weight of the evidence rule in Connecticut

2001Basically, an agency is not required to use in any particular fashion any of the materials presented to it so long as the conduct of the hearing is fundamentally fair. . . . [W]e must decide, in view of all of the evidence, whether the agency, in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily or illegally, or abused its discretion.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Simard v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 62 Conn. App. 690, 693-94 , 772 A.2d 1137 (2001), quoting Bancroft v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 48 Conn. App. 391, 399-401 , 710 A.2d 807 , cert. denied, 245

2001Basically, an agency is not required to use in any particular fashion any of the materials presented to it so long as the conduct of the hearing is fundamentally fair. . . . [W]e must decide, in view of all of the evidence, whether the agency, in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily or illegally, or abused its discretion.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Simard v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 62 Conn. App. 690, 693-94 , 772 A.2d 1137 (2001), quoting Bancroft v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 48 Conn. App. 391, 399-401 , 710 A.2d 807 , cert. denied, 245

2001Basically, an agency is not required to use in any particular fashion any of the materials presented to it so long as the conduct of the hearing is fundamentally fair. . . . [W]e must decide, in view of all of the evidence, whether the agency, in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily or illegally, or abused its discretion.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Simard v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 62 Conn. App. 690, 693-94 , 772 A.2d 1137 (2001), quoting Bancroft v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 48 Conn. App. 391, 399-401 , 710 A.2d 807 , cert. denied, 245

2001Basically, an agency is not required to use in any particular fashion any of the materials presented to it so long as the conduct of the hearing is fundamentally fair. . . . [W]e must decide, in view of all of the evidence, whether the agency, in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily or illegally, or abused its discretion.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Simard v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 62 Conn. App. 690, 693-94 , 772 A.2d 1137 (2001), quoting Bancroft v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 48 Conn. App. 391, 399-401 , 710 A.2d 807 , cert. denied, 245

1997In determining whether an administrative finding is supported by substantial evidence, a court must defer ... to the agency’s right to believe or disbelieve the evidence presented by any witness, even an expert, in whole or in part.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Briggs v. State Employees Retirement Commission, 210 Conn. 214, 217 , 554 A.2d 292 (1989). “[I]f the administrative record provides substantial evidence upon which the hearing officer could reasonably have based his finding . . . the decision must be upheld.” Connecticut Building Wrecking Co. v. Carothers, 218

1997In determining whether an administrative finding is supported by substantial evidence, a court must defer ... to the agency’s right to believe or disbelieve the evidence presented by any witness, even an expert, in whole or in part.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Briggs v. State Employees Retirement Commission, 210 Conn. 214, 217 , 554 A.2d 292 (1989). “[I]f the administrative record provides substantial evidence upon which the hearing officer could reasonably have based his finding . . . the decision must be upheld.” Connecticut Building Wrecking Co. v. Carothers, 218

2025It necessarily follows that appellate review of a weight of the evidence claim is greatly circumscribed. . . . [T]he proper appellate standard of review when considering the action of a trial court granting or denying a motion to set aside a verdict and a motion for a new trial is the abuse of discretion standard.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Capasso, 203 Conn. App. 333 , 346–47, 248 A.3d 58 , cert. denied, 336 Conn. 939 , 249 A.3d 352 (2021).

2017"Appellate review of a trial court's decision granting or denying a motion for a new trial must take into account the trial judge's superior opportunity to assess the proceedings over which he or she has personally presided." State v. Hammond , supra, 221 Conn. at 269 , 604 A.2d 793 .

2017"Appellate review of a trial court's decision granting or denying a motion for a new trial must take into account the trial judge's superior opportunity to assess the proceedings over which he or she has personally presided." State v. Hammond , supra, 221 Conn. at 269 , 604 A.2d 793 .

2017The second special defense, which was separately pleaded as to each count of the petition, was that the claim therein pleaded was not a claim upon which relief could be granted in a habeas corpus proceeding because, under our case law, specifically State v. Griffin , 253 Conn. 195 , 199-202, 749 A.2d 1192 (2000), the weight of the evidence claim on which it was based could only be assessed by the trial judge who had presided over the trial where the challenged verdict was returned.

2017The second special defense, which was separately pleaded as to each count of the petition, was that the claim therein pleaded was not a claim upon which relief could be granted in a habeas corpus proceeding because, under our case law, specifically State v. Griffin , 253 Conn. 195 , 199-202, 749 A.2d 1192 (2000), the weight of the evidence claim on which it was based could only be assessed by the trial judge who had presided over the trial where the challenged verdict was returned.

2017It is well settled that " only the judge who presided over the trial where a challenged verdict was returned is legally competent to decide if that verdict was against the weight of the evidence ...." (Emphasis added.) Sinchak v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 173 Conn.App. at 362 .

2001Basically, an agency is not required to use in any particular fashion any of the materials presented to it so long as the conduct of the hearing is fundamentally fair.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 400. “[W]e must decide, in view of all of the evidence, whether the agency, in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily or illegally, or abused its discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 401, quoting Stamford v. Freedom of Information Commission, 241 Conn. 310, 314 , 696 A.2d 321 (1997); Burinskas v. Dept. of Social Services, 240 Conn. 141, 147

2001Basically, an agency is not required to use in any particular fashion any of the materials presented to it so long as the conduct of the hearing is fundamentally fair.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 400. “[W]e must decide, in view of all of the evidence, whether the agency, in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily or illegally, or abused its discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 401, quoting Stamford v. Freedom of Information Commission, 241 Conn. 310, 314 , 696 A.2d 321 (1997); Burinskas v. Dept. of Social Services, 240 Conn. 141, 147

2001Basically, an agency is not required to use in any particular fashion any of the materials presented to it so long as the conduct of the hearing is fundamentally fair.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 400. “[W]e must decide, in view of all of the evidence, whether the agency, in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily or illegally, or abused its discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 401, quoting Stamford v. Freedom of Information Commission, 241 Conn. 310, 314 , 696 A.2d 321 (1997); Burinskas v. Dept. of Social Services, 240 Conn. 141, 147

2001Basically, an agency is not required to use in any particular fashion any of the materials presented to it so long as the conduct of the hearing is fundamentally fair.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 400. “[W]e must decide, in view of all of the evidence, whether the agency, in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily or illegally, or abused its discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 401, quoting Stamford v. Freedom of Information Commission, 241 Conn. 310, 314 , 696 A.2d 321 (1997); Burinskas v. Dept. of Social Services, 240 Conn. 141, 147

2001In determining whether an admin istrative finding is supported by substantial evidence, a court must defer to the agency’s right to believe or disbelieve the evidence presented by any witness, even an expert, in whole or in part.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lomen v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 61 Conn. App. 213, 218 , 763 A.2d 676 (2000).

2001In determining whether an admin istrative finding is supported by substantial evidence, a court must defer to the agency’s right to believe or disbelieve the evidence presented by any witness, even an expert, in whole or in part.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lomen v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 61 Conn. App. 213, 218 , 763 A.2d 676 (2000).

2001Basically, an agency is not required to use in any particular fashion any of the materials presented to it so long as the conduct of the hearing is fundamentally fair. . . . [W]e must decide, in view of all of the evidence, whether the agency, in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily or illegally, or abused its discretion.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Simard v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 62 Conn. App. 690, 693-94 , 772 A.2d 1137 (2001), quoting Bancroft v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 48 Conn. App. 391, 399-401 , 710 A.2d 807 , cert. denied, 245

2001Basically, an agency is not required to use in any particular fashion any of the materials presented to it so long as the conduct of the hearing is fundamentally fair. . . . [W]e must decide, in view of all of the evidence, whether the agency, in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily or illegally, or abused its discretion.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Simard v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 62 Conn. App. 690, 693-94 , 772 A.2d 1137 (2001), quoting Bancroft v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 48 Conn. App. 391, 399-401 , 710 A.2d 807 , cert. denied, 245

1997In determining whether an administrative finding is supported by substantial evidence, a court must defer ... to the agency’s right to believe or disbelieve the evidence presented by any witness, even an expert, in whole or in part.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Briggs v. State Employees Retirement Commission, 210 Conn. 214, 217 , 554 A.2d 292 (1989). “[I]f the administrative record provides substantial evidence upon which the hearing officer could reasonably have based his finding . . . the decision must be upheld.” Connecticut Building Wrecking Co. v. Carothers, 218

1997In determining whether an administrative finding is supported by substantial evidence, a court must defer ... to the agency’s right to believe or disbelieve the evidence presented by any witness, even an expert, in whole or in part.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Briggs v. State Employees Retirement Commission, 210 Conn. 214, 217 , 554 A.2d 292 (1989). “[I]f the administrative record provides substantial evidence upon which the hearing officer could reasonably have based his finding . . . the decision must be upheld.” Connecticut Building Wrecking Co. v. Carothers, 218

1991“Such a standard of review allows less room for judicial scrutiny than does the weight of the evidence rule or the clearly erroneous rule.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 640 .