7 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 2012–2023 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Navy Federal Credit Union v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2017Cf. Baseline Financial Servs. v. Madison, 229 Ariz. 543, 544, ¶ 7 , 278 P.3d 321 (App. 2012) (“When an installment contract contains an optional acceleration clause ... an action as to future installments does not accrue until the holder exercises the option to accelerate.”); Navy Federal Credit Union v. Jones, 187 Ariz. 493, 495 , 930 P.2d 1007 (App. 1996) (claim for failure to make an installment payment accrues on the date installment becomes due; claim for future unmatured installments does not accrue until creditor exercises right to accelerate). 2017Cf. Baseline Financial Servs. v. Madison, 229 Ariz. 543, 544, ¶ 7 , 278 P.3d 321 (App. 2012) (“When an installment contract contains an optional acceleration clause ... an action as to future installments does not accrue until the holder exercises the option to accelerate.”); Navy Federal Credit Union v. Jones, 187 Ariz. 493, 495 , 930 P.2d 1007 (App. 1996) (claim for failure to make an installment payment accrues on the date installment becomes due; claim for future unmatured installments does not accrue until creditor exercises right to accelerate). | 3 | 4 |
BASELINE FINANCIAL SERVICES v. Madisongreen2 sentences2017Cf. Baseline Financial Servs. v. Madison, 229 Ariz. 543, 544, ¶ 7 , 278 P.3d 321 (App. 2012) (“When an installment contract contains an optional acceleration clause ... an action as to future installments does not accrue until the holder exercises the option to accelerate.”); Navy Federal Credit Union v. Jones, 187 Ariz. 493, 495 , 930 P.2d 1007 (App. 1996) (claim for failure to make an installment payment accrues on the date installment becomes due; claim for future unmatured installments does not accrue until creditor exercises right to accelerate). 2017Cf. Baseline Financial Servs. v. Madison, 229 Ariz. 543, 544, ¶ 7 , 278 P.3d 321 (App. 2012) (“When an installment contract contains an optional acceleration clause ... an action as to future installments does not accrue until the holder exercises the option to accelerate.”); Navy Federal Credit Union v. Jones, 187 Ariz. 493, 495 , 930 P.2d 1007 (App. 1996) (claim for failure to make an installment payment accrues on the date installment becomes due; claim for future unmatured installments does not accrue until creditor exercises right to accelerate). | 1 | 2 |
Browne v. Nowlingreen2 sentences2018See Browne , 117 Ariz. at 75 , 570 P.2d 1246 . ¶ 12 In February 2008, Santos stopped making monthly minimum payments. 2018See Browne , 117 Ariz. at 75 , 570 P.2d 1246 . ¶ 12 In February 2008, Santos stopped making monthly minimum payments. | 1 | 1 |
Markle v. Columbia Union National Bank & Trust Co.green1 sentence2012See Wheel Estate, 139 Ariz. at 508 , 679 P.2d at 531 (citation omitted) (“[T]he assignees exercised the option to accelerate by taking possession of the mobile home.”); see also Markle v. Columbia Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 483 S.W.2d 682, 685 (Mo.Ct.App.1972) (describing repossession as “a sufficient overt act” to exercise option to accelerate). ¶ 16 We reverse the judgment of the superior court and remand for further appropriate proceedings, which may include consideration of Madison’s laches claim. 1 The superior court has not yet considered that issue given its dismissal on statute of l | 1 | 1 |
Wheel Estate Corp. v. Webbgreen2 sentences2012See Wheel Estate, 139 Ariz. at 508 , 679 P.2d at 531 (citation omitted) (“[T]he assignees exercised the option to accelerate by taking possession of the mobile home.”); see also Markle v. Columbia Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 483 S.W.2d 682, 685 (Mo.Ct.App.1972) (describing repossession as “a sufficient overt act” to exercise option to accelerate). ¶ 16 We reverse the judgment of the superior court and remand for further appropriate proceedings, which may include consideration of Madison’s laches claim. 1 The superior court has not yet considered that issue given its dismissal on statute of l 2012See Wheel Estate, 139 Ariz. at 508 , 679 P.2d at 531 (citation omitted) (“[T]he assignees exercised the option to accelerate by taking possession of the mobile home.”); see also Markle v. Columbia Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 483 S.W.2d 682, 685 (Mo.Ct.App.1972) (describing repossession as “a sufficient overt act” to exercise option to accelerate). ¶ 16 We reverse the judgment of the superior court and remand for further appropriate proceedings, which may include consideration of Madison’s laches claim. 1 The superior court has not yet considered that issue given its dismissal on statute of l | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mertola, LLC v. Santos
neutral
2 sentences2018Id. ¶ 7 We granted review to decide when the statute of limitations commences on credit-card debt subject to an optional acceleration clause, a question of statewide importance that is likely to recur. 2018Mertola , 241 Ariz. at 574 ¶ 8, 390 P.3d at 814 (citing Baseline Fin. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Central Home Trust Co. v. Lippincott
green
1 sentence2012As in Lippincott , the internal write off was simply an “accounting procedure within the bank” and not an affirmative exercise of the optional acceleration clause. 392 So.2d at 933 . ¶ 15 Repossession of the Cadillac in December 2007, on the other hand, was an affirmative act sufficient to exercise the acceleration clause. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.