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10 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Continental Casualty Co. v. Florida Power & Light Co.green1 sentence1992Co. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 222 So.2d 58, 59 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 229 So.2d 867 (Fla. 1969). [6] In view of our disposition of this issue, we find it unnecessary to discuss the alternative theories of estoppel and waiver Grissom asserted as legal grounds to extend the statute of limitations beyond five years period, even though these grounds were rejected by the trial court. [7] This condition reads: 5. | 1 | 1 |
Employers Commercial U. Ins. Co. of Am. v. Kottmeiergreen1 sentence1986The principle is established in Florida that "even though the act which causes an injury was intentionally done, liability coverage will not be excluded under an intentional injury exclusion clause unless the insured acted with the specific intent to cause the injury." Employers Commercial Union Insurance Company of America v. Kottmeier, 323 So.2d 605, 607 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND CAS. v. Swindal
green
2 sentences2016The Swindal court reaffirmed its earlier holding in Nash and explained that “injury or damage is caused intentionally within the meaning of an intentional injury exclusion clause if the insured has acted with the specific intent to cause harm to a third party.” Swindal, 622 So.2d at 471 (quoting Cloud v. Shelby Mut. 2002“The. courts have generally held that injury or damage is caused intentionally within the meaning of an intentional injury exclusion clause if the insured has acted with specific intent to cause harm to a third party....” Id. at 470 . citing Cloud v. Shelby Mut Insur. | 3 | 2002–2016 |
Cloud v. Shelby Mutual Ins. Co. of Shelby, Ohio
green
2 sentences2002Co., 248 So.2d 217 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)(em-phasis added); see also State Auto Mut. 1993The court in Cloud stated that the "reasonably foreseeable" test of causation so familiar in tort law had not been applied in cases dealing with accident insurance, and it adopted the following rule, which it determined to be the majority rule in the United States: "The courts have generally held that injury or damage is caused intentionally within the meaning of an intentional injury exclusion clause if the insured has acted with the specific intent to cause harm to a third party, with the result that the insurer will not be relieved of its obligations under a liability policy containing such | 3 | 1983–2002 |
Phoenix Insurance Company v. Helton
green
2 sentences1993Nash and Cloud were later followed in Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Helton, 298 So.2d 177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), cert. discharged, 330 So.2d 724 (Fla. 1976). 1983Phoenix Insurance Company v. Helton, 298 So.2d 177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Cloud v. Shelby Mutual Insurance Company, 248 So.2d 217 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971). | 3 | 1975–1993 |
Ruvolo v. American Casualty Co.
green
2 sentences1994This line of cases is exemplified by Ruvolo v. American Casualty Company, 1963, 39 N.J. 490 , 189 A.2d 204 , and the cases there cited. 1994This line of cases is exemplified by Ruvolo v. American Casualty Company, 1963, 39 N.J. 490 , 189 A.2d 204 , and the cases there cited. | 2 | 1972–1994 |
George v. Stone
green
1 sentence1994If * * * the insured in the instant case was suffering from a derangement of his intellect which deprived him of the capacity to govern his conduct in accordance with reason, and while in that condition acting on an irrational impulse he shot and injured plaintiff, his act was not intentional within the meaning of the exclusionary clause." [c.o.] 260 So.2d at 262 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Landis v. Allstate Ins. Co.
green
1 sentence1993Landis held that an intentional injury exclusion clause excluded coverage for injuries suffered by children who were sexually molested while under the care of the insureds. 546 So.2d at 1053 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Helton v. Phoenix Insurance Co.
neutral
1 sentence1993Nash and Cloud were later followed in Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Helton, 298 So.2d 177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), cert. discharged, 330 So.2d 724 (Fla. 1976). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Continental Casualty Co. v. Florida Power & Light Co.
neutral
1 sentence1992Co. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 222 So.2d 58, 59 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 229 So.2d 867 (Fla. 1969). [6] In view of our disposition of this issue, we find it unnecessary to discuss the alternative theories of estoppel and waiver Grissom asserted as legal grounds to extend the statute of limitations beyond five years period, even though these grounds were rejected by the trial court. [7] This condition reads: 5. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.