan, 199 Ill.2d 430 , 438 n. 1, 264 Ill.Dec. 710 , 771 N.E.2d 414 (2002) (waiver is an admonition to the parties, not a limitation upon the powers of this court); Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill.2d 223, 225 , 230 N.E.2d 831 (1967) (this court has "the responsibility * * * for a just result and for the maintenance of a sound and uniform body of precedent [that] may sometimes override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversary character of our system"). "`Where statutes are enacted after judicial opinions are published, it must be presumed that the legislature acted with k

1990Nevertheless, because it is the responsibility of the reviewing court for a just result and for the maintenance of a sound and uniform body of precedent, this court may sometimes override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversary character of our system and decide a case on a ground not raised by the parties. ( Hux v. Raben (1967), 38 Ill.2d 223, 224-25 , 230 N.E.2d 831 ; see also Schutzenhofer v. Granite City Steel Co. (1982), 93 Ill.2d 208, 210-11 , 66 Ill.Dec. 637 , 443 N.E.2d 563 ; Champaign National Bank v. Landers Seed Co. (1990), 194 Ill.App.3d 1019, 1022-25 , 141 Ill.De

1990Nevertheless, because it is the responsibility of the reviewing court for a just result and for the maintenance of a sound and uniform body of precedent, this court may sometimes override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversary character of our system and decide a case on a ground not raised by the parties. ( Hux v. Raben (1967), 38 Ill.2d 223, 224-25 , 230 N.E.2d 831 ; see also Schutzenhofer v. Granite City Steel Co. (1982), 93 Ill.2d 208, 210-11 , 66 Ill.Dec. 637 , 443 N.E.2d 563 ; Champaign National Bank v. Landers Seed Co. (1990), 194 Ill.App.3d 1019, 1022-25 , 141 Ill.De

2001American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Council 31 v. County of Cook, 145 Ill. 2d 475, 480 , 584 N.E.2d 116, 118-19 (1991) (‘the responsibility of a reviewing court for a just result and for the maintenance of a sound and uniform body of precedent may sometimes override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversarial nature of our system’).” (Emphasis added.) Thorpe, 318 Ill.

2001American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Council 31 v. County of Cook, 145 Ill.2d 475, 480 [ 164 Ill.Dec. 904 ], 584 N.E.2d 116, 118-19 (1991) (`the responsibility of a reviewing court for a just result and for the maintenance of a sound and uniform body of *50 precedent may sometimes override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversarial nature of our system')." (Emphasis added.) Thorpe, 318 Ill.

2011Only the supreme court has authority to disregard forfeiture to maintain "a sound and uniform body of precedent which may sometimes `"override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversary character of our system."'" People v. Jones, 211 Ill.2d 140, 145 , 284 Ill.Dec. 287 , 809 N.E.2d 1233 (2004) (quoting People v. De La Paz, 204 Ill.2d 426, 432-33 , 274 Ill.Dec. 397 , 791 N.E.2d 489 (2003), quoting Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill.2d 223, 225 , 230 N.E.2d 831 (1967)). "[T]he appellate court [does] not possess [the supreme] court's supervisory authority to recognize procedurally defaulted clai

2011Only the supreme court has authority to disregard forfeiture to maintain "a sound and uniform body of precedent which may sometimes `"override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversary character of our system."'" People v. Jones, 211 Ill.2d 140, 145 , 284 Ill.Dec. 287 , 809 N.E.2d 1233 (2004) (quoting People v. De La Paz, 204 Ill.2d 426, 432-33 , 274 Ill.Dec. 397 , 791 N.E.2d 489 (2003), quoting Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill.2d 223, 225 , 230 N.E.2d 831 (1967)). "[T]he appellate court [does] not possess [the supreme] court's supervisory authority to recognize procedurally defaulted clai

2023Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill. 2d 223, 225 (1967) (noting “the responsibility of a reviewing court for a just result and for the maintenance of a sound and uniform body of precedent may sometimes override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversary character of our system”); see People v. Lang, 346 Ill.

2021Kaczmarek does provide an example, as it were, of our supreme court allowing argument that “change[s] with evolving *** jurisprudence” (Kaczmarek, 207 Ill. 2d at 300 ), but it is not necessary to our holding. “[W]e have previously noted that Rule 341(e)(7) ‘states an admonition to the parties, not a limitation upon the jurisdiction of the reviewing court.’ [Citation.] Moreover, the ‘responsibility of a reviewing court for a just result and for the maintenance of a sound and uniform body of precedent may sometimes override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversarial nature of ou

1994(See People v. Lucas (1992), 151 Ill. 2d 461, 490 , 603 N.E.2d 460, 473 (invoking plain error rule to review the defendant’s waived claim that he was denied his sixth amendment right to fully cross-examine State’s witnesses); People v. Chandler (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 233, 242 , 543 N.E.2d 1290, 1293 (invoking plain error to review the defendant’s constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel which was not properly preserved for appeal).) 4 The same fundamental constitutional concerns encountered in Hudson are raised by defendant on appeal, albeit waived in both cases.

1994(See People v. Lucas (1992), 151 Ill. 2d 461, 490 , 603 N.E.2d 460, 473 (invoking plain error rule to review the defendant’s waived claim that he was denied his sixth amendment right to fully cross-examine State’s witnesses); People v. Chandler (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 233, 242 , 543 N.E.2d 1290, 1293 (invoking plain error to review the defendant’s constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel which was not properly preserved for appeal).) 4 The same fundamental constitutional concerns encountered in Hudson are raised by defendant on appeal, albeit waived in both cases.

1994(See People v. Lucas (1992), 151 Ill. 2d 461, 490 , 603 N.E.2d 460, 473 (invoking plain error rule to review the defendant’s waived claim that he was denied his sixth amendment right to fully cross-examine State’s witnesses); People v. Chandler (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 233, 242 , 543 N.E.2d 1290, 1293 (invoking plain error to review the defendant’s constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel which was not properly preserved for appeal).) 4 The same fundamental constitutional concerns encountered in Hudson are raised by defendant on appeal, albeit waived in both cases.

1994(See People v. Lucas (1992), 151 Ill. 2d 461, 490 , 603 N.E.2d 460, 473 (invoking plain error rule to review the defendant’s waived claim that he was denied his sixth amendment right to fully cross-examine State’s witnesses); People v. Chandler (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 233, 242 , 543 N.E.2d 1290, 1293 (invoking plain error to review the defendant’s constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel which was not properly preserved for appeal).) 4 The same fundamental constitutional concerns encountered in Hudson are raised by defendant on appeal, albeit waived in both cases.

1994The court rejected the plaintiff’s contention and held that Rule 366(a) or Rule 615(a), its functional equivalent in criminal appeals, empowered the reviewing court "to override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversary character of our system,” in order to achieve its paramount "responsibility *** for a just result and for the maintenance of a sound and uniform body of precedents.” Hux, 38 Ill. 2d at 225 , 230 N.E.2d at 832 ; see also People v. McAdrian (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 250, 253 , 287 N.E.2d 688, 690 ("[The waiver] rule has not been universally applied[, for t]here are matte

1994The court rejected the plaintiff’s contention and held that Rule 366(a) or Rule 615(a), its functional equivalent in criminal appeals, empowered the reviewing court "to override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversary character of our system,” in order to achieve its paramount "responsibility *** for a just result and for the maintenance of a sound and uniform body of precedents.” Hux, 38 Ill. 2d at 225 , 230 N.E.2d at 832 ; see also People v. McAdrian (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 250, 253 , 287 N.E.2d 688, 690 ("[The waiver] rule has not been universally applied[, for t]here are matte