reasonable expectation of privacy test in Connecticut

2017Similarly, in another decision relied on by the majority, United States v. Whitaker, 820 F.3d 849 , 852–53 (7th Cir. 2016), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit relies solely on the concurring opinion of Justice Kagan in Jardines to con- clude that Kyllo should be extended to dog sniffs, ignor- ing the majority decision in Jardines.

2016Similarly, in another decision relied on by the majority, United States v. Whitaker , 820 F.3d 849 , 852-53 (7th Cir. 2016), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit relies solely on the concurring opinion of Justice Kagan in Jardines to conclude that Kyllo should be extended to dog sniffs, ignoring the majority decision in Jardines .

2025Regarding the fourth factor, the defendant contends that our decision in State v. Joyce, 229 Conn. 10 , 639 A.2d 1007 (1994), weighs in favor of his position that article first, § 7, provides greater protection than its federal counterpart in this context.

2025Regarding the fourth factor, the defendant contends that our decision in State v. Joyce, 229 Conn. 10 , 639 A.2d 1007 (1994), weighs in favor of his position that article first, § 7, provides greater protection than its federal counterpart in this context.

2021We further stated, with respect to those state courts that have concluded that a canine sniff of the front door of a single-family home requires a warrant supported by probable cause, that, ‘‘[b]ecause these courts based their rulings on the reasonable expectation of privacy test recognized in Katz [v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 88 S. Ct. 507 , 19 L.

2021We further stated, with respect to those state courts that have concluded that a canine sniff of the front door of a single-family home requires a warrant supported by probable cause, that, ‘‘[b]ecause these courts based their rulings on the reasonable expectation of privacy test recognized in Katz [v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 88 S. Ct. 507 , 19 L.

2016See, e.g., State v. Boyd, supra, 295 Conn. at 718 , 992 A.2d 1071 ; State v. Michael D., 153 Conn.App. 296 , 304-305, 101 A.3d 298 , cert. denied, 314 Conn. 951 , 103 A.3d 978 (2014) ; State v. Jevarjian, 124 Conn.App. 331 , 338, 4 A.3d 1231 (2010), appeal dismissed, 307 Conn. 559 , 58 A.3d 243 (2012) ; State v. Vallejo, 102 Conn.App. 628 , 635-36, 926 A.2d 681 , cert. denied, 284 Conn. 912 , 931 A.2d 934 (2007).

2016See, e.g., State v. Boyd, supra, 295 Conn. at 718 , 992 A.2d 1071 ; State v. Michael D., 153 Conn.App. 296 , 304-305, 101 A.3d 298 , cert. denied, 314 Conn. 951 , 103 A.3d 978 (2014) ; State v. Jevarjian, 124 Conn.App. 331 , 338, 4 A.3d 1231 (2010), appeal dismissed, 307 Conn. 559 , 58 A.3d 243 (2012) ; State v. Vallejo, 102 Conn.App. 628 , 635-36, 926 A.2d 681 , cert. denied, 284 Conn. 912 , 931 A.2d 934 (2007).

2016Id., at 34-35 , 121 S.Ct. 2038 .

2016See, e.g., State v. Boyd, supra, 295 Conn. at 718 , 992 A.2d 1071 ; State v. Michael D., 153 Conn.App. 296 , 304-305, 101 A.3d 298 , cert. denied, 314 Conn. 951 , 103 A.3d 978 (2014) ; State v. Jevarjian, 124 Conn.App. 331 , 338, 4 A.3d 1231 (2010), appeal dismissed, 307 Conn. 559 , 58 A.3d 243 (2012) ; State v. Vallejo, 102 Conn.App. 628 , 635-36, 926 A.2d 681 , cert. denied, 284 Conn. 912 , 931 A.2d 934 (2007).

2016See, e.g., State v. Boyd, supra, 295 Conn. at 718 , 992 A.2d 1071 ; State v. Michael D., 153 Conn.App. 296 , 304-305, 101 A.3d 298 , cert. denied, 314 Conn. 951 , 103 A.3d 978 (2014) ; State v. Jevarjian, 124 Conn.App. 331 , 338, 4 A.3d 1231 (2010), appeal dismissed, 307 Conn. 559 , 58 A.3d 243 (2012) ; State v. Vallejo, 102 Conn.App. 628 , 635-36, 926 A.2d 681 , cert. denied, 284 Conn. 912 , 931 A.2d 934 (2007).

2016See, e.g., State v. Boyd, supra, 295 Conn. at 718 , 992 A.2d 1071 ; State v. Michael D., 153 Conn.App. 296 , 304-305, 101 A.3d 298 , cert. denied, 314 Conn. 951 , 103 A.3d 978 (2014) ; State v. Jevarjian, 124 Conn.App. 331 , 338, 4 A.3d 1231 (2010), appeal dismissed, 307 Conn. 559 , 58 A.3d 243 (2012) ; State v. Vallejo, 102 Conn.App. 628 , 635-36, 926 A.2d 681 , cert. denied, 284 Conn. 912 , 931 A.2d 934 (2007).

2016See, e.g., State v. Boyd, supra, 295 Conn. at 718 , 992 A.2d 1071 ; State v. Michael D., 153 Conn.App. 296 , 304-305, 101 A.3d 298 , cert. denied, 314 Conn. 951 , 103 A.3d 978 (2014) ; State v. Jevarjian, 124 Conn.App. 331 , 338, 4 A.3d 1231 (2010), appeal dismissed, 307 Conn. 559 , 58 A.3d 243 (2012) ; State v. Vallejo, 102 Conn.App. 628 , 635-36, 926 A.2d 681 , cert. denied, 284 Conn. 912 , 931 A.2d 934 (2007).

2015Although Lee, Hoffa, and Lopez all preceded the adop- tion of the reasonable expectation of privacy test in Katz, in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 , 749–50, 91 S. Ct. 1122 , 28 L.

2015Although Lee, Hoffa, and Lopez all preceded the adop- tion of the reasonable expectation of privacy test in Katz, in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 , 749–50, 91 S. Ct. 1122 , 28 L.

1997“Whether our Supreme Court precedent should be reexamined, discarded or changed is not for this court to decide.” State v. Panella, 43 Conn. App. 76, 83 , 682 A.2d 532 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 937 , 684 A.2d 710 (1996).

1997“Whether our Supreme Court precedent should be reexamined, discarded or changed is not for this court to decide.” State v. Panella, 43 Conn. App. 76, 83 , 682 A.2d 532 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 937 , 684 A.2d 710 (1996).

1997“Whether our Supreme Court precedent should be reexamined, discarded or changed is not for this court to decide.” State v. Panella, 43 Conn. App. 76, 83 , 682 A.2d 532 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 937 , 684 A.2d 710 (1996).

1997“Whether our Supreme Court precedent should be reexamined, discarded or changed is not for this court to decide.” State v. Panella, 43 Conn. App. 76, 83 , 682 A.2d 532 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 937 , 684 A.2d 710 (1996).

1997Furthermore, even after Rakas v. Illinois, supra, 439 U.S. 128 , and United States v. Salvucci, supra, 448 U.S. 83 , this court questioned the wisdom of abandoning the automatic standing doctrine in State v. Conger, 183 Conn. 386 , 439 A.2d 381 (1981). 4 I would grant the defendant’s petition for certification on the following issue: Under the state constitution, should the court adopt the rule of automatic standing?

1997Our Supreme Court abandoned the automatic standing doctrine and adopted the reasonable expectation of privacy test in State v. Altrui, 188 Conn. 161 , 179 n.6, 448 A.2d 837 (1982).

1997Our Supreme Court abandoned the automatic standing doctrine and adopted the reasonable expectation of privacy test in State v. Altrui, 188 Conn. 161 , 179 n.6, 448 A.2d 837 (1982).

1997Furthermore, even after Rakas v. Illinois, supra, 439 U.S. 128 , and United States v. Salvucci, supra, 448 U.S. 83 , this court questioned the wisdom of abandoning the automatic standing doctrine in State v. Conger, 183 Conn. 386 , 439 A.2d 381 (1981). 4 I would grant the defendant’s petition for certification on the following issue: Under the state constitution, should the court adopt the rule of automatic standing?

1997Furthermore, even after Rakas v. Illinois, supra, 439 U.S. 128 , and United States v. Salvucci, supra, 448 U.S. 83 , this court questioned the wisdom of abandoning the automatic standing doctrine in State v. Conger, 183 Conn. 386 , 439 A.2d 381 (1981). 4 I would grant the defendant’s petition for certification on the following issue: Under the state constitution, should the court adopt the rule of automatic standing?

1997Furthermore, even after Rakas v. Illinois, supra, 439 U.S. 128 , and United States v. Salvucci, supra, 448 U.S. 83 , this court questioned the wisdom of abandoning the automatic standing doctrine in State v. Conger, 183 Conn. 386 , 439 A.2d 381 (1981). 4 I would grant the defendant’s petition for certification on the following issue: Under the state constitution, should the court adopt the rule of automatic standing?

1996Ed. 2d 595 (1993); State v. Whitaker, 215 Conn. 739 , 751 n.14, 578 A.2d 1031 (1990); we must conclude that the defendant adequately apprised this court, and the state, of his claim that article first, § 7, of the state constitution should be construed to incorporate the broader “automatic standing” rule, at least to the extent that it protects casual visitors.

1996Ed. 2d 595 (1993); State v. Whitaker, 215 Conn. 739 , 751 n.14, 578 A.2d 1031 (1990); we must conclude that the defendant adequately apprised this court, and the state, of his claim that article first, § 7, of the state constitution should be construed to incorporate the broader “automatic standing” rule, at least to the extent that it protects casual visitors.

1996He notes that this court has previously recognized the automatic standing rule in applying the federal constitution, and he argues that, although this court in Joyce articulated the reasonable expectation of privacy test of standing, “[w]hether this court is prepared to bestow standing on houseguests of varying degrees and relations, as the defendant urges, remains an open question in this jurisdiction,” referring us to several cases from “other state courts of last resort that hold that state constitutional or statutory provisions require continued adherence to the standing doctrines of Jones

1996He notes that this court has previously recognized the automatic standing rule in applying the federal constitution, and he argues that, although this court in Joyce articulated the reasonable expectation of privacy test of standing, “[w]hether this court is prepared to bestow standing on houseguests of varying degrees and relations, as the defendant urges, remains an open question in this jurisdiction,” referring us to several cases from “other state courts of last resort that hold that state constitutional or statutory provisions require continued adherence to the standing doctrines of Jones

1996He notes that this court has previously recognized the automatic standing rule in applying the federal constitution, and he argues that, although this court in Joyce articulated the reasonable expectation of privacy test of standing, “[w]hether this court is prepared to bestow standing on houseguests of varying degrees and relations, as the defendant urges, remains an open question in this jurisdiction,” referring us to several cases from “other state courts of last resort that hold that state constitutional or statutory provisions require continued adherence to the standing doctrines of Jones

1996He notes that this court has previously recognized the automatic standing rule in applying the federal constitution, and he argues that, although this court in Joyce articulated the reasonable expectation of privacy test of standing, “[w]hether this court is prepared to bestow standing on houseguests of varying degrees and relations, as the defendant urges, remains an open question in this jurisdiction,” referring us to several cases from “other state courts of last resort that hold that state constitutional or statutory provisions require continued adherence to the standing doctrines of Jones

1996Indeed, his sole reference to automatic standing is the observation that “[t]o date, the court has not joined with some other state courts of last resort that hold that state constitutional or statutory provisions require continued adherence to the standing doctrine of Jones [v. United States, 363 U.S. 257 , 80 S. Ct. 725 , 4 L.

1996Indeed, his sole reference to automatic standing is the observation that “[t]o date, the court has not joined with some other state courts of last resort that hold that state constitutional or statutory provisions require continued adherence to the standing doctrine of Jones [v. United States, 363 U.S. 257 , 80 S. Ct. 725 , 4 L.