optional acceleration clause in Texas

54 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1957–2024 12 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (7)

Case	Followed	Cited
HOLY CROSS CHURCH OF GOD IN CHRIST v. Wolfgreen tex · 2001 · cited in 44 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2001–2024 2 sentences 2023Id. at 6. (citing Mandarino v. Sherwood Lane Invs., LLC, No 01-15-00192-CV, 2016 WL 4034568 , at 7-8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 26, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Because we concluded that the junior lienholder was not seeking a –15– deficiency judgment when it sued on its promissory note, it was not subject to the statute of limitations for deficiency judgments.”)); see also Holy Cross Church of God in Christ v. Wolf, 44 S.W.3d 562, 566 (Tex. 2001) (if a promissory note contains an optional acceleration clause, limitations does not automatically start to run upon default; an action ac 2021“If, as here, the security instrument contains an optional acceleration clause, the cause of action accrues when the lender exercises its option to accelerate the maturity date of the note.” Id. (citing Holy Cross Church of God in Christ v. Wolf, 44 S.W.3d 562, 566 (Tex. 2001)).	35	44
Khan v. GBAK Properties, Inc.green texapp · 2012 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2014–2019 2 sentences 2019Holy Cross Church of God in Christ v. Wolf, 44 S.W.3d 562, 566 (Tex. 2001); Khan v. GBAK Props., Inc., 371 S.W.3d 347, 353 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.). 2014Id. at 566 ; Khan v. GBAK Props., Inc., 371 S.W.3d 347, 353 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.).	2	2
Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Savings Ass'ngreen tex · 1982 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1984–2015 2 sentences 2015In Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Savings Association, 633 S.W.2d 811, 816 (Tex.1982), the court was merely called upon to decide whether an optional acceleration clause, as executed, was valid and enforceable but in that case there was no allegation that there was anything wrongful or improper in the manner in which the clause was enforced. 1984In Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Savings Association, 633 S.W.2d 811, 816 (Tex.1982), the court was merely called upon to decide whether an optional acceleration clause, as executed, was valid and enforceable but in that case there was no allegation that there was anything wrongful or improper in the manner in which the clause was enforced.	2	2
Crestview, Ltd. v. Foremost Insurance Co.green texapp · 1981 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1984–2015 2 sentences 2015In Crestview, Ltd. v. Foremost Insurance Company, 621 S.W.2d 816, 820, 823 (Tex.Civ.App.-- Austin 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the alleged wrongdoer was found not to have enforced the due-on-sale clause in an unreasonable, inequitable, unjust or oppressive manner. 1984In Crestview, Ltd. v. Foremost Insurance Company, 621 S.W.2d 816, 820, 823 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.), the alleged wrongdoer was found not to have enforced the due-on-sale clause in an unreasonable, inequitable, unjust or oppressive manner.	2	2
National City Bank of Indiana v. Ortizgreen texapp · 2013 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2015–2018 2 sentences 2018Holy Cross Church of God in Christ v. Wolf, 44 S.W.3d 562, 566 (Tex. 2001) (non-judicial foreclosure); Nat’l City Bank of Ind. v. Ortiz, 401 S.W.3d 867 , 885–86 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (judicial foreclosure). 2015Holy Cross Church of God in Christ v. Wolf, 44 S.W.3d 562, 566 (Tex.2001) (nonjudicial foreclosure); Nat’l City Bank of Ind. v. Ortiz, 401 S.W.3d 867, 885-86 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (judicial foreclosure).	1	2
Allen Sales & Servicenter, Inc. v. Ryangreen tex · 1975 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1975–1985 2 sentences 1985Allen, 525 S.W.2d at 864-66 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 1975These facts alone are sufficient grounds to sustain the judgment of the trial court. ■In the case of Allen Sales & Servicecenter, Inc. et al. v. Ryan et al., 525 S.W.2d 863 in an opinion delivered by the Supreme Court of Texas on July 9, 1975, that court held that the holder of an installment note must make a demand to the maker for payment of an overdue installment before he cam exercise the optional acceleration clause in the note. *643 The sole question before the trial court at the time it granted the temporary injunction was whether or not Eva Mae Short had a probable right to injunction	1	2
Motor & Industrial Finance Corporation v. Hughesgreen tex · 1957 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1982–1982 2 sentences 1982In words which have beeifquoted with approval by the Texas Supreme Court in Motor & Industrial Finance Corp. v. Hughes, 157 Tex. 276 , 302 S.W.2d 386, 394 (1957) and Ramo, Inc. v. English, 500 S.W.2d 461, 466 (Tex.1973), a clause automatically accelerating maturity of a debt has been described as a remedy that is harsh in its nature, and provisions therefor, in order to be effective, should be clear and unequivocal; and if there is a reasonable doubt as to the meaning of the terms employed, preference should be given to that construction which will avoid the forfeiture and prevent acceleration 1982In words which have beeifquoted with approval by the Texas Supreme Court in Motor & Industrial Finance Corp. v. Hughes, 157 Tex. 276 , 302 S.W.2d 386, 394 (1957) and Ramo, Inc. v. English, 500 S.W.2d 461, 466 (Tex.1973), a clause automatically accelerating maturity of a debt has been described as a remedy that is harsh in its nature, and provisions therefor, in order to be effective, should be clear and unequivocal; and if there is a reasonable doubt as to the meaning of the terms employed, preference should be given to that construction which will avoid the forfeiture and prevent acceleration	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (14)

Case	Cited	Years
Brown v. Hewitt green texapp · 1940 2 sentences 1975Brown v. Hewitt, supra. Until the legislature clearly evinces an intent that this rule be abolished, we will continue to apply it and require that the holder of an installment note make a demand to the maker for payment of an overdue installment prior to exercising an optional acceleration clause. 1965Faulk v. Futch, 147 Tex. 253 , 214 S.W.2d 614 , 5 A.L.R.2d 963 ; Luczynski v. Sevier, Tex.Civ.App. (n. r. e.), 302 S.W.2d 474 ; Griffith v. Griffith, Tex.Civ.App. (n. r. e.), 252 S.W.2d 517 ; 5 A.L.R.2d 977 ; Jernigan v. O’Brien, Tex.Civ.App. (n. w. h.), 303 S.W.2d 515 ; Bischoff v. Rearick, Tex.Civ.App. (n. r. e.), 232 S.W.2d 174 ; Brown v. Hewitt, Tex.Civ.App., Er.Ref., 143 S.W.2d 223 ; Curtis v. Speck, Tex.Civ.App., Er.Ref., 130 S.W.2d 348 .	2	1965–1975
Faulk v. Futch green tex · 1948 2 sentences 1965Faulk v. Futch, 147 Tex. 253 , 214 S.W.2d 614 , 5 A.L.R.2d 963 ; Luczynski v. Sevier, Tex.Civ.App. (n. r. e.), 302 S.W.2d 474 ; Griffith v. Griffith, Tex.Civ.App. (n. r. e.), 252 S.W.2d 517 ; 5 A.L.R.2d 977 ; Jernigan v. O’Brien, Tex.Civ.App. (n. w. h.), 303 S.W.2d 515 ; Bischoff v. Rearick, Tex.Civ.App. (n. r. e.), 232 S.W.2d 174 ; Brown v. Hewitt, Tex.Civ.App., Er.Ref., 143 S.W.2d 223 ; Curtis v. Speck, Tex.Civ.App., Er.Ref., 130 S.W.2d 348 . 1965Faulk v. Futch, 147 Tex. 253 , 214 S.W.2d 614 , 5 A.L.R.2d 963 ; Luczynski v. Sevier, Tex.Civ.App. (n. r. e.), 302 S.W.2d 474 ; Griffith v. Griffith, Tex.Civ.App. (n. r. e.), 252 S.W.2d 517 ; 5 A.L.R.2d 977 ; Jernigan v. O’Brien, Tex.Civ.App. (n. w. h.), 303 S.W.2d 515 ; Bischoff v. Rearick, Tex.Civ.App. (n. r. e.), 232 S.W.2d 174 ; Brown v. Hewitt, Tex.Civ.App., Er.Ref., 143 S.W.2d 223 ; Curtis v. Speck, Tex.Civ.App., Er.Ref., 130 S.W.2d 348 .	2	1957–1965
Curtis v. Speck green texapp · 1939 2 sentences 1965Faulk v. Futch, 147 Tex. 253 , 214 S.W.2d 614 , 5 A.L.R.2d 963 ; Luczynski v. Sevier, Tex.Civ.App. (n. r. e.), 302 S.W.2d 474 ; Griffith v. Griffith, Tex.Civ.App. (n. r. e.), 252 S.W.2d 517 ; 5 A.L.R.2d 977 ; Jernigan v. O’Brien, Tex.Civ.App. (n. w. h.), 303 S.W.2d 515 ; Bischoff v. Rearick, Tex.Civ.App. (n. r. e.), 232 S.W.2d 174 ; Brown v. Hewitt, Tex.Civ.App., Er.Ref., 143 S.W.2d 223 ; Curtis v. Speck, Tex.Civ.App., Er.Ref., 130 S.W.2d 348 . 1957He must as a condition precedent to the exercise of his option present the instrument and make formal demand upon the payor to pay the installment due.’ ” Faulk v. Futch, 147 Tex. 253 , 214 S.W.2d 614 , 5 A.L.R.2d 963 , cites approvingly Parker v. Mazur and Curtis v. Speck, supra, and as we understand it, supports our decision here.	2	1957–1965
Gordon M Swoboda v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC And U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee green texapp · 2019 1 sentence 2024Swoboda, 579 S.W.3d at 632 ; see Holy Cross Church of God in Christ v. Wolf, 44 S.W.3d 562, 566 (Tex. 2001).	1	2024–2024
EMC MORTG. CORP. v. Window Box Ass'n, Inc. green texapp · 2008 1 sentence 2019Corp. v. Window Box Ass’n, Inc., 264 S.W.3d 331 , 335–36 (Tex. App.— Waco 2008, no pet.).	1	2019–2019
CA PARTNERS v. Spears green texapp · 2008 1 sentence 2014Id. (citing Holy Cross, 44 S.W.3d at 566 ).	1	2014–2014
Swoboda v. Wilshire Credit Corp. green texapp · 1998 1 sentence 2001It relied on section 51.002 of the Texas Property Code and Swoboda v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 975 S.W.2d 770 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1998, pet. denied).	1	2001–2001
Baldazo v. Villa Oldsmobile, Inc. green texapp · 1985 2 sentences 1989Ogden, 640 S.W.2d at 233-34 ; Baldazo v. Villa Oldsmobile, Inc., 695 S.W.2d 815 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1985, no writ). 1989Ogden, 640 S.W.2d at 233-34 ; Baldazo v. Villa Oldsmobile, Inc., 695 S.W.2d 815 (Tex.App. Amarillo 1985, no writ).	1	1989–1989
Ogden v. Gibraltar Savings Ass'n green tex · 1982 2 sentences 1989Ogden, 640 S.W.2d at 233-34 ; Baldazo v. Villa Oldsmobile, Inc., 695 S.W.2d 815 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1985, no writ). 1989Ogden, 640 S.W.2d at 233-34 ; Baldazo v. Villa Oldsmobile, Inc., 695 S.W.2d 815 (Tex.App. Amarillo 1985, no writ).	1	1989–1989
Ramo, Inc. v. English green tex · 1973 1 sentence 1982In words which have beeifquoted with approval by the Texas Supreme Court in Motor & Industrial Finance Corp. v. Hughes, 157 Tex. 276 , 302 S.W.2d 386, 394 (1957) and Ramo, Inc. v. English, 500 S.W.2d 461, 466 (Tex.1973), a clause automatically accelerating maturity of a debt has been described as a remedy that is harsh in its nature, and provisions therefor, in order to be effective, should be clear and unequivocal; and if there is a reasonable doubt as to the meaning of the terms employed, preference should be given to that construction which will avoid the forfeiture and prevent acceleration	1	1982–1982
Bischoff v. Rearick green texapp · 1950 1 sentence 1965Faulk v. Futch, 147 Tex. 253 , 214 S.W.2d 614 , 5 A.L.R.2d 963 ; Luczynski v. Sevier, Tex.Civ.App. (n. r. e.), 302 S.W.2d 474 ; Griffith v. Griffith, Tex.Civ.App. (n. r. e.), 252 S.W.2d 517 ; 5 A.L.R.2d 977 ; Jernigan v. O’Brien, Tex.Civ.App. (n. w. h.), 303 S.W.2d 515 ; Bischoff v. Rearick, Tex.Civ.App. (n. r. e.), 232 S.W.2d 174 ; Brown v. Hewitt, Tex.Civ.App., Er.Ref., 143 S.W.2d 223 ; Curtis v. Speck, Tex.Civ.App., Er.Ref., 130 S.W.2d 348 .	1	1965–1965
Griffith v. Griffith green texapp · 1952 1 sentence 1965Faulk v. Futch, 147 Tex. 253 , 214 S.W.2d 614 , 5 A.L.R.2d 963 ; Luczynski v. Sevier, Tex.Civ.App. (n. r. e.), 302 S.W.2d 474 ; Griffith v. Griffith, Tex.Civ.App. (n. r. e.), 252 S.W.2d 517 ; 5 A.L.R.2d 977 ; Jernigan v. O’Brien, Tex.Civ.App. (n. w. h.), 303 S.W.2d 515 ; Bischoff v. Rearick, Tex.Civ.App. (n. r. e.), 232 S.W.2d 174 ; Brown v. Hewitt, Tex.Civ.App., Er.Ref., 143 S.W.2d 223 ; Curtis v. Speck, Tex.Civ.App., Er.Ref., 130 S.W.2d 348 .	1	1965–1965
Luczynski v. Sevier neutral texapp · 1957 1 sentence 1965Faulk v. Futch, 147 Tex. 253 , 214 S.W.2d 614 , 5 A.L.R.2d 963 ; Luczynski v. Sevier, Tex.Civ.App. (n. r. e.), 302 S.W.2d 474 ; Griffith v. Griffith, Tex.Civ.App. (n. r. e.), 252 S.W.2d 517 ; 5 A.L.R.2d 977 ; Jernigan v. O’Brien, Tex.Civ.App. (n. w. h.), 303 S.W.2d 515 ; Bischoff v. Rearick, Tex.Civ.App. (n. r. e.), 232 S.W.2d 174 ; Brown v. Hewitt, Tex.Civ.App., Er.Ref., 143 S.W.2d 223 ; Curtis v. Speck, Tex.Civ.App., Er.Ref., 130 S.W.2d 348 .	1	1965–1965
Jernigan v. O'BRIEN green texapp · 1957 1 sentence 1965Faulk v. Futch, 147 Tex. 253 , 214 S.W.2d 614 , 5 A.L.R.2d 963 ; Luczynski v. Sevier, Tex.Civ.App. (n. r. e.), 302 S.W.2d 474 ; Griffith v. Griffith, Tex.Civ.App. (n. r. e.), 252 S.W.2d 517 ; 5 A.L.R.2d 977 ; Jernigan v. O’Brien, Tex.Civ.App. (n. w. h.), 303 S.W.2d 515 ; Bischoff v. Rearick, Tex.Civ.App. (n. r. e.), 232 S.W.2d 174 ; Brown v. Hewitt, Tex.Civ.App., Er.Ref., 143 S.W.2d 223 ; Curtis v. Speck, Tex.Civ.App., Er.Ref., 130 S.W.2d 348 .	1	1965–1965

Statutes the citing opinions construe

TX § Tex. Prop. Code § 51.002 (5)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 54 (1957–2024) NY 22 (1994–2022) IN 11 (1981–2020) FL 10 (1976–2018) AZ 7 (2012–2023) CO 3 (2012–2018) AR 3 (1993–2025) ME 3 (2017–2017) DC 2 (1975–1987) LA 2 (1993–2005) CA 2 (1937–1971) KS 2 (2008–2021) AL 2 (1986–2012) CT 2 (1998–1998) HI 2 (1997–2000)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check