10 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Greene v. Burseygreen2 sentences2015See Greene, 733 So.2d at 1115 ; Monte v. Tipton, 612 So.2d 714 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)(holding that, in a mortgage containing an optional acceleration clause, the cause of action for foreclosure did not accrue, and the statute of limitations did not begin to run, until the lender exercised her option to accelerate and demanded the total balance of principal and interest). 2014See Greene v. Bursey, 733 So. 2d 1111, 1115 (Fla. 4th DCA 8 1999) (noting that in an installment contract with an optional acceleration clause, “the entire debt does not become due on the mere default of payment; rather, it become[s] due when the creditor takes affirmative action to alert the debtor that he has exercised his option to accelerate.”); Monte v. Tipton, 612 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Smith v. F.D.I.C., 61 F.3d 1552, 1561 (11th Cir. 1995)(holding, “when the promissory note secured by a mortgage contains an optional acceleration clause, the foreclosure cause of action accrues, a | 3 | 3 |
Monte v. Tiptongreen2 sentences2015See Greene, 733 So.2d at 1115 ; Monte v. Tipton, 612 So.2d 714 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)(holding that, in a mortgage containing an optional acceleration clause, the cause of action for foreclosure did not accrue, and the statute of limitations did not begin to run, until the lender exercised her option to accelerate and demanded the total balance of principal and interest). 2014See Greene v. Bursey, 733 So. 2d 1111, 1115 (Fla. 4th DCA 8 1999) (noting that in an installment contract with an optional acceleration clause, “the entire debt does not become due on the mere default of payment; rather, it become[s] due when the creditor takes affirmative action to alert the debtor that he has exercised his option to accelerate.”); Monte v. Tipton, 612 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Smith v. F.D.I.C., 61 F.3d 1552, 1561 (11th Cir. 1995)(holding, “when the promissory note secured by a mortgage contains an optional acceleration clause, the foreclosure cause of action accrues, a | 2 | 4 |
Campbell v. Wernergreen2 sentences2018Typically, when a mortgage contains an optional acceleration clause, “[t]he filing of suit for foreclosure amounts to exercise of the option of the mortgagee to declare the whole of the principal sum and interest secured by the mortgage due and payable.” Campbell v. Werner, 232 So. 2d 252 , 254 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970); see also Reano, 191 So. 3d at 961 (similarly explaining that when a mortgage contains an optional acceleration clause, “[t]he filing of a lawsuit constitutes notice of acceleration.”). 2014See Campbell, 232 So. 2d at 256 n.1 and cases cited therein (noting “the filing of suit for foreclosure amounts to exercise of the option of the mortgagee to declare the whole of the principal sum and interest secured by the mortgage due and payable”). | 1 | 2 |
& SC14-1266 & SC14-1305 Lewis Brooke Bartram v. U.S. Bank National Association, etc. & The Plantation at Ponte Vedra v. U.S. Bank National Association, etc. & Gideon M.G. Gratsiani v. U.S. Bank National Association, etc.green2 sentences2018Admittedly, the Bank voluntarily dismissed the first complaint, but that had no effect on the Bank’s ability to file a second complaint and re- accelerate the mortgage, given that the dismissal was without prejudice, and the Borrowers continued to be in default. “[A]fter the dismissal, the parties are simply back in the same contractual relationship as before, where the residential mortgage remained an installment loan, and the acceleration of the mortgage declared in the unsuccessful foreclosure action is revoked.” Bartram v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 211 So. 3d 1009, 1019 (Fla. 2016). “[A] dism 2018Admittedly, the Bank voluntarily dismissed the first complaint, but that had no effect on the Bank’s ability to file a second complaint and re- accelerate the mortgage, given that the dismissal was without prejudice, and the Borrowers continued to be in default. “[A]fter the dismissal, the parties are simply back in the same contractual relationship as before, where the residential mortgage remained an installment loan, and the acceleration of the mortgage declared in the unsuccessful foreclosure action is revoked.” Bartram v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 211 So. 3d 1009, 1019 (Fla. 2016). “[A] dism | 1 | 2 |
Central Home Trust Co. v. Lippincottgreen2 sentences2015We hold that the December 7, 2007 letter did not constitute an acceleration of the debt nor did it “apprise the maker of the fact that the option to accelerate has been exercised.” Central Home Trust, 392 So.2d at 933 (emphasis supplied). 1999Id. (footnote omitted). | 1 | 2 |
Conner v. Cogginsgreen1 sentence2018See Conner v. Coggins, 349 So. 2d 780, 781-82 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (noting that when a mortgage contains an optional acceleration clause, the lender could have either brought its foreclosure suit within five years of a monthly default, or within five years from the date of the maturity of the note). | 1 | 1 |
3, French Villas Condominium Association, Inc.green2 sentences2018As a preliminary matter, we note that because we are dealing with an optional acceleration clause in the mortgage, acceleration “is not automatic or self-executing, but requires the lender to exercise this option and to give notice to the borrowers that it has done so.” Snow v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 156 So. 3d 538, 542 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015); see also Reano v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 191 So. 3d 959, 961 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). 2018Typically, when a mortgage contains an optional acceleration clause, “[t]he filing of suit for foreclosure amounts to exercise of the option of the mortgagee to declare the whole of the principal sum and interest secured by the mortgage due and payable.” Campbell v. Werner, 232 So. 2d 252 , 254 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970); see also Reano, 191 So. 3d at 961 (similarly explaining that when a mortgage contains an optional acceleration clause, “[t]he filing of a lawsuit constitutes notice of acceleration.”). | 1 | 1 |
Snow v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.green1 sentence2018As a preliminary matter, we note that because we are dealing with an optional acceleration clause in the mortgage, acceleration “is not automatic or self-executing, but requires the lender to exercise this option and to give notice to the borrowers that it has done so.” Snow v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 156 So. 3d 538, 542 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015); see also Reano v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 191 So. 3d 959, 961 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporationgreen2 sentences2014See Greene v. Bursey, 733 So. 2d 1111, 1115 (Fla. 4th DCA 8 1999) (noting that in an installment contract with an optional acceleration clause, “the entire debt does not become due on the mere default of payment; rather, it become[s] due when the creditor takes affirmative action to alert the debtor that he has exercised his option to accelerate.”); Monte v. Tipton, 612 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Smith v. F.D.I.C., 61 F.3d 1552, 1561 (11th Cir. 1995)(holding, “when the promissory note secured by a mortgage contains an optional acceleration clause, the foreclosure cause of action accrues, a 2014See Greene v. Bursey, 733 So. 2d 1111, 1115 (Fla. 4th DCA 8 1999) (noting that in an installment contract with an optional acceleration clause, “the entire debt does not become due on the mere default of payment; rather, it become[s] due when the creditor takes affirmative action to alert the debtor that he has exercised his option to accelerate.”); Monte v. Tipton, 612 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Smith v. F.D.I.C., 61 F.3d 1552, 1561 (11th Cir. 1995)(holding, “when the promissory note secured by a mortgage contains an optional acceleration clause, the foreclosure cause of action accrues, a | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Singleton v. Greymar Associates
green
2 sentences2017As we cautioned in Singleton, “justice would not be served if the mortgagee was barred from challenging the subsequent default payment solely because he failed to prove the earlier alleged default.” 882 So. 2d at 1008 . 2016As we cautioned in Singleton, “justice would not be served if the mortgagee was barred from challenging the subsequent default payment solely because he failed to prove the earlier alleged default.” 882 So. 2d at 1008 . | 2 | 2016–2017 |
Bollettieri Resort Villas Condominium Association, Inc. v. the Bank of New York Mellon, etc.
green
1 sentence2018When a mortgage contains an optional acceleration clause, “forbearance [to collect all sums due upon a monthly default] will not constitute a waiver or defense against future collection of all sums due and owing under the note.” Id. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Reed v. Lincoln
neutral
1 sentence2014In other words, the entire debt does not become due on the mere default of payment; rather, it become due when the creditor takes affirmative action to alert the debtor that he has exercised his option to accelerate.” (citations omitted)); Reed v. Lincoln, 731 So.2d 104 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (holding that in the absence of acceleration clause, default did not result in entire remaining debt becoming due immediately and thus remand for a determination as to which monthly installments were barred by the statute of limitations was necessary); Monte v. Tipton, 612 So.2d 714, 716 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) ( | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Baader v. Walker
green
1 sentence1976The Cooks urge that the court erred in failing to recognize the absolute acceleration called for in the contract when the payment was missed on 1 November 1973. *299 In Baader v. Walker, 153 So.2d 51 (Fla. App.2d, 1963), the court discussed at length the difference between an absolute acceleration clause and an optional acceleration clause. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.