building code violation in Florida

2024We acknowledge our holding that “Florida law recognizes no defense of lack of knowledge of a building code violation creating a dangerous condition by an owner as to his own maintenance of his own property.” Di Mare & Drews, Inc. v. Kerrigan, 810 So. 2d 1066, 1069 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (citing Owens v. Publix Supermkts., Inc., 802 So. 2d 315, 320 (Fla. 2001)).

2002Owens, 802 So.2d 315, 320 (2001) (“ ‘actual or constructive knowledge is irrelevant in cases not involving transitory, foreign substances (i.e., the typical banana peel case), if ample evidence of negli gent maintenance can be shown’ ” (quoting Mabrey v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 438 So.2d 937, 938 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983))).

2019See Holland v. Baguette, Inc. , 540 So. 2d 197 , 198 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).

2019See Holland v. Baguette, Inc. , 540 So. 2d 197 , 198 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).

2024But as Judge Warner clarified in Kerrigan, “[t]o be liable, a property owner must still have superior knowledge, either actual or constructive, to the plaintiff concerning any dangerous conditions on the property.” Kerrigan, 810 So. 2d at 1070 (Warner, J., dissenting) (citing Lynch v. Brown, 489 So. 2d 65, 66-67 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)).

2024We acknowledge our holding that “Florida law recognizes no defense of lack of knowledge of a building code violation creating a dangerous condition by an owner as to his own maintenance of his own property.” Di Mare & Drews, Inc. v. Kerrigan, 810 So. 2d 1066, 1069 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (citing Owens v. Publix Supermkts., Inc., 802 So. 2d 315, 320 (Fla. 2001)).

2024But as Judge Warner clarified in Kerrigan, “[t]o be liable, a property owner must still have superior knowledge, either actual or constructive, to the plaintiff concerning any dangerous conditions on the property.” Kerrigan, 810 So. 2d at 1070 (Warner, J., dissenting) (citing Lynch v. Brown, 489 So. 2d 65, 66-67 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)).

2022The court also held the exculpatory clause contravened public policy to the extent it attempted to contract away the defendant’s responsibility to comply with building codes, noting the “complaint was dismissed prior to a determination of whether [the defendant’s] alleged negligence also constituted a building code violation.” Id. (“[A] party may not contract away its responsibility to comply with a building code when the person with whom the contract is made is one of those whom the code is designed to protect.”).

2022In explaining its decision, the court noted that “Florida’s comprehensive regulation of the licensing of building contractors and building construction standards reflect a clear public policy to protect purchasers of residential homes from personal injuries caused by improper construction practices.” Id. (footnotes omitted).

2011Cf. Seabridge, Inc. v. Superior Kitchens, Inc., 672 So.2d 848, 850 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (citing Murthy ⅛ holding that “while chapter 489 provides administrative remedies against a qualifying agent, it does not expressly provide for a civil cause of action”; reversing judgment against qualifying agent of corporation, which was liable for damages because it failed to pay kitchen contractor); Evans v. Taylor, 711 So.2d 1317, 1318 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (finding Murthy inapplicable to case where homeowners sued qualifying agent “because he himself had performed work on the project”).

2011Cf. Seabridge, Inc. v. Superior Kitchens, Inc., 672 So.2d 848, 850 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (citing Murthy ⅛ holding that “while chapter 489 provides administrative remedies against a qualifying agent, it does not expressly provide for a civil cause of action”; reversing judgment against qualifying agent of corporation, which was liable for damages because it failed to pay kitchen contractor); Evans v. Taylor, 711 So.2d 1317, 1318 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (finding Murthy inapplicable to case where homeowners sued qualifying agent “because he himself had performed work on the project”).

2002While this may be accurate, see Grant v. Thornton, 749 So.2d 529, 532 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), nevertheless a property owner has no duty to warn of an open and obvious condition which is not in itself dangerous, see Williams v. Madden, 588 So.2d 41, 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).

2002Owens, 802 So.2d 315, 320 (2001) (“ ‘actual or constructive knowledge is irrelevant in cases not involving transitory, foreign substances (i.e., the typical banana peel case), if ample evidence of negli gent maintenance can be shown’ ” (quoting Mabrey v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 438 So.2d 937, 938 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983))).

2002While this may be accurate, see Grant v. Thornton, 749 So.2d 529, 532 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), nevertheless a property owner has no duty to warn of an open and obvious condition which is not in itself dangerous, see Williams v. Madden, 588 So.2d 41, 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).

2001See Rocker, 454 So.2d at 15 (holding that a building code requirement that ramps not exceed a specific slope and that they have either a "non-slip" or "broomed concrete" surface is designed to protect the public in general rather than a particular class of individuals).

1998See Hotels of Key Largo, Inc. v. RHI Hotels, Inc., 694 So.2d at 74 . [4] Thus we find the ELR does *1259 apply to prohibit Comptech from pursuing a dependent statutory tort action in an attempt to expand its remedies for breach of contract beyond that which was agreed to. [5] II.