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7 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
MacLaird v. Stategreen2 sentences2004As one court said, "It is difficult to see how a lawful search and seizure becomes unreasonable when new information is received linking the property seized with a crime not known to the authorities initially." MacLaird v. State, 718 P.2d 41, 45 (Wyo.1986); see also United States v. Oaxaca, 569 F.2d 518, 523-24 (9th Cir.), cert. den., 439 U.S. 926 , 99 S.Ct. 310 , 58 L.Ed.2d 319 (1978). 2004As one court said, “It is difficult to see how a lawful search and seizure becomes unreasonable when new information is received linking the property seized with a crime not known to the authorities initially.” MacLaird v. State, 718 P2d 41, 45 (Wyo 1986); see also United States v. Oaxaca, 569 F2d 518, 523-24 (9th Cir), cert den, 439 US 926 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Michael Roybal Oaxaca, United States of America v. Steven Edward Delmangreen1 sentence2004As one court said, "It is difficult to see how a lawful search and seizure becomes unreasonable when new information is received linking the property seized with a crime not known to the authorities initially." MacLaird v. State, 718 P.2d 41, 45 (Wyo.1986); see also United States v. Oaxaca, 569 F.2d 518, 523-24 (9th Cir.), cert. den., 439 U.S. 926 , 99 S.Ct. 310 , 58 L.Ed.2d 319 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
Thomas v. North Carolinagreen2 sentences2004As one court said, "It is difficult to see how a lawful search and seizure becomes unreasonable when new information is received linking the property seized with a crime not known to the authorities initially." MacLaird v. State, 718 P.2d 41, 45 (Wyo.1986); see also United States v. Oaxaca, 569 F.2d 518, 523-24 (9th Cir.), cert. den., 439 U.S. 926 , 99 S.Ct. 310 , 58 L.Ed.2d 319 (1978). 2004As one court said, “It is difficult to see how a lawful search and seizure becomes unreasonable when new information is received linking the property seized with a crime not known to the authorities initially.” MacLaird v. State, 718 P2d 41, 45 (Wyo 1986); see also United States v. Oaxaca, 569 F2d 518, 523-24 (9th Cir), cert den, 439 US 926 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
Oaxaca v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2004As one court said, "It is difficult to see how a lawful search and seizure becomes unreasonable when new information is received linking the property seized with a crime not known to the authorities initially." MacLaird v. State, 718 P.2d 41, 45 (Wyo.1986); see also United States v. Oaxaca, 569 F.2d 518, 523-24 (9th Cir.), cert. den., 439 U.S. 926 , 99 S.Ct. 310 , 58 L.Ed.2d 319 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
Beck v. Northwestern R. R.green1 sentence2004As one court said, "It is difficult to see how a lawful search and seizure becomes unreasonable when new information is received linking the property seized with a crime not known to the authorities initially." MacLaird v. State, 718 P.2d 41, 45 (Wyo.1986); see also United States v. Oaxaca, 569 F.2d 518, 523-24 (9th Cir.), cert. den., 439 U.S. 926 , 99 S.Ct. 310 , 58 L.Ed.2d 319 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
Oliver v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1989State v. Campbell, 306 Or 157 , 759 P2d 1040 (1988); compare Oliver v. United States, 466 US 214 , 104 S Ct 1735 , 80 L Ed 2d 214 (1984). 1989State v. Campbell, 306 Or 157 , 759 P2d 1040 (1988); compare Oliver v. United States, 466 US 214 , 104 S Ct 1735 , 80 L Ed 2d 214 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Owensgreen2 sentences1987See State v. Owens, 302 Or. 196, 206 , 729 P.2d 524 (1986). 1987See State v. Owens, 302 Or. 196, 206 , 729 P.2d 524 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Martingreen2 sentences1997But see Commonwealth v. Martin, 534 Pa. 136 , 626 A.2d 556 (1993) (full probable cause and warrant required for dog sniff of person). [3] The New Hampshire court has "neither adopted nor rejected the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis for purposes of determining what constitutes an invasion of protected interests" under its state constitution. 1997But see Commonwealth v. Martin, 534 Pa. 136 , 626 A.2d 556 (1993) (full probable cause and warrant required for dog sniff of person). [3] The New Hampshire court has "neither adopted nor rejected the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis for purposes of determining what constitutes an invasion of protected interests" under its state constitution. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Katz v. United States
green
2 sentences1995In that opinion, we recognized that the defendant’s argument under both Article I, section 9, and the Fourth Amendment was grounded on the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis enunciated in Katz v. United States, 389 US 347, 361 , 88 S Ct 507 , 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 87 Or App at 680. 1995In that opinion, we recognized that the defendant’s argument under both Article I, section 9, and the Fourth Amendment was grounded on the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis enunciated in Katz v. United States, 389 US 347, 361 , 88 S Ct 507 , 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 87 Or App at 680. | 4 | 1987–1995 |
State v. Campbell
green
2 sentences2019As we explained in Campbell : "The phrase becomes a formula for expressing a conclusion rather than a starting point for analysis, masking the various substantive considerations that are the real bases on which Fourth Amendment searches are defined. * * * Moreover, the privacy protected by Article I, section 9, is **785 not the privacy that one reasonably expects but the privacy to which one has a right ." 306 Or. at 164 , 759 P.2d 1040 . 2019As we explained in Campbell : "The phrase becomes a formula for expressing a conclusion rather than a starting point for analysis, masking the various substantive considerations that are the real bases on which Fourth Amendment searches are defined. * * * Moreover, the privacy protected by Article I, section 9, is **785 not the privacy that one reasonably expects but the privacy to which one has a right ." 306 Or. at 164 , 759 P.2d 1040 . | 2 | 1989–2019 |
State v. Pellicci
green
2 sentences1997Pellicci, 580 A.2d at 717 . [4] The concurrence would have used a balancing test, comparing the analysis to that used in other prisoner search cases. 1997Pellicci, 580 A2d at 717 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Slowikowski
green
2 sentences1995In that opinion, we recognized that the defendant's argument under both Article I, section 9, and the Fourth Amendment was grounded on the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis enunciated in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 , 88 S.Ct. 507, 516-17 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 87 Or.App. at 680, 743 P.2d 1126 . 1995Noting that the issue was one of first impression under Article I, section 9, we emphasized that the "overwhelming trend" among the courts, including the United States Supreme Court, was to find that the use of a trained dog to sniff property located in a public place does not constitute a search. [5] Id. at 681-82 , 743 P.2d 1126 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
National Small Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc. v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc.
green
1 sentence1989Both of those cases were decided under the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis that originated with Katz v. United States, 389 US 576 , 88 S Ct 507 , 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967), which has been rejected in analyzing privacy rights under the Oregon Constitution. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
State v. Farkes
green
1 sentence1989State v. Campbell, 306 Or. 157 , 759 P.2d 1040 (1988); compare Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 , 104 S.Ct. 1735 , 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984). [3] Defendants argue that their case can be factually distinguished from three aerial observation cases relied on by the state, in which we held that the evidence need not be suppressed: State v. Farkes, 71 Or. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.