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8 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1957–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Celestingreen2 sentences2020In concluding that such evidence constituted an impermissible sentencing factor, this Court recognized that “a sentencing court in one case cannot possibly know all of -8- J-A20045-20 the various considerations and factors underlying a negotiated plea in another case.” Id. at 680 . 2006See Commonwealth v. Celestin, 825 A.2d 670, 680 (Pa.Super.2003) (in rejecting such comparisons as unreasonable, noting that “a sentencing court in one case cannot possibly know all of the various considerations and factors underlying a negotiated plea in another case”). ¶22 Next, the sentencing court, apparently in justification of a more lenient sentence, noted that incarceration would be a hardship for McIntosh’s family because they were financially dependent on him. | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Beattygreen2 sentences1986“It is fundamental that a rule of law should not be applied where its application fails to serve the purposes for which it was designed.” Commonwealth v. Beatty, 500 Pa. 284, 291 , 455 A.2d 1194, 1198 (1983). 1986“It is fundamental that a rule of law should not be applied where its application fails to serve the purposes for which it was designed.” Commonwealth v. Beatty, 500 Pa. 284, 291 , 455 A.2d 1194, 1198 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Piloskygreen2 sentences1984See Commonwealth v. Pilosky, 239 Pa.Super. 233 , 362 A.2d 253 (1976) (applying rules regarding impeachment of defendants by use of convictions for crimes of dishonesty or false statements to defense witnesses ). 1984See Commonwealth v. Pilosky, 239 Pa.Super. 233 , 362 A.2d 253 (1976) (applying rules regarding impeachment of defendants by use of convictions for crimes of dishonesty or false statements to defense witnesses ). | 1 | 1 |
Shuman v. Shumangreen2 sentences1982Respondent’s ability to pay, the separate estate of the petitioner, the character, situation and surroundings of the parties are all to be considered in determining if an award is appropriate and, if so, the reasonable amount: Shuman v. Shuman, 195 Pa. Superior Ct. 155, 157-8 , 170 A. 2d 602, 603 (1961). 7. 1982Respondent’s ability to pay, the separate estate of the petitioner, the character, situation and surroundings of the parties are all to be considered in determining if an award is appropriate and, if so, the reasonable amount: Shuman v. Shuman, 195 Pa. Superior Ct. 155, 157-8 , 170 A. 2d 602, 603 (1961). 7. | 1 | 1 |
Gregg v. Georgiagreen2 sentences1977Gregg v. Georgia, supra, 428 U.S. at 175, 96 S.Ct. 2909 . 1977Gregg v. Georgia, supra, 428 U.S. at 175, 96 S.Ct. 2909 . | 1 | 1 |
Turner v. Pennsylvaniagreen2 sentences1957Upon a review of Turner’s first conviction, on certiorari to our judgment of affirmance, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the pertinent considerations left “open no other possible conclusion than that . . . [Turner’s] confession was obtained under circumstances which made its use at the trial a denial of due process” and that “the same considerations that bar admission of the confession by Turner made over his own name extend to his contemporaneous adoption of the Johnson and Lofton confessions” : see 338 U. S. 62, 65 . 1957Upon a review of Turner's first conviction, on certiorari to our judgment of affirmance, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the pertinent considerations left "open no other possible conclusion than that . . . [Turner's] confession was obtained under circumstances which made its use at the trial a denial of due process" and that "the same considerations that bar admission of the confession by Turner made over his own name extend to his contemporaneous adoption of the Johnson and Lofton confessions": see 338 U.S. 62, 65 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wiegand v. Wiegand
green
2 sentences1982The same considerations or factors are relevant whether a spouse seeks alimony pendente lite or counsel fees and costs: Wiegand v. Wiegand, 242 Pa. Superior Ct. 170 , 363 A. 2d 1215 (1976). 6. 1982The same considerations or factors are relevant whether a spouse seeks alimony pendente lite or counsel fees and costs: Wiegand v. Wiegand, 242 Pa. Superior Ct. 170 , 363 A. 2d 1215 (1976). 6. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Taylor v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.
green
2 sentences1980As to the proper considerations where the claim is that there has been invalid service of process and that the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment, see Johnson v. Atlas Van Lines, 274 Pa.Super. 253 , 418 A.2d 392 (1980); Liquid Carbonic Corp. v. Cooper & Reese, Inc., supra; Cobb v. Gray, 269 Pa.Super. 267 , 409 A.2d 882 (1979); Taylor v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 221 Pa.Super. 394 , 292 A.2d 481 (1972). 1980As to the proper considerations where the claim is that there has been invalid service of process and that the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment, see Johnson v. Atlas Van Lines, 274 Pa.Super. 253 , 418 A.2d 392 (1980); Liquid Carbonic Corp. v. Cooper & Reese, Inc., supra; Cobb v. Gray, 269 Pa.Super. 267 , 409 A.2d 882 (1979); Taylor v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 221 Pa.Super. 394 , 292 A.2d 481 (1972). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Cobb v. Gray
green
2 sentences1980As to the proper considerations where the claim is that there has been invalid service of process and that the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment, see Johnson v. Atlas Van Lines, 274 Pa.Super. 253 , 418 A.2d 392 (1980); Liquid Carbonic Corp. v. Cooper & Reese, Inc., supra; Cobb v. Gray, 269 Pa.Super. 267 , 409 A.2d 882 (1979); Taylor v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 221 Pa.Super. 394 , 292 A.2d 481 (1972). 1980As to the proper considerations where the claim is that there has been invalid service of process and that the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment, see Johnson v. Atlas Van Lines, 274 Pa.Super. 253 , 418 A.2d 392 (1980); Liquid Carbonic Corp. v. Cooper & Reese, Inc., supra; Cobb v. Gray, 269 Pa.Super. 267 , 409 A.2d 882 (1979); Taylor v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 221 Pa.Super. 394 , 292 A.2d 481 (1972). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Edward Bershad Co. v. Babe's Bar, Inc.
neutral
2 sentences1980As to whether judgment entered by confession should be opened, see Pa.R.Civ.P., No. 2959(e) (“[i]f evidence is produced which in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted to the jury the court shall open the judgment.”); Edward Bershad Co. v. Babe’s Bar, Inc., 254 Pa.Super. 477 , 386 A.2d 50 (1978). 2 . 1980As to whether judgment entered by confession should be opened, see Pa.R.Civ.P., No. 2959(e) (“[i]f evidence is produced which in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted to the jury the court shall open the judgment.”); Edward Bershad Co. v. Babe’s Bar, Inc., 254 Pa.Super. 477 , 386 A.2d 50 (1978). 2 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Johnson v. Atlas Van Lines
neutral
2 sentences1980As to the proper considerations where the claim is that there has been invalid service of process and that the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment, see Johnson v. Atlas Van Lines, 274 Pa.Super. 253 , 418 A.2d 392 (1980); Liquid Carbonic Corp. v. Cooper & Reese, Inc., supra; Cobb v. Gray, 269 Pa.Super. 267 , 409 A.2d 882 (1979); Taylor v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 221 Pa.Super. 394 , 292 A.2d 481 (1972). 1980As to the proper considerations where the claim is that there has been invalid service of process and that the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment, see Johnson v. Atlas Van Lines, 274 Pa.Super. 253 , 418 A.2d 392 (1980); Liquid Carbonic Corp. v. Cooper & Reese, Inc., supra; Cobb v. Gray, 269 Pa.Super. 267 , 409 A.2d 882 (1979); Taylor v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 221 Pa.Super. 394 , 292 A.2d 481 (1972). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Roberts v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences1977Although expressing a strong preference for individualized sentences rather than mandatory ones, *250 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 , 96 S.Ct. 2978 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976); Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 , 96 S.Ct. 3001 , 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976); Harry Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 , 97 S.Ct. 1993 , 52 L.Ed.2d 637 (1977); Green v. Oklahoma, 428 U.S. 907 , 96 S.Ct. 3216 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1214 (1976); Sparks v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 905 , 96 S.Ct. 3213 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1212 (1976), there is a suggestion that the "plurality" might find acceptable a narrowly-defined categor 1977Although expressing a strong preference for individualized sentences rather than mandatory ones, *250 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 , 96 S.Ct. 2978 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976); Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 , 96 S.Ct. 3001 , 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976); Harry Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 , 97 S.Ct. 1993 , 52 L.Ed.2d 637 (1977); Green v. Oklahoma, 428 U.S. 907 , 96 S.Ct. 3216 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1214 (1976); Sparks v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 905 , 96 S.Ct. 3213 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1212 (1976), there is a suggestion that the "plurality" might find acceptable a narrowly-defined categor | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Roberts v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences1977Although expressing a strong preference for individualized sentences rather than mandatory ones, *250 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 , 96 S.Ct. 2978 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976); Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 , 96 S.Ct. 3001 , 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976); Harry Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 , 97 S.Ct. 1993 , 52 L.Ed.2d 637 (1977); Green v. Oklahoma, 428 U.S. 907 , 96 S.Ct. 3216 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1214 (1976); Sparks v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 905 , 96 S.Ct. 3213 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1212 (1976), there is a suggestion that the "plurality" might find acceptable a narrowly-defined categor 1977Although expressing a strong preference for individualized sentences rather than mandatory ones, *250 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 , 96 S.Ct. 2978 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976); Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 , 96 S.Ct. 3001 , 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976); Harry Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 , 97 S.Ct. 1993 , 52 L.Ed.2d 637 (1977); Green v. Oklahoma, 428 U.S. 907 , 96 S.Ct. 3216 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1214 (1976); Sparks v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 905 , 96 S.Ct. 3213 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1212 (1976), there is a suggestion that the "plurality" might find acceptable a narrowly-defined categor | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Woodson v. North Carolina
green
2 sentences1977Although expressing a strong preference for individualized sentences rather than mandatory ones, *250 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 , 96 S.Ct. 2978 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976); Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 , 96 S.Ct. 3001 , 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976); Harry Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 , 97 S.Ct. 1993 , 52 L.Ed.2d 637 (1977); Green v. Oklahoma, 428 U.S. 907 , 96 S.Ct. 3216 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1214 (1976); Sparks v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 905 , 96 S.Ct. 3213 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1212 (1976), there is a suggestion that the "plurality" might find acceptable a narrowly-defined categor 1977Although expressing a strong preference for individualized sentences rather than mandatory ones, *250 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 , 96 S.Ct. 2978 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976); Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 , 96 S.Ct. 3001 , 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976); Harry Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 , 97 S.Ct. 1993 , 52 L.Ed.2d 637 (1977); Green v. Oklahoma, 428 U.S. 907 , 96 S.Ct. 3216 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1214 (1976); Sparks v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 905 , 96 S.Ct. 3213 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1212 (1976), there is a suggestion that the "plurality" might find acceptable a narrowly-defined categor | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Sparks v. North Carolina
green
2 sentences1977Although expressing a strong preference for individualized sentences rather than mandatory ones, *250 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 , 96 S.Ct. 2978 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976); Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 , 96 S.Ct. 3001 , 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976); Harry Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 , 97 S.Ct. 1993 , 52 L.Ed.2d 637 (1977); Green v. Oklahoma, 428 U.S. 907 , 96 S.Ct. 3216 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1214 (1976); Sparks v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 905 , 96 S.Ct. 3213 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1212 (1976), there is a suggestion that the "plurality" might find acceptable a narrowly-defined categor 1977Although expressing a strong preference for individualized sentences rather than mandatory ones, *250 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 , 96 S.Ct. 2978 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976); Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 , 96 S.Ct. 3001 , 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976); Harry Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 , 97 S.Ct. 1993 , 52 L.Ed.2d 637 (1977); Green v. Oklahoma, 428 U.S. 907 , 96 S.Ct. 3216 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1214 (1976); Sparks v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 905 , 96 S.Ct. 3213 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1212 (1976), there is a suggestion that the "plurality" might find acceptable a narrowly-defined categor | 1 | 1977–1977 |
LaVallee v. Mungo
green
2 sentences1977Gregg v. Georgia, supra. Although expressing a strong preference for individualized sentences rather than mandatory ones, Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 , 96 S.Ct. 2978 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976); Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 , 96 S.Ct. 3001 , 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976); Harry Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 , 97 S.Ct. 1993 , 52 L.Ed.2d 637 (1977); Green v. Oklahoma, 428 U.S. 907 , 96 S.Ct. 3216 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1214 (1976); Sparks v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 905 , 96 S.Ct. 3213 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1212 (1976), there is a suggestion that the “plurality” might find acceptable a narr 1977Although expressing a strong preference for individualized sentences rather than mandatory ones, *250 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 , 96 S.Ct. 2978 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976); Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 , 96 S.Ct. 3001 , 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976); Harry Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 , 97 S.Ct. 1993 , 52 L.Ed.2d 637 (1977); Green v. Oklahoma, 428 U.S. 907 , 96 S.Ct. 3216 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1214 (1976); Sparks v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 905 , 96 S.Ct. 3213 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1212 (1976), there is a suggestion that the "plurality" might find acceptable a narrowly-defined categor | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Justus v. Oklahoma
green
2 sentences1977Gregg v. Georgia, supra. Although expressing a strong preference for individualized sentences rather than mandatory ones, Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 , 96 S.Ct. 2978 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976); Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 , 96 S.Ct. 3001 , 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976); Harry Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 , 97 S.Ct. 1993 , 52 L.Ed.2d 637 (1977); Green v. Oklahoma, 428 U.S. 907 , 96 S.Ct. 3216 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1214 (1976); Sparks v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 905 , 96 S.Ct. 3213 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1212 (1976), there is a suggestion that the “plurality” might find acceptable a narr 1977Although expressing a strong preference for individualized sentences rather than mandatory ones, *250 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 , 96 S.Ct. 2978 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976); Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 , 96 S.Ct. 3001 , 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976); Harry Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 , 97 S.Ct. 1993 , 52 L.Ed.2d 637 (1977); Green v. Oklahoma, 428 U.S. 907 , 96 S.Ct. 3216 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1214 (1976); Sparks v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 905 , 96 S.Ct. 3213 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1212 (1976), there is a suggestion that the "plurality" might find acceptable a narrowly-defined categor | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.