charges violation in Georgia

1975The first enumeration urges error in the failure to appoint an attorney to represent the child because "appellant, a minor girl, was represented only by a parent whose interest conflicted with appellant's in that said parent was the same person who brought the charges of violation of probation to the Court's attention and caused a petition demanding adjudication of those charges to be filed." Appellee argues absence of merit to this contention is two-fold: (a) there is no right to counsel in probation revocation hearings; and (b) even if entitled to counsel as an absolute right, there was an e

1975The first enumeration urges error in the failure to appoint an attorney to represent the child because "appellant, a minor girl, was represented only by a parent whose interest conflicted with appellant's in that said parent was the same person who brought the charges of violation of probation to the Court's attention and caused a petition demanding adjudication of those charges to be filed." Appellee argues absence of merit to this contention is two-fold: (a) there is no right to counsel in probation revocation hearings; and (b) even if entitled to counsel as an absolute right, there was an e

1985Pretermitting the question of whether it is error for a trial court to refuse to give a requested charge on such a collateral matter, but see Burger v. State, 245 Ga. 458 (1) ( 265 SE2d 796 ) (1980); Tillman v. State, 136 Ga. 59 (1) ( 70 SE 876 ) (1911), we find that if the failure to give the charges was error, it was nevertheless harmless, Johnson v. State, supra, 238 Ga. 59 .

1985Pretermitting the question of whether it is error for a trial court to refuse to give a requested charge on such a collateral matter, but see Burger v. State, 245 Ga. 458 (1) ( 265 SE2d 796 ) (1980); Tillman v. State, 136 Ga. 59 (1) ( 70 SE 876 ) (1911), we find that if the failure to give the charges was error, it was nevertheless harmless, Johnson v. State, supra, 238 Ga. 59 .

1985Pretermitting the question of whether it is error for a trial court to refuse to give a requested charge on such a collateral matter, but see Burger v. State, 245 Ga. 458 (1) ( 265 SE2d 796 ) (1980); Tillman v. State, 136 Ga. 59 (1) ( 70 SE 876 ) (1911), we find that if the failure to give the charges was error, it was nevertheless harmless, Johnson v. State, supra, 238 Ga. 59 .

1985Pretermitting the question of whether it is error for a trial court to refuse to give a requested charge on such a collateral matter, but see Burger v. State, 245 Ga. 458 (1) ( 265 SE2d 796 ) (1980); Tillman v. State, 136 Ga. 59 (1) ( 70 SE 876 ) (1911), we find that if the failure to give the charges was error, it was nevertheless harmless, Johnson v. State, supra, 238 Ga. 59 .

1985Pretermitting the question of whether it is error for a trial court to refuse to give a requested charge on such a collateral matter, but see Burger v. State, 245 Ga. 458 (1) ( 265 SE2d 796 ) (1980); Tillman v. State, 136 Ga. 59 (1) ( 70 SE 876 ) (1911), we find that if the failure to give the charges was error, it was nevertheless harmless, Johnson v. State, supra, 238 Ga. 59 .

1981Thompson v. State, 120 Ga. 132 (5) ( 47 SE 566 ) (1904).

1981Thompson v. State, 120 Ga. 132 (5) ( 47 SE 566 ) (1904).

1952It is contended by the-plaintiff that, under the principle of law held in Shropshire v. Heard, 27 Ga. App. 256 ( 107 S. E. 892 )—that “The plaintiff sued on an alleged express contract, . . he was not entitled to recover on a quantum meruit”-—-the foregoing charges were error and prejudicial to him and permitted the jury to find for a lesser sum than the contract price.- The jury having found against the contentions of the plaintiff that he had complied with the express contract with the defendants as set up by him—he would be, under his own contentions, therefore, entitled to nothing.

1952It is contended by the-plaintiff that, under the principle of law held in Shropshire v. Heard, 27 Ga. App. 256 ( 107 S. E. 892 )—that “The plaintiff sued on an alleged express contract, . . he was not entitled to recover on a quantum meruit”-—-the foregoing charges were error and prejudicial to him and permitted the jury to find for a lesser sum than the contract price.- The jury having found against the contentions of the plaintiff that he had complied with the express contract with the defendants as set up by him—he would be, under his own contentions, therefore, entitled to nothing.

1951Piedmont Hospital v. Anderson, 65 Ga. App. 491 ( 16 S. E. 2d, 90 ); Pacetti v. Central Ry.

1951Piedmont Hospital v. Anderson, 65 Ga. App. 491 ( 16 S. E. 2d, 90 ); Pacetti v. Central Ry.

1949Code § 26-3911 provides that “any person who shall have in his possession any such false, forged, counterfeit, or altered note, bill, draft or check, with intention fraudulently to pass the same, shall be punished by imprisonment,” etc. Construing this section in pari materia with Code § 26-3907, as is required (see Glover v. Dorsey, 27 Ga. App. 105 (1), supra), the indictment sufficiently charges a violation of this section (see Green v. Russell, 176 Ga. 354 , supra, particularly the specially con *248 curring opinion of Mr. Justice Gilbert at page 360) since it alleges that the check in ques

1949Code § 26-3911 provides that “any person who shall have in his possession any such false, forged, counterfeit, or altered note, bill, draft or check, with intention fraudulently to pass the same, shall be punished by imprisonment,” etc. Construing this section in pari materia with Code § 26-3907, as is required (see Glover v. Dorsey, 27 Ga. App. 105 (1), supra), the indictment sufficiently charges a violation of this section (see Green v. Russell, 176 Ga. 354 , supra, particularly the specially con *248 curring opinion of Mr. Justice Gilbert at page 360) since it alleges that the check in ques

1902There was no material error in any of the several charges to which exception is taken, nor in admitting testimony ; none of the numerous special grounds of the motion for a new trial not covered by the foregoing are meritorious ; the verdict was warranted by the evidence, and was not excessive in amount; the case was tried in substantial accord with the rulings made therein by this court, at the October term, 1900 ( 112 Ga. 914 ), and does not present any new question of law or practice for determination.