exception to sovereign immunity in Connecticut

2022Adams v. Crawford, 99 Conn. 378 , 382–83, 121 A. 800 (1923) (Adams), in which our Supreme Court explained that, ‘‘because the [s]tate is interested in com- pelling its agents to obey its commands, it is well settled that mandamus will lie to compel the payment of money by public officials when the duty to pay it is plain and the claim is just, undisputed in amount, and based on a clear legal right.’’ The defendants claim that Adams does not support the plaintiff’s claim because (1) it was decided eighty years before our Supreme Court held in Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 321 , 828 A.2d 549 (2

2022Adams v. Crawford, 99 Conn. 378 , 382–83, 121 A. 800 (1923) (Adams), in which our Supreme Court explained that, ‘‘because the [s]tate is interested in com- pelling its agents to obey its commands, it is well settled that mandamus will lie to compel the payment of money by public officials when the duty to pay it is plain and the claim is just, undisputed in amount, and based on a clear legal right.’’ The defendants claim that Adams does not support the plaintiff’s claim because (1) it was decided eighty years before our Supreme Court held in Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 321 , 828 A.2d 549 (2

2003The plaintiff relies on our decisions in Shay v. Rossi, supra, 253 Conn. 134 , and Antinerella v. Rioux, supra, 229 Conn. 479 , to argue that the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not bar an action for monetary damages when the plaintiff has alleged injury resulting from a state officer’s actions in excess of statutory authority.

1996"The motion to dismiss shall be used to assert . . . lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. . . ." Practice Book § 143; Sadloski v. Manchester , 235 Conn. 637 , 645-46 n. 13, 668 A.2d 1314 (1995). "[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Antinerella v. Rioux , 229 Conn. 479 , 489 , 642 A.2d 699 (1994).

2003The plaintiff relies on our decisions in Shay v. Rossi, supra, 253 Conn. 134 , and Antinerella v. Rioux, supra, 229 Conn. 479 , to argue that the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not bar an action for monetary damages when the plaintiff has alleged injury resulting from a state officer’s actions in excess of statutory authority.

2003The plaintiff relies on our decisions in Shay v. Rossi, supra, 253 Conn. 134 , and Antinerella v. Rioux, supra, 229 Conn. 479 , to argue that the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not bar an action for monetary damages when the plaintiff has alleged injury resulting from a state officer’s actions in excess of statutory authority.

2022Adams v. Crawford, 99 Conn. 378 , 382–83, 121 A. 800 (1923) (Adams), in which our Supreme Court explained that, ‘‘because the [s]tate is interested in com- pelling its agents to obey its commands, it is well settled that mandamus will lie to compel the payment of money by public officials when the duty to pay it is plain and the claim is just, undisputed in amount, and based on a clear legal right.’’ The defendants claim that Adams does not support the plaintiff’s claim because (1) it was decided eighty years before our Supreme Court held in Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 321 , 828 A.2d 549 (2

2022Adams v. Crawford, 99 Conn. 378 , 382–83, 121 A. 800 (1923) (Adams), in which our Supreme Court explained that, ‘‘because the [s]tate is interested in com- pelling its agents to obey its commands, it is well settled that mandamus will lie to compel the payment of money by public officials when the duty to pay it is plain and the claim is just, undisputed in amount, and based on a clear legal right.’’ The defendants claim that Adams does not support the plaintiff’s claim because (1) it was decided eighty years before our Supreme Court held in Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 321 , 828 A.2d 549 (2

2008The scope of this exception must be construed strictly, and “is not to be extended, modified, repealed or enlarged in its scope by the mechanics of [statutory] construction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Spears v. Garcia, 263 Conn. 22, 28 , 818 A.2d 37 (2003).

2008The scope of this exception must be construed strictly, and “is not to be extended, modified, repealed or enlarged in its scope by the mechanics of [statutory] construction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Spears v. Garcia, 263 Conn. 22, 28 , 818 A.2d 37 (2003).

2008Corp. v. Peabody, N.E., Inc., supra, 239 Conn. 103 (legislative history of § 4-61 “reflects the narrow and limited purpose for the exception to sovereign immunity contained in § 4-61 [a], and indicates that impleaders like that in the present appeal were not contemplated”); DeFonce Construction Corp. v. State, supra, 198 Conn. 189 (“[t]he legislative history [of § 4-61] makes no mention of contracts involving nonstate facilities . . . [and] [i]n the absence of evidence of legislative intent to waive its immunity in cases such as this, we presume that the legislature meant to exclude such contr

2008Corp. v. Peabody, N.E., Inc., supra, 239 Conn. 103 (legislative history of § 4-61 “reflects the narrow and limited purpose for the exception to sovereign immunity contained in § 4-61 [a], and indicates that impleaders like that in the present appeal were not contemplated”); DeFonce Construction Corp. v. State, supra, 198 Conn. 189 (“[t]he legislative history [of § 4-61] makes no mention of contracts involving nonstate facilities . . . [and] [i]n the absence of evidence of legislative intent to waive its immunity in cases such as this, we presume that the legislature meant to exclude such contr

2008Corp. v. Peabody, N.E., Inc., supra, 239 Conn. 103 (legislative history of § 4-61 “reflects the narrow and limited purpose for the exception to sovereign immunity contained in § 4-61 [a], and indicates that impleaders like that in the present appeal were not contemplated”); DeFonce Construction Corp. v. State, supra, 198 Conn. 189 (“[t]he legislative history [of § 4-61] makes no mention of contracts involving nonstate facilities . . . [and] [i]n the absence of evidence of legislative intent to waive its immunity in cases such as this, we presume that the legislature meant to exclude such contr

2008Corp. v. Peabody, N.E., Inc., supra, 239 Conn. 103 (legislative history of § 4-61 “reflects the narrow and limited purpose for the exception to sovereign immunity contained in § 4-61 [a], and indicates that impleaders like that in the present appeal were not contemplated”); DeFonce Construction Corp. v. State, supra, 198 Conn. 189 (“[t]he legislative history [of § 4-61] makes no mention of contracts involving nonstate facilities . . . [and] [i]n the absence of evidence of legislative intent to waive its immunity in cases such as this, we presume that the legislature meant to exclude such contr

2002Tamm v. Burns , supra , 222 Conn. at 284 .

2000"The purpose of a special defense is to plead facts that are consistent with the allegations of the complaint but demonstrate, nonetheless, that the plaintiff has no cause of action." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Danbury v. Dana Investment Corporation , 249 Conn. 1 , 17 (1999).

2000In that motion, the plaintiff claims that the "Second Special Defense is insufficient as a matter of law because it fails to set forth any facts that would qualify the Defendant as a sovereign entity." Second, the plaintiff asserts that the "Third Special Defense is insufficient as a matter of law because it fails to allege any facts that would qualify the Defendant as a municipality." Third, the plaintiff recites, in the alternative, that even if the defendants were able to qualify either as a sovereign entity or as a municipality, the allegations of negligence "are ministerial and not discre

1996"The motion to dismiss shall be used to assert . . . lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. . . ." Practice Book § 143; Sadloski v. Manchester , 235 Conn. 637 , 645-46 n. 13, 668 A.2d 1314 (1995). "[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Antinerella v. Rioux , 229 Conn. 479 , 489 , 642 A.2d 699 (1994).

1996"The motion to dismiss shall be used to assert . . . lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. . . ." Practice Book § 143; Sadloski v. Manchester , 235 Conn. 637 , 645-46 n. 13, 668 A.2d 1314 (1995). "[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Antinerella v. Rioux , 229 Conn. 479 , 489 , 642 A.2d 699 (1994).

1994An exception to sovereign immunity exists where a declaratory judgment is sought when "`state officials [are] acting in excess of their statutory authority' or in violation of constitutional rights." (Internal citation omitted.) Savage v. Aronson , 214 Conn. 256 , 264 , 571 A.2d 696 (1990); see also Barde v. Board of Trustees , 207 Conn. 59 , 64 , 539 A.2d 1000 (1988).

1994An exception to sovereign immunity exists where a declaratory judgment is sought when "`state officials [are] acting in excess of their statutory authority' or in violation of constitutional rights." (Internal citation omitted.) Savage v. Aronson , 214 Conn. 256 , 264 , 571 A.2d 696 (1990); see also Barde v. Board of Trustees , 207 Conn. 59 , 64 , 539 A.2d 1000 (1988).