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11 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Estate of Carpentergreen2 sentences1982Appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to follow the requirements of In re Estate of Carpenter, 253 So.2d 697 (Fla. 1971), in considering the alleged procurement by appellant of the gift through undue influence. [1] The Carpenter test requires the court to consider the evidence in three steps: (1) whether the beneficiary enjoyed a confidential relationship with the grantor; (2) whether the beneficiary actively procured the instrument, and (3) if the second factor is positive, a presumption of undue influence arises placing upon the beneficiary the burden of giving a reasonabl 1982Appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to follow the requirements of In re Estate of Carpenter, 253 So.2d 697 (Fla. 1971), in considering the alleged procurement by appellant of the gift through undue influence. [1] The Carpenter test requires the court to consider the evidence in three steps: (1) whether the beneficiary enjoyed a confidential relationship with the grantor; (2) whether the beneficiary actively procured the instrument, and (3) if the second factor is positive, a presumption of undue influence arises placing upon the beneficiary the burden of giving a reasonabl | 1 | 4 |
Higgins v. Trigil Repair, Inc.green2 sentences1984As indicated in Higgins v. Trigil Repair, Inc., 436 So.2d 222, 223 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), the Carpenter defense requires a “medical relationship between the claimant’s present injury and his misrepresented physical condition at the time of employment resulting from an undisclosed prior injury.” See also Cycenas v. Sarasota Coca Cola Bottling Co., 440 So.2d 39 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). 1984As indicated in Higgins v. Trigil Repair, Inc., 436 So.2d 222, 223 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), the Carpenter defense requires a “medical relationship between the claimant’s present injury and his misrepresented physical condition at the time of employment resulting from an undisclosed prior injury.” See also Cycenas v. Sarasota Coca Cola Bottling Co., 440 So.2d 39 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). | 1 | 2 |
Kurtz v. Stategreen2 sentences1995Kurtz v. State, 564 So.2d 519, 522 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) ("Finally, it seems clear that neither crime is a `lesser offense' because the two carry the same penalty."), disapproved on other grounds, Novaton v. State, 634 So.2d 607 (Fla. 1994) (double jeopardy issue). [1] 2 Second, one of the basic underlying policy reasons for allowing a jury to convict on a lesser included offense is that it allows a jury, in the proper case, to exercise its "pardon" power by acquitting the defendant of the charged offense and convicting the defendant of a lesser offense. 1995Kurtz v. State, 564 So.2d 519, 522 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) ("Finally, it seems clear that neither crime is a `lesser offense' because the two carry the same penalty."), disapproved on other grounds, Novaton v. State, 634 So.2d 607 (Fla. 1994) (double jeopardy issue). [1] 2 Second, one of the basic underlying policy reasons for allowing a jury to convict on a lesser included offense is that it allows a jury, in the proper case, to exercise its "pardon" power by acquitting the defendant of the charged offense and convicting the defendant of a lesser offense. | 1 | 1 |
Florida Mining & Materials v. Perkinsgreen1 sentence1994Florida Mining & Materials v. Perkins, 612 So.2d 667, 669 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Davis v. United States
green
2 sentences2017After the suppression .hearing, the trial court granted Carpenter’s motion to suppress, relying on the holding in Smallwood II that warrantless cell phone searches are unconstitutional/ The First District reversed, relying on Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 , 131 S.Ct. 2419 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011), to support the position that, because the officers were relying in good faith on the holding in Smallwood I, the appellate precedent at the time of the search, the evidence recovered from Carpenter’s cell phone was not subject to the exclusionary rule because the good-faith exception applied. 2017After the suppression .hearing, the trial court granted Carpenter’s motion to suppress, relying on the holding in Smallwood II that warrantless cell phone searches are unconstitutional/ The First District reversed, relying on Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 , 131 S.Ct. 2419 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011), to support the position that, because the officers were relying in good faith on the holding in Smallwood I, the appellate precedent at the time of the search, the evidence recovered from Carpenter’s cell phone was not subject to the exclusionary rule because the good-faith exception applied. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
State of Florida v. Christopher L. Carpenter
neutral
2 sentences2017After the suppression .hearing, the trial court granted Carpenter’s motion to suppress, relying on the holding in Smallwood II that warrantless cell phone searches are unconstitutional/ The First District reversed, relying on Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 , 131 S.Ct. 2419 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011), to support the position that, because the officers were relying in good faith on the holding in Smallwood I, the appellate precedent at the time of the search, the evidence recovered from Carpenter’s cell phone was not subject to the exclusionary rule because the good-faith exception applied. 2017The First District reversed, relying on Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011), to support the position that, because the officers were relying in good faith on the holding in Smallwood I, the appellate precedent at the time of the search, the evidence recovered from Carpenter’s cell phone was not subject to the exclusionary rule because the good-faith exception applied.1 Carpenter, 158 So. 3d at 697 . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
1 sentence2026We write only to address Carpenter’s claim that his designation as a PRR and resulting sentence were unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and its progeny. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Novaton v. State
green
2 sentences1995Kurtz v. State, 564 So.2d 519, 522 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) ("Finally, it seems clear that neither crime is a `lesser offense' because the two carry the same penalty."), disapproved on other grounds, Novaton v. State, 634 So.2d 607 (Fla. 1994) (double jeopardy issue). [1] 2 Second, one of the basic underlying policy reasons for allowing a jury to convict on a lesser included offense is that it allows a jury, in the proper case, to exercise its "pardon" power by acquitting the defendant of the charged offense and convicting the defendant of a lesser offense. 1995Kurtz v. State, 564 So.2d 519, 522 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) ("Finally, it seems clear that neither crime is a `lesser offense' because the two carry the same penalty."), disapproved on other grounds, Novaton v. State, 634 So.2d 607 (Fla. 1994) (double jeopardy issue). [1] 2 Second, one of the basic underlying policy reasons for allowing a jury to convict on a lesser included offense is that it allows a jury, in the proper case, to exercise its "pardon" power by acquitting the defendant of the charged offense and convicting the defendant of a lesser offense. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Cycenas v. Sarasota Coca Cola Bottling Co.
green
2 sentences1984As indicated in Higgins v. Trigil Repair, Inc., 436 So.2d 222, 223 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), the Carpenter defense requires a “medical relationship between the claimant’s present injury and his misrepresented physical condition at the time of employment resulting from an undisclosed prior injury.” See also Cycenas v. Sarasota Coca Cola Bottling Co., 440 So.2d 39 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). 1984As indicated in Higgins v. Trigil Repair, Inc., 436 So.2d 222, 223 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), the Carpenter defense requires a “medical relationship between the claimant’s present injury and his misrepresented physical condition at the time of employment resulting from an undisclosed prior injury.” See also Cycenas v. Sarasota Coca Cola Bottling Co., 440 So.2d 39 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.