11 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Smither v. Asset Acceptance, LLCgreen2 sentences2019Id. at 43. [20] To the degree that the trial court denied the Blairs' statute-of-limitations defense, it rejected the Blairs' claim that EMC did not invoke the acceleration clause in a reasonable time: Indiana law is clear that "if an installment loan contract or promissory note has an optional acceleration clause, ... a creditor may (but is not required) to declare all future installments on the loan immediately due and payable after a debtor's default." Smither v. Asset Acceptance, LLC , 919 N.E.2d 1153 , 1160 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). 2019Nevertheless, the Smither court cautioned that, "Waiting until after the statute of limitations has passed following default before making demand for full and immediate payment of a debt is per se an unreasonable amount of time to invoke an optional acceleration clause and cannot be given effect." Id. at 1279 (quoting Smither , 919 N.E.2d at 1161-62 ). | 4 | 6 |
Griese-Traylor Corp. v. Lemmonsgreen2 sentences2015Smither, 919 N.E.2d at 1160 (citing Griese-Traylor Corp. v. Lemmons, 424 N.E.2d 173, 183 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981)). 2010See Griese-Traylor Corp. v. Lemmons, 424 N.E.2d 173, 183 (Ind.Ct.App.1981). | 2 | 2 |
Curry v. US, Small Business Admin.green2 sentences2019Cal. 1987), a person who fails to exercise an optional acceleration clause on an installment contract (where demand is not necessary to perfect a cause of action) is not "stav[ing] off operation of the statute of limitations *1193 ..." Id. 2018The court also noted, " 'a party is not at liberty to stave off operation of the statute [of limitations] inordinately by failing to make demand.' " Id. at 1161 (quoting Curry v. United States , 679 F.Supp. 966 , 970 (N.D. | 1 | 3 |
Collins Asset Group, LLC v. Alkhemer Alialygreen2 sentences2020Collins Asset Grp., LLC v. Alialy, 115 N.E.3d 1275, 1279 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). 2019Nevertheless, the Smither court cautioned that, "Waiting until after the statute of limitations has passed following default before making demand for full and immediate payment of a debt is per se an unreasonable amount of time to invoke an optional acceleration clause and cannot be given effect." Id. at 1279 (quoting Smither , 919 N.E.2d at 1161-62 ). | 1 | 2 |
Robert Imbody v. Fifth Third Bankgreen2 sentences2020Id. (cleaned Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-MF-530 | February 17, 2020 Page 7 of 10 up); see also Imbody v. Fifth Third Bank, 12 N.E.3d 943, 945 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that a secured creditor exercised an optional acceleration clause, “which triggered the statute of limitations” under Indiana Code section 34-11-2-9). 2019Id. | 1 | 2 |
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. v. KENNETH H. GRAYBUSH and ROBIN B. GRAYBUSHgreen2 sentences2020The Florida District Court of Appeals, applying that state’s general five- year statute of limitations, found that “[w]hen a note contains an optional acceleration clause, a lender only runs out of opportunities to foreclose, under the applicable statute of limitations, after five years of the latest default, or after five years of the date of maturity of the note.” Bank of America v. Graybush, 253 So. 3d 1188, 1195 (Fla. Dist. 2020The Florida District Court of Appeals, applying that state’s general five- year statute of limitations, found that “[w]hen a note contains an optional acceleration clause, a lender only runs out of opportunities to foreclose, under the applicable statute of limitations, after five years of the latest default, or after five years of the date of maturity of the note.” Bank of America v. Graybush, 253 So. 3d 1188, 1195 (Fla. Dist. | 1 | 1 |
BASELINE FINANCIAL SERVICES v. Madisongreen1 sentence2014And the court stated that Arizona courts “have deemed a variety of actions, including repossession of property, sufficient to demonstrate a creditor’s exercise of an optional acceleration clause.” Id. at 323. | 1 | 1 |
AMERICAN STATE BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF WILLISTON v. Sorensongreen1 sentence2010Other courts have noted that in some instances, the exercising of an optional acceleration clause may be implied from the creditor's conduct, but "a court will rarely imply acceleration from [such] conduct." American State Bank and Trust Co. of Williston v. Sorenson, 539 N.W.2d 59, 63 (N.D.1995). | 1 | 1 |
Newsom v. Board of Commissionersgreen2 sentences2010Clearly, waiting until after the statute of limitations has passed following default before making *1162 demand for full and immediate payment of a debt is per se an "unreasonable" amount of time to invoke an optional acceleration clause and cannot be given effect. 5 See Newsom v. Board of Comm'rs, 103 Ind. 526, 530 , 3 N.E. 163, 165 (1885) (holding that parties cannot avoid the running of the statute of limitations by waiting until after the limitations period has passed before demanding payment). 2010Clearly, waiting until after the statute of limitations has passed following default before making *1162 demand for full and immediate payment of a debt is per se an "unreasonable" amount of time to invoke an optional acceleration clause and cannot be given effect. 5 See Newsom v. Board of Comm'rs, 103 Ind. 526, 530 , 3 N.E. 163, 165 (1885) (holding that parties cannot avoid the running of the statute of limitations by waiting until after the limitations period has passed before demanding payment). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kuhn v. Kuhn
green
2 sentences2020Id. (cleaned Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-MF-530 | February 17, 2020 Page 7 of 10 up); see also Imbody v. Fifth Third Bank, 12 N.E.3d 943, 945 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that a secured creditor exercised an optional acceleration clause, “which triggered the statute of limitations” under Indiana Code section 34-11-2-9). 1981We have held that a cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run on installment obligations as each installment becomes due, Kuhn v. Kuhn, (1980) Ind., 402 N.E.2d 989 , as a mandatory acceleration clause brings all payments due immediately, Cowan, supra, or as an optional acceleration clause is exercised, Central Trust and Savings Co. v. Kirkman, (1920) 73 Ind.App. 633 , 127 N.E. 452 , Cf. Roberts v. Watson, (1977) 172 Ind.App. 108 , 359 N.E.2d 615 (action for rent cannot recover rent not alleged to be due); Booher v. Richmond Square, Inc., (1974) 160 Ind.App. 44 , 310 | 2 | 1981–2020 |
Cowan v. Murphy
green
2 sentences2020Finally, the note’s maturity date triggers the statute of limitations, as acknowledged by Cowan v. Murphy, 165 Ind. App. 566 , 333 N.E.2d 802 (1975). 2020Finally, the note’s maturity date triggers the statute of limitations, as acknowledged by Cowan v. Murphy, 165 Ind. App. 566 , 333 N.E.2d 802 (1975). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Moryl v. Ransone
green
1 sentence2019Reh'g p. 8 (quoting Moryl v. Ransone , 4 N.E.3d 1133 , 1136 (Ind. 2014). [3] However, at the time we issued our opinion, a review of the record revealed that CAG's counsel had asserted in his memorandum in opposition to Alialy's motion to dismiss that "the statute of limitations to collect the entire debt does not begin to run immediately upon the debtor's default, but when the creditor exercises the optional acceleration clause." (Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 21). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Roberts v. Watson
green
2 sentences1981We have held that a cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run on installment obligations as each installment becomes due, Kuhn v. Kuhn, (1980) Ind., 402 N.E.2d 989 , as a mandatory acceleration clause brings all payments due immediately, Cowan, supra, or as an optional acceleration clause is exercised, Central Trust and Savings Co. v. Kirkman, (1920) 73 Ind.App. 633 , 127 N.E. 452 , Cf. Roberts v. Watson, (1977) 172 Ind.App. 108 , 359 N.E.2d 615 (action for rent cannot recover rent not alleged to be due); Booher v. Richmond Square, Inc., (1974) 160 Ind.App. 44 , 310 1981We have held that a cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run on installment obligations as each installment becomes due, Kuhn v. Kuhn, (1980) Ind., 402 N.E.2d 989 , as a mandatory acceleration clause brings all payments due immediately, Cowan, supra, or as an optional acceleration clause is exercised, Central Trust and Savings Co. v. Kirkman, (1920) 73 Ind.App. 633 , 127 N.E. 452 , Cf. Roberts v. Watson, (1977) 172 Ind.App. 108 , 359 N.E.2d 615 (action for rent cannot recover rent not alleged to be due); Booher v. Richmond Square, Inc., (1974) 160 Ind.App. 44 , 310 | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Booher v. Richmond Square, Inc.
green
2 sentences1981We have held that a cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run on installment obligations as each installment becomes due, Kuhn v. Kuhn, (1980) Ind., 402 N.E.2d 989 , as a mandatory acceleration clause brings all payments due immediately, Cowan, supra, or as an optional acceleration clause is exercised, Central Trust and Savings Co. v. Kirkman, (1920) 73 Ind.App. 633 , 127 N.E. 452 , Cf. Roberts v. Watson, (1977) 172 Ind.App. 108 , 359 N.E.2d 615 (action for rent cannot recover rent not alleged to be due); Booher v. Richmond Square, Inc., (1974) 160 Ind.App. 44 , 310 1981We have held that a cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run on installment obligations as each installment becomes due, Kuhn v. Kuhn, (1980) Ind., 402 N.E.2d 989 , as a mandatory acceleration clause brings all payments due immediately, Cowan, supra, or as an optional acceleration clause is exercised, Central Trust and Savings Co. v. Kirkman, (1920) 73 Ind.App. 633 , 127 N.E. 452 , Cf. Roberts v. Watson, (1977) 172 Ind.App. 108 , 359 N.E.2d 615 (action for rent cannot recover rent not alleged to be due); Booher v. Richmond Square, Inc., (1974) 160 Ind.App. 44 , 310 | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Central Trust & Savings Co. v. Kirkman
green
2 sentences1981We have held that a cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run on installment obligations as each installment becomes due, Kuhn v. Kuhn, (1980) Ind., 402 N.E.2d 989 , as a mandatory acceleration clause brings all payments due immediately, Cowan, supra, or as an optional acceleration clause is exercised, Central Trust and Savings Co. v. Kirkman, (1920) 73 Ind.App. 633 , 127 N.E. 452 , Cf. Roberts v. Watson, (1977) 172 Ind.App. 108 , 359 N.E.2d 615 (action for rent cannot recover rent not alleged to be due); Booher v. Richmond Square, Inc., (1974) 160 Ind.App. 44 , 310 1981We have held that a cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run on installment obligations as each installment becomes due, Kuhn v. Kuhn, (1980) Ind., 402 N.E.2d 989 , as a mandatory acceleration clause brings all payments due immediately, Cowan, supra, or as an optional acceleration clause is exercised, Central Trust and Savings Co. v. Kirkman, (1920) 73 Ind.App. 633 , 127 N.E. 452 , Cf. Roberts v. Watson, (1977) 172 Ind.App. 108 , 359 N.E.2d 615 (action for rent cannot recover rent not alleged to be due); Booher v. Richmond Square, Inc., (1974) 160 Ind.App. 44 , 310 | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.