reasonable expectation of privacy test (Vermont) · Go Syfert
← Vermont issues

reasonable expectation of privacy test in Vermont

5 Vermont opinions name it 1 courts 1987–2019 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Vermont courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (4)

CaseFollowedCited
Fraser v. Sleepergreen
vt · 2007 · cited in 1 Vermont opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
1 sentence

2019See Fraser, 2007 VT 78 , 43 ¶ 11 (holding that provisions that “make an excuse or exception to the definition, particularly those principally within the knowledge of the defendant, are defenses”).

11
Oliver v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 1984 · cited in 1 Vermont opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992
2 sentences

1992In Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984), the Court held that a subjective expectation of privacy in lands outside the curtilage, so-called “open fields,” is objectively unreasonable.

1992In Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 , 104 S.Ct. 1735, 1741 , 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984), the Court held that a subjective expectation of privacy in lands outside the curtilage, so-called "open fields," is objectively unreasonable.

11
Florida v. Rileygreen
scotus · 1989 · cited in 1 Vermont opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991
2 sentences

1991See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-51 (1989).

1991See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-51 , 109 S.Ct. 693, 696 , 102 L.Ed.2d 835 (1989).

11
Mancusi v. DeFortegreen
scotus · 1968 · cited in 1 Vermont opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987
2 sentences

1987Thus, in Alderman, 394 U.S. at 171 , it was held that only a defendant whose conversations were improperly overheard could rely on the protection of the Fourth Amendment, while co-conspirators or co-defendants could not vicariously invoke that defendant’s interest, and in Jeffers, 342 U.S. at 50-52 , it was determined that the accused was advancing his rights rather than those of his two aunts, in whose hotel room he was staying. 3 In Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968), a reasonable expectation of privacy test for standing analysis was employed.

1987Nonetheless, the analysis still focused on the collateral inquiry of whether the defendant had “personal standing,” id. at 367 , to challenge an unlawful search of the offices of the union for which he was an officer.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Vermont. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (4)

CaseCitedYears
State v. McCaffrey green
vt · 1896
1 sentence

2019V.R.Cr.P. 12(d)(2) (requiring that, on motion to dismiss for lack of prima facie case, State show “it has substantial, admissible evidence as to the elements of the offense challenged by the defendant’s motion”); McCaffrey, 69 Vt. at 90 , 37 A. at 235-36 (noting statutory “exceptions must be negatived” by State “where they are descriptive of the offense, or define it”). ¶ 104.

12019–2019
State v. Blow green
vt · 1991
2 sentences

1991Rather, we stated our task under Article 11 is to “identify the values that are at risk, and vest the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test with those values.” Id. at 518 , 602 A.2d at 556 .

1991Rather, we stated our task under Article 11 is to “identify the values that are at risk, and vest the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test with those values.” Id. at 518 , 602 A.2d at 556 .

11991–1991
United States v. Jeffers green
scotus · 1951
1 sentence

1987Thus, in Alderman, 394 U.S. at 171 , it was held that only a defendant whose conversations were improperly overheard could rely on the protection of the Fourth Amendment, while co-conspirators or co-defendants could not vicariously invoke that defendant’s interest, and in Jeffers, 342 U.S. at 50-52 , it was determined that the accused was advancing his rights rather than those of his two aunts, in whose hotel room he was staying. 3 In Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968), a reasonable expectation of privacy test for standing analysis was employed.

11987–1987
Alderman v. United States green
scotus · 1969
1 sentence

1987Thus, in Alderman, 394 U.S. at 171 , it was held that only a defendant whose conversations were improperly overheard could rely on the protection of the Fourth Amendment, while co-conspirators or co-defendants could not vicariously invoke that defendant’s interest, and in Jeffers, 342 U.S. at 50-52 , it was determined that the accused was advancing his rights rather than those of his two aunts, in whose hotel room he was staying. 3 In Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968), a reasonable expectation of privacy test for standing analysis was employed.

11987–1987

Where else courts name it

NH 12 (1987–2017) NJ 11 (2008–2025) ID 11 (2019–2025) WI 10 (2000–2026) CT 10 (1993–2025) IA 8 (2015–2025) TX 8 (1984–2025) OR 7 (1987–2019) AZ 6 (1982–2021) VT 5 (1987–2019) MD 4 (2001–2013) OH 4 (2000–2025) CA 4 (1971–2014) IL 3 (2015–2016) PA 3 (1989–2025) IN 3 (1980–2017) MI 3 (1986–2003) NY 3 (1987–2009) FL 3 (1981–2020) HI 3 (2002–2017) MN 2 (2016–2018) KS 2 (2007–2015) NC 2 (2014–2016) MA 2 (2013–2013) NE 2 (2013–2014) SD 2 (2012–2017) CO 2 (1985–2019) WV 2 (1985–1989) MT 2 (2008–2008)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check