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10 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1951–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Piz v. Housing Authoritygreen2 sentences2013"In the context of municipalities, the doctrine of equitable estoppel bars a city from enforcing some obligation by taking a position contrary to a previous representation reasonably relied upon by the party dealing with the city to his detriment." Kruse, 192 P.3d at 608 (quoting P-W Investments, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 655 P.2d 1365, 1372 (Colo.1982)). "[The doctrine of equitable estoppel has been invoked to cut off rights or privileges conferred by statute." Fanning v. Denver Urban Renewal Authority, 709 P.2d 22, 24-25 (Colo.App.1985) (quoting Johnson v. Neel, 123 Colo. 377, 388 , 229 P 2013"In the context of municipalities, the doctrine of equitable estoppel bars a city from enforcing some obligation by taking a position contrary to a previous representation reasonably relied upon by the party dealing with the city to his detriment." Kruse, 192 P.3d at 608 (quoting P-W Investments, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 655 P.2d 1365, 1372 (Colo.1982)). "[The doctrine of equitable estoppel has been invoked to cut off rights or privileges conferred by statute." Fanning v. Denver Urban Renewal Authority, 709 P.2d 22, 24-25 (Colo.App.1985) (quoting Johnson v. Neel, 123 Colo. 377, 388 , 229 P | 2 | 5 |
P-W Investments, Inc. v. City of Westminstergreen2 sentences2013A party asserting equitable estoppel must establish that (1) the party to be estopped knew the facts and either intended the conduct to be acted on or so acted that the party asserting estoppel must have been ignorant of the true facts, and (2) the party asserting estoppel must have reasonably relied on the other party's conduct with resulting injury. _P-W Investments, 655 P.2d at 18372 . 2013"In the context of municipalities, the doctrine of equitable estoppel bars a city from enforcing some obligation by taking a position contrary to a previous representation reasonably relied upon by the party dealing with the city to his detriment." Kruse, 192 P.3d at 608 (quoting P-W Investments, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 655 P.2d 1365, 1372 (Colo.1982)). "[The doctrine of equitable estoppel has been invoked to cut off rights or privileges conferred by statute." Fanning v. Denver Urban Renewal Authority, 709 P.2d 22, 24-25 (Colo.App.1985) (quoting Johnson v. Neel, 123 Colo. 377, 388 , 229 P | 1 | 1 |
Fanning v. Denver Urban Renewal Authoritygreen1 sentence2013"In the context of municipalities, the doctrine of equitable estoppel bars a city from enforcing some obligation by taking a position contrary to a previous representation reasonably relied upon by the party dealing with the city to his detriment." Kruse, 192 P.3d at 608 (quoting P-W Investments, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 655 P.2d 1365, 1372 (Colo.1982)). "[The doctrine of equitable estoppel has been invoked to cut off rights or privileges conferred by statute." Fanning v. Denver Urban Renewal Authority, 709 P.2d 22, 24-25 (Colo.App.1985) (quoting Johnson v. Neel, 123 Colo. 377, 388 , 229 P | 1 | 1 |
Jerome Jablon, M.D. v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2007By contrast, the doctrine of equitable estoppel is not a cause of action at all, but rather a defensive doctrine, which may be invoked “to bar a party from raising a defense or objection it otherwise would have, or from instituting an action which it is entitled to institute.” Jablon v. United States, 657 F.2d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir.1981); see also Piz v. Housing Auth. of the City & County of Denver, 132 Colo. 457, 463 , 289 P.2d 905, 908-909 (1955) (“The doctrine of equitable estoppel has been invoked to cut off rights or privilege conferred by statute ... ”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wilson v. Philadelphia School District
green
2 sentences1965Munsell v. People, 122 Colo. 420 , 222 P.2d 615 ; Kalloch v. Elward, 118 Me. 346 , 108 Atl. 256 , 8 A.L.R. 750 ; Wilson v. Philadelphia School District, 328 Penn. 225 , 195 Atl. 90 , 113 A.L.R. 1401 . ‘A statute cannot stand in the way of waiver or equitable estoppel when the facts demand their application in the interest of justice and right.’ Kalloch v. Elward, supra.” See also Sanger v. Larson Construction Co., 126 Colo. 479 , 251 P.2d 930 ; Piz v. Housing Authority, 132 Colo. 457 , 289 P.2d 905 ; Mabray v. Williams, 132 Colo. 523 , 291 P.2d 677 . 1965Munsell v. People, 122 Colo. 420 , 222 P.2d 615 ; Kalloch v. Elward, 118 Me. 346 , 108 Atl. 256 , 8 A.L.R. 750 ; Wilson v. Philadelphia School District, 328 Penn. 225 , 195 Atl. 90 , 113 A.L.R. 1401 . ‘A statute cannot stand in the way of waiver or equitable estoppel when the facts demand their application in the interest of justice and right.’ Kalloch v. Elward, supra.” See also Sanger v. Larson Construction Co., 126 Colo. 479 , 251 P.2d 930 ; Piz v. Housing Authority, 132 Colo. 457 , 289 P.2d 905 ; Mabray v. Williams, 132 Colo. 523 , 291 P.2d 677 . | 6 | 1951–1965 |
Munsell v. People
green
2 sentences1965Munsell v. People, 122 Colo. 420 , 222 P.2d 615 ; Kalloch v. Elward, 118 Me. 346 , 108 Atl. 256 , 8 A.L.R. 750 ; Wilson v. Philadelphia School District, 328 Penn. 225 , 195 Atl. 90 , 113 A.L.R. 1401 . ‘A statute cannot stand in the way of waiver or equitable estoppel when the facts demand their application in the interest of justice and right.’ Kalloch v. Elward, supra.” See also Sanger v. Larson Construction Co., 126 Colo. 479 , 251 P.2d 930 ; Piz v. Housing Authority, 132 Colo. 457 , 289 P.2d 905 ; Mabray v. Williams, 132 Colo. 523 , 291 P.2d 677 . 1965Munsell v. People, 122 Colo. 420 , 222 P.2d 615 ; Kalloch v. Elward, 118 Me. 346 , 108 Atl. 256 , 8 A.L.R. 750 ; Wilson v. Philadelphia School District, 328 Penn. 225 , 195 Atl. 90 , 113 A.L.R. 1401 . ‘A statute cannot stand in the way of waiver or equitable estoppel when the facts demand their application in the interest of justice and right.’ Kalloch v. Elward, supra.” See also Sanger v. Larson Construction Co., 126 Colo. 479 , 251 P.2d 930 ; Piz v. Housing Authority, 132 Colo. 457 , 289 P.2d 905 ; Mabray v. Williams, 132 Colo. 523 , 291 P.2d 677 . | 6 | 1951–1965 |
Kalloch v. Elward
green
2 sentences1965Munsell v. People, 122 Colo. 420 , 222 P.2d 615 ; Kalloch v. Elward, 118 Me. 346 , 108 Atl. 256 , 8 A.L.R. 750 ; Wilson v. Philadelphia School District, 328 Penn. 225 , 195 Atl. 90 , 113 A.L.R. 1401 . ‘A statute cannot stand in the way of waiver or equitable estoppel when the facts demand their application in the interest of justice and right.’ Kalloch v. Elward, supra.” See also Sanger v. Larson Construction Co., 126 Colo. 479 , 251 P.2d 930 ; Piz v. Housing Authority, 132 Colo. 457 , 289 P.2d 905 ; Mabray v. Williams, 132 Colo. 523 , 291 P.2d 677 . 1965Munsell v. People, 122 Colo. 420 , 222 P.2d 615 ; Kalloch v. Elward, 118 Me. 346 , 108 Atl. 256 , 8 A.L.R. 750 ; Wilson v. Philadelphia School District, 328 Penn. 225 , 195 Atl. 90 , 113 A.L.R. 1401 . ‘A statute cannot stand in the way of waiver or equitable estoppel when the facts demand their application in the interest of justice and right.’ Kalloch v. Elward, supra.” See also Sanger v. Larson Construction Co., 126 Colo. 479 , 251 P.2d 930 ; Piz v. Housing Authority, 132 Colo. 457 , 289 P.2d 905 ; Mabray v. Williams, 132 Colo. 523 , 291 P.2d 677 . | 6 | 1951–1965 |
Johnson v. Neel
green
2 sentences2013"In the context of municipalities, the doctrine of equitable estoppel bars a city from enforcing some obligation by taking a position contrary to a previous representation reasonably relied upon by the party dealing with the city to his detriment." Kruse, 192 P.3d at 608 (quoting P-W Investments, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 655 P.2d 1365, 1372 (Colo.1982)). "[The doctrine of equitable estoppel has been invoked to cut off rights or privileges conferred by statute." Fanning v. Denver Urban Renewal Authority, 709 P.2d 22, 24-25 (Colo.App.1985) (quoting Johnson v. Neel, 123 Colo. 377, 388 , 229 P 1985Chamberlain v. Poe, 127 Colo. 215 , 256 P.2d 229 (1953); Corporation of Presiding Bishop, supra. The fact that Fanning claims title to the alley pursuant to § 43-2-302, C.R.S., does not affect the application of equitable estoppel because “the doctrine of equitable estoppel has been invoked to cut off rights *25 or privileges conferred by statute.” Johnson v. Neel, 123 Colo. 377 , 229 P.2d 939 (1951); Mountain Stone Co. v. H. | 3 | 1952–2013 |
Sanger v. Larson Construction Co.
green
2 sentences1965Munsell v. People, 122 Colo. 420 , 222 P.2d 615 ; Kalloch v. Elward, 118 Me. 346 , 108 Atl. 256 , 8 A.L.R. 750 ; Wilson v. Philadelphia School District, 328 Penn. 225 , 195 Atl. 90 , 113 A.L.R. 1401 . ‘A statute cannot stand in the way of waiver or equitable estoppel when the facts demand their application in the interest of justice and right.’ Kalloch v. Elward, supra.” See also Sanger v. Larson Construction Co., 126 Colo. 479 , 251 P.2d 930 ; Piz v. Housing Authority, 132 Colo. 457 , 289 P.2d 905 ; Mabray v. Williams, 132 Colo. 523 , 291 P.2d 677 . 1965Munsell v. People, 122 Colo. 420 , 222 P.2d 615 ; Kalloch v. Elward, 118 Me. 346 , 108 Atl. 256 , 8 A.L.R. 750 ; Wilson v. Philadelphia School District, 328 Penn. 225 , 195 Atl. 90 , 113 A.L.R. 1401 . ‘A statute cannot stand in the way of waiver or equitable estoppel when the facts demand their application in the interest of justice and right.’ Kalloch v. Elward, supra.” See also Sanger v. Larson Construction Co., 126 Colo. 479 , 251 P.2d 930 ; Piz v. Housing Authority, 132 Colo. 457 , 289 P.2d 905 ; Mabray v. Williams, 132 Colo. 523 , 291 P.2d 677 . | 3 | 1965–1965 |
Mabray v. Williams
green
2 sentences1965Munsell v. People, 122 Colo. 420 , 222 P.2d 615 ; Kalloch v. Elward, 118 Me. 346 , 108 Atl. 256 , 8 A.L.R. 750 ; Wilson v. Philadelphia School District, 328 Penn. 225 , 195 Atl. 90 , 113 A.L.R. 1401 . ‘A statute cannot stand in the way of waiver or equitable estoppel when the facts demand their application in the interest of justice and right.’ Kalloch v. Elward, supra.” See also Sanger v. Larson Construction Co., 126 Colo. 479 , 251 P.2d 930 ; Piz v. Housing Authority, 132 Colo. 457 , 289 P.2d 905 ; Mabray v. Williams, 132 Colo. 523 , 291 P.2d 677 . 1965Munsell v. People, 122 Colo. 420 , 222 P.2d 615 ; Kalloch v. Elward, 118 Me. 346 , 108 Atl. 256 , 8 A.L.R. 750 ; Wilson v. Philadelphia School District, 328 Penn. 225 , 195 Atl. 90 , 113 A.L.R. 1401 . ‘A statute cannot stand in the way of waiver or equitable estoppel when the facts demand their application in the interest of justice and right.’ Kalloch v. Elward, supra.” See also Sanger v. Larson Construction Co., 126 Colo. 479 , 251 P.2d 930 ; Piz v. Housing Authority, 132 Colo. 457 , 289 P.2d 905 ; Mabray v. Williams, 132 Colo. 523 , 291 P.2d 677 . | 3 | 1965–1965 |
Kruse v. Town of Castle Rock
green
1 sentence2013"In the context of municipalities, the doctrine of equitable estoppel bars a city from enforcing some obligation by taking a position contrary to a previous representation reasonably relied upon by the party dealing with the city to his detriment." Kruse, 192 P.3d at 608 (quoting P-W Investments, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 655 P.2d 1365, 1372 (Colo.1982)). "[The doctrine of equitable estoppel has been invoked to cut off rights or privileges conferred by statute." Fanning v. Denver Urban Renewal Authority, 709 P.2d 22, 24-25 (Colo.App.1985) (quoting Johnson v. Neel, 123 Colo. 377, 388 , 229 P | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Chamberlain v. Poe
neutral
2 sentences1985Chamberlain v. Poe, 127 Colo. 215 , 256 P.2d 229 (1953); Corporation of Presiding Bishop, supra. The fact that Fanning claims title to the alley pursuant to § 43-2-302, C.R.S., does not affect the application of equitable estoppel because “the doctrine of equitable estoppel has been invoked to cut off rights *25 or privileges conferred by statute.” Johnson v. Neel, 123 Colo. 377 , 229 P.2d 939 (1951); Mountain Stone Co. v. H. 1985Chamberlain v. Poe, 127 Colo. 215 , 256 P.2d 229 (1953); Corporation of Presiding Bishop, supra. The fact that Fanning claims title to the alley pursuant to § 43-2-302, C.R.S., does not affect the application of equitable estoppel because “the doctrine of equitable estoppel has been invoked to cut off rights *25 or privileges conferred by statute.” Johnson v. Neel, 123 Colo. 377 , 229 P.2d 939 (1951); Mountain Stone Co. v. H. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. Board of County Commissioners
green
1 sentence1985Chamberlain v. Poe, 127 Colo. 215 , 256 P.2d 229 (1953); Corporation of Presiding Bishop, supra. The fact that Fanning claims title to the alley pursuant to § 43-2-302, C.R.S., does not affect the application of equitable estoppel because “the doctrine of equitable estoppel has been invoked to cut off rights *25 or privileges conferred by statute.” Johnson v. Neel, 123 Colo. 377 , 229 P.2d 939 (1951); Mountain Stone Co. v. H. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.