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10 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Francis v. Newtongreen2 sentences1999See Francis v. Newton, [supra at] 344 (1).” Id. at 197, n. 2. 3 Moreover, this court also has held: *98 It is well-settled law in this State that the defendant in a tort action is not subject to garnishment until the tort claim is reduced to judgment. . . . [Although one may have the right to bring a tort action against another, the tort-feasor is not subject to garnishment at the instance of a creditor of the injured party. . . . 1997See Francis v. Newton, 75 Ga. App. 341, 344 (1) ( 43 SE2d 282 ) (1947). | 2 | 2 |
Roberts v. Stategreen2 sentences2024See Roberts v. State, 286 Ga. 532, 532 ( 690 SE2d 150 ) (2010); Sledge v. State, 312 Ga. App. 97, 98 (1) ( 717 SE2d 682 ) (2011) (“[c]ourts should examine the substance of a motion, rather than its nomenclature, to determine what sort of relief is sought”). 2024See Roberts v. State, 286 Ga. 532, 532 ( 690 SE2d 150 ) (2010); Sledge v. State, 312 Ga. App. 97, 98 (1) ( 717 SE2d 682 ) (2011) (“[c]ourts should examine the substance of a motion, rather than its nomenclature, to determine what sort of relief is sought”). | 1 | 1 |
Wheeler v. Stategreen1 sentence2024See Roberts v. State, 286 Ga. 532, 532 ( 690 SE2d 150 ) (2010); Sledge v. State, 312 Ga. App. 97, 98 (1) ( 717 SE2d 682 ) (2011) (“[c]ourts should examine the substance of a motion, rather than its nomenclature, to determine what sort of relief is sought”). | 1 | 1 |
Sledge v. Stategreen1 sentence2024See Roberts v. State, 286 Ga. 532, 532 ( 690 SE2d 150 ) (2010); Sledge v. State, 312 Ga. App. 97, 98 (1) ( 717 SE2d 682 ) (2011) (“[c]ourts should examine the substance of a motion, rather than its nomenclature, to determine what sort of relief is sought”). | 1 | 1 |
Grier v. Stategreen2 sentences2012As stated above, trial counsel’s reasonable trial strategy does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, and although another trial defense counsel may have 23 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Grier v. State, 273 Ga. 363, 365 (4) ( 541 SE2d 369 ) (2001). 24 Rawls v. State, __ Ga. App. __ (4) (a) (Case No. A12A0093, decided on May 17, 2012). 10 followed a different strategy, this does not mean that Barber’s trial counsel’s strategy constituted the denial of effective assistance of counsel.25 3. 2012As stated above, trial counsel’s reasonable trial strategy does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, and although another trial defense counsel may have 23 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Grier v. State, 273 Ga. 363, 365 (4) ( 541 SE2d 369 ) (2001). 24 Rawls v. State, __ Ga. App. __ (4) (a) (Case No. A12A0093, decided on May 17, 2012). 10 followed a different strategy, this does not mean that Barber’s trial counsel’s strategy constituted the denial of effective assistance of counsel.25 3. | 1 | 1 |
Phillips v. Stategreen2 sentences2012Whether there was possession with intent to distribute or straight possession, we wanted to focus on that he never possessed anything.” “As a general rule, matters of reasonable tactics and strategy, whether wise or unwise, do not amount to ineffective assistance of 21 See Division 3, infra. 22 Phillips v. State, 285 Ga. 213, 219 (5) (a) ( 675 SE2d 1 ) (2009). 9 counsel.” 23 In light of trial counsel’s reasonable strategy in failing to object, Barber cannot demonstrate deficient performance on that basis.24 (c) Barber contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to object 2012Whether there was possession with intent to distribute or straight possession, we wanted to focus on that he never possessed anything.” “As a general rule, matters of reasonable tactics and strategy, whether wise or unwise, do not amount to ineffective assistance of 21 See Division 3, infra. 22 Phillips v. State, 285 Ga. 213, 219 (5) (a) ( 675 SE2d 1 ) (2009). 9 counsel.” 23 In light of trial counsel’s reasonable strategy in failing to object, Barber cannot demonstrate deficient performance on that basis.24 (c) Barber contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to object | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jacksongreen2 sentences2011Id. ("Stare decisis is an important principle that promotes the rule of law, particularly in the context of statutory interpretation, where our incorrect decisions are more easily corrected by the democratic process."). 2011Id. ("Stare decisis is an important principle that promotes the rule of law, particularly in the context of statutory interpretation, where our incorrect decisions are more easily corrected by the democratic process."). | 1 | 1 |
Rankin v. Stategreen2 sentences2010Thus, the only remaining charges for purposes of this appeal are armed robbery (Counts 1-3). 2 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 3 (Citations omitted.) Rankin v. State, 278 Ga. 704, 705 ( 606 SE2d 269 ) (2004). 4 Varner testified that he backed into the parking spot “[s]o when we took their money or whatever[,] we could ... pull on out.” 5 OCGA § 16-8-41 (a). 6 Robinson v. State, 246 Ga. App. 576, 577-578 (1) ( 541 SE2d 660 ) (2000). 2010Thus, the only remaining charges for purposes of this appeal are armed robbery (Counts 1-3). 2 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 3 (Citations omitted.) Rankin v. State, 278 Ga. 704, 705 ( 606 SE2d 269 ) (2004). 4 Varner testified that he backed into the parking spot “[s]o when we took their money or whatever[,] we could ... pull on out.” 5 OCGA § 16-8-41 (a). 6 Robinson v. State, 246 Ga. App. 576, 577-578 (1) ( 541 SE2d 660 ) (2000). | 1 | 1 |
Robinson v. Stategreen2 sentences2010Thus, the only remaining charges for purposes of this appeal are armed robbery (Counts 1-3). 2 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 3 (Citations omitted.) Rankin v. State, 278 Ga. 704, 705 ( 606 SE2d 269 ) (2004). 4 Varner testified that he backed into the parking spot “[s]o when we took their money or whatever[,] we could ... pull on out.” 5 OCGA § 16-8-41 (a). 6 Robinson v. State, 246 Ga. App. 576, 577-578 (1) ( 541 SE2d 660 ) (2000). 2010Thus, the only remaining charges for purposes of this appeal are armed robbery (Counts 1-3). 2 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 3 (Citations omitted.) Rankin v. State, 278 Ga. 704, 705 ( 606 SE2d 269 ) (2004). 4 Varner testified that he backed into the parking spot “[s]o when we took their money or whatever[,] we could ... pull on out.” 5 OCGA § 16-8-41 (a). 6 Robinson v. State, 246 Ga. App. 576, 577-578 (1) ( 541 SE2d 660 ) (2000). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Stategreen2 sentences1999See Smith v. State, 195 Ga. App. 669 (1) ( 394 SE2d 558 ) (1990). 1999See Smith v. State, 195 Ga. App. 669 (1) ( 394 SE2d 558 ) (1990). | 1 | 1 |
DeYoung v. Stategreen2 sentences1999See DeYoung v. State, 268 Ga. 780, 784-786 (5) ( 493 SE2d 157 ) (1997). 1999See DeYoung v. State, 268 Ga. 780, 784-786 (5) ( 493 SE2d 157 ) (1997). | 1 | 1 |
Goodman v. Davisgreen2 sentences1998“Due process of law requires ‘that there be a record of the guilty plea hearing adequate for the reviewing court to determine whether (1) the defendant has freely and voluntarily entered the plea with (2) an understanding of the nature of the charges against him and (3) an understanding of the consequences of his plea.’ Goodman v. Davis, 249 Ga. 11, 13 ( 287 SE2d 26 ) [(1982)]. ‘After a prisoner raises the question of the validity of his plea of guilty, the burden is on the State to show that the plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered. 1998“Due process of law requires ‘that there be a record of the guilty plea hearing adequate for the reviewing court to determine whether (1) the defendant has freely and voluntarily entered the plea with (2) an understanding of the nature of the charges against him and (3) an understanding of the consequences of his plea.’ Goodman v. Davis, 249 Ga. 11, 13 ( 287 SE2d 26 ) [(1982)]. ‘After a prisoner raises the question of the validity of his plea of guilty, the burden is on the State to show that the plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered. | 1 | 1 |
Hyman v. Moldovangreen2 sentences1991The denial of Barber’s claim for refund and his alleged mental disorder and subsequent incarceration, even if there was a “conspiracy” involved (Hyman v. Moldovan, 166 Ga. App. 891, 892 ( 305 SE2d 648 ) (1983)), are too remote and contingent, as a matter of law, to be the proximate cause of any of the damages claimed to have been suffered by Barber. 1991The denial of Barber’s claim for refund and his alleged mental disorder and subsequent incarceration, even if there was a “conspiracy” involved (Hyman v. Moldovan, 166 Ga. App. 891, 892 ( 305 SE2d 648 ) (1983)), are too remote and contingent, as a matter of law, to be the proximate cause of any of the damages claimed to have been suffered by Barber. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Watson v. State
green
2 sentences2012Barber was in a state of flight when he discarded the cocaine he now seeks to suppress, and contrary to Barber’s assertions, “being chased is not tantamount to being ‘seized’ in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”3 Rather, contraband discarded before a suspect is seized or during flight is admissible as evidence, even if an issue exists as to whether the officers possessed reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.4 Accordingly, Barber’s abandonment of the contraband 3 (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) Smith v. State, 217 Ga. App. 680 (2) ( 458 SE2d 704 ) (1995). 4 Watson v. State, 24 2012Barber was in a state of flight when he discarded the cocaine he now seeks to suppress, and contrary to Barber’s assertions, “being chased is not tantamount to being ‘seized’ in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”3 Rather, contraband discarded before a suspect is seized or during flight is admissible as evidence, even if an issue exists as to whether the officers possessed reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.4 Accordingly, Barber’s abandonment of the contraband 3 (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) Smith v. State, 217 Ga. App. 680 (2) ( 458 SE2d 704 ) (1995). 4 Watson v. State, 24 | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Smith v. State
green
2 sentences2012Barber was in a state of flight when he discarded the cocaine he now seeks to suppress, and contrary to Barber’s assertions, “being chased is not tantamount to being ‘seized’ in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”3 Rather, contraband discarded before a suspect is seized or during flight is admissible as evidence, even if an issue exists as to whether the officers possessed reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.4 Accordingly, Barber’s abandonment of the contraband 3 (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) Smith v. State, 217 Ga. App. 680 (2) ( 458 SE2d 704 ) (1995). 4 Watson v. State, 24 2012Barber was in a state of flight when he discarded the cocaine he now seeks to suppress, and contrary to Barber’s assertions, “being chased is not tantamount to being ‘seized’ in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”3 Rather, contraband discarded before a suspect is seized or during flight is admissible as evidence, even if an issue exists as to whether the officers possessed reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.4 Accordingly, Barber’s abandonment of the contraband 3 (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) Smith v. State, 217 Ga. App. 680 (2) ( 458 SE2d 704 ) (1995). 4 Watson v. State, 24 | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Jackson v. Virginia
red
1 sentence2010Thus, the only remaining charges for purposes of this appeal are armed robbery (Counts 1-3). 2 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 3 (Citations omitted.) Rankin v. State, 278 Ga. 704, 705 ( 606 SE2d 269 ) (2004). 4 Varner testified that he backed into the parking spot “[s]o when we took their money or whatever[,] we could ... pull on out.” 5 OCGA § 16-8-41 (a). 6 Robinson v. State, 246 Ga. App. 576, 577-578 (1) ( 541 SE2d 660 ) (2000). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Southern General Insurance v. Ross
green
2 sentences1999Co. v. Ross, 227 Ga. App. 191 ( 489 SE2d 53 ) (1997), observing that Ross, a judgment creditor, had no right to assert the claims of Barber, the insured, for Barber’s insurance company’s bad faith failure to settle, “as Ross, who was not an insured and had received no assignment of Barber’s claim, had no standing to do so. 1999Co. v. Ross, 227 Ga. App. 191 ( 489 SE2d 53 ) (1997), observing that Ross, a judgment creditor, had no right to assert the claims of Barber, the insured, for Barber’s insurance company’s bad faith failure to settle, “as Ross, who was not an insured and had received no assignment of Barber’s claim, had no standing to do so. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Barber v. State
green
2 sentences1979Appellant has asked that we disapprove Barber v. State, 146 Ga. App. 523 ( 246 SE2d 510 ) (1978), which upheld Barber's plea of former jeopardy to a simple battery prosecution under Code Ann. § 26-1304 following prosecution in municipal court for disorderly conduct. 1979Appellant has asked that we disapprove Barber v. State, 146 Ga. App. 523 ( 246 SE2d 510 ) (1978), which upheld Barber's plea of former jeopardy to a simple battery prosecution under Code Ann. § 26-1304 following prosecution in municipal court for disorderly conduct. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.