Barber rule in California

2001However, “[w]hen a reviewing court is satisfied that no prejudice could have occurred, suppression is generally found to be an adequate remedy, even where the violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights was deliberate. [Citations.]” (People v. Garewal (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 285, 292 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 690 ]; accord, People v. Cantrell (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 523, 550 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 188 ]; e.g., People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 236 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385 , 926 P.2d *482 365] [improper disclosure of defense information by interpreter deemed harmless].) Defendant argues that the prosecuto

2001However, “[w]hen a reviewing court is satisfied that no prejudice could have occurred, suppression is generally found to be an adequate remedy, even where the violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights was deliberate. [Citations.]” (People v. Garewal (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 285, 292 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 690 ]; accord, People v. Cantrell (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 523, 550 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 188 ]; e.g., People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 236 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385 , 926 P.2d *482 365] [improper disclosure of defense information by interpreter deemed harmless].) Defendant argues that the prosecuto

2002(In fact, within the San Mateo Superior Court action, the Allison Claimants removed the matter to federal court for decision on Barber’s motion to vacate the 1999 default judgment, asserting that Barber had obtained a discharge in bankruptcy unbeknownst to the Allison Claimants.) 8 The Allison Claimants mistakenly rely on a case arising before the 1987 amendments in which the court held that a judgment discharged in bankruptcy could form the basis for recovery from the Recovery Account “[e]ven though [the broker] might not be personally liable for the discharged debt.” (Rogers v. Edmonds (1988

2002(In fact, within the San Mateo Superior Court action, the Allison Claimants removed the matter to federal court for decision on Barber’s motion to vacate the 1999 default judgment, asserting that Barber had obtained a discharge in bankruptcy unbeknownst to the Allison Claimants.) 8 The Allison Claimants mistakenly rely on a case arising before the 1987 amendments in which the court held that a judgment discharged in bankruptcy could form the basis for recovery from the Recovery Account “[e]ven though [the broker] might not be personally liable for the discharged debt.” (Rogers v. Edmonds (1988

2001However, “[w]hen a reviewing court is satisfied that no prejudice could have occurred, suppression is generally found to be an adequate remedy, even where the violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights was deliberate. [Citations.]” (People v. Garewal (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 285, 292 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 690 ]; accord, People v. Cantrell (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 523, 550 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 188 ]; e.g., People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 236 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385 , 926 P.2d *482 365] [improper disclosure of defense information by interpreter deemed harmless].) Defendant argues that the prosecuto

2001However, “[w]hen a reviewing court is satisfied that no prejudice could have occurred, suppression is generally found to be an adequate remedy, even where the violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights was deliberate. [Citations.]” (People v. Garewal (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 285, 292 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 690 ]; accord, People v. Cantrell (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 523, 550 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 188 ]; e.g., People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 236 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385 , 926 P.2d *482 365] [improper disclosure of defense information by interpreter deemed harmless].) Defendant argues that the prosecuto

2001However, “[w]hen a reviewing court is satisfied that no prejudice could have occurred, suppression is generally found to be an adequate remedy, even where the violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights was deliberate. [Citations.]” (People v. Garewal (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 285, 292 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 690 ]; accord, People v. Cantrell (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 523, 550 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 188 ]; e.g., People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 236 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385 , 926 P.2d *482 365] [improper disclosure of defense information by interpreter deemed harmless].) Defendant argues that the prosecuto

2001However, “[w]hen a reviewing court is satisfied that no prejudice could have occurred, suppression is generally found to be an adequate remedy, even where the violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights was deliberate. [Citations.]” (People v. Garewal (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 285, 292 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 690 ]; accord, People v. Cantrell (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 523, 550 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 188 ]; e.g., People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 236 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385 , 926 P.2d *482 365] [improper disclosure of defense information by interpreter deemed harmless].) Defendant argues that the prosecuto

1992The seized evidence consisted of unrecorded conversations rather than documents which could have been examined by the trial court to determine “whether or not the prosecution was actually aided by the information and whether some remedy short of dismissal would [have been] adequate to protect [defendants’] rights.” (People v. Towler (1982) 31 Cal.3d 105, 122 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 391 , 641 P.2d 1253 ].) As a consequence, the Barber rule of dismissal has been limited to cases in which prejudice to the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights cannot be reasonably measured.

1992The seized evidence consisted of unrecorded conversations rather than documents which could have been examined by the trial court to determine “whether or not the prosecution was actually aided by the information and whether some remedy short of dismissal would [have been] adequate to protect [defendants’] rights.” (People v. Towler (1982) 31 Cal.3d 105, 122 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 391 , 641 P.2d 1253 ].) As a consequence, the Barber rule of dismissal has been limited to cases in which prejudice to the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights cannot be reasonably measured.

1970Code, §§ 1290-1292 2 ), but observed that Barber “adds the factor of necessity to the constitutional aspect of confrontation—which factor may, in appropriate cases, outweigh the lack of contemporaneous cross-examination.” ( 70 Cal.2d at p. 664 , see fn. 10.) Accordingly, the Barber rule was articulated thusly in Green : “the ‘contemporaneous’ cross-examination which alone, in the absence of a legal showing of necessity; can be considered fully effective and constitutionally adequate is cross-examination at the same time as the direct testimony is given, before the same trier as must ultimately

1970Code, §§ 1290-1292 2 ), but observed that Barber “adds the factor of necessity to the constitutional aspect of confrontation—which factor may, in appropriate cases, outweigh the lack of contemporaneous cross-examination.” ( 70 Cal.2d at p. 664 , see fn. 10.) Accordingly, the Barber rule was articulated thusly in Green : “the ‘contemporaneous’ cross-examination which alone, in the absence of a legal showing of necessity; can be considered fully effective and constitutionally adequate is cross-examination at the same time as the direct testimony is given, before the same trier as must ultimately

1970(See People v. Green, supra, 70 Cal.2d 654, 664, fn. 10 .) In People v. Peters, 276 Cal.App.2d 71, 78 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 648 ], such “necessity” was equated with a showing that the testimony given at the preliminary hearing was necessary at the trial and that a good *695 faith effort was made, with reasonable diligence, to procure the attendance of the unavailable witness.

1970(See People v. Green, supra, 70 Cal.2d 654, 664, fn. 10 .) In People v. Peters, 276 Cal.App.2d 71, 78 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 648 ], such “necessity” was equated with a showing that the testimony given at the preliminary hearing was necessary at the trial and that a good *695 faith effort was made, with reasonable diligence, to procure the attendance of the unavailable witness.