10 Georgia opinions name it 1 courts 1980–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Renton v. Watsongreen2 sentences2014See Morrison v. Morrison, 284 Ga. 112, 113 (2) ( 663 SE2d 714 ) (2008) (OCGA § 51-5-8 explicitly applies only to libel claims); Renton v. Watson, 319 Ga. App. 896, 903 (4), n. 4 ( 739 SE2d 19 ) (2013). 2014See Morrison v. Morrison, 284 Ga. 112, 113 (2) ( 663 SE2d 714 ) (2008) (OCGA § 51-5-8 explicitly applies only to libel claims); Renton v. Watson, 319 Ga. App. 896, 903 (4), n. 4 ( 739 SE2d 19 ) (2013). | 2 | 2 |
Morrison v. Morrisongreen2 sentences2014See Morrison v. Morrison, 284 Ga. 112, 113 (2) ( 663 SE2d 714 ) (2008) (OCGA § 51-5-8 explicitly applies only to libel claims); Renton v. Watson, 319 Ga. App. 896, 903 (4), n. 4 ( 739 SE2d 19 ) (2013). 2014See Morrison v. Morrison, 284 Ga. 112, 113 (2) ( 663 SE2d 714 ) (2008) (OCGA § 51-5-8 explicitly applies only to libel claims); Renton v. Watson, 319 Ga. App. 896, 903 (4), n. 4 ( 739 SE2d 19 ) (2013). | 2 | 2 |
Mario Williams v. Andrew Russogreen1 sentence2016See Williams, 636 F. App’x at 532 (III) (B) (no Fourth Amendment privacy interest in unmailed letters); McConnell, 337 8 On appeal, the DOC explains that it did not read Williams’ complaint as including an invasion of privacy claim, so the DOC did not raise any arguments regarding such claim in its motion to dismiss. | 1 | 1 |
Kobeck v. Nabisco, Inc.green2 sentences1999See also Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P2d 1337, 1345 (Wyo. 1997) (Thomas, J., concurring specially), which recognizes the problems in carefully crafting the parameters of this potentially volatile tort. 3 Because of the physical nature of some of Troncalli’s intrusions, we are not presented here with the issue illustrated by Kobeck v. Nabisco, Inc., 166 Ga. App. 652, 654 (2) ( 305 SE2d 183 ) (1983), in which this Court stated that in order to proceed under the theory of intrusion into plaintiff’s solitude, Georgia law requires that the intrusion be “physical, analogous to a trespass.” (Punctuation o 1999See also Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P2d 1337, 1345 (Wyo. 1997) (Thomas, J., concurring specially), which recognizes the problems in carefully crafting the parameters of this potentially volatile tort. 3 Because of the physical nature of some of Troncalli’s intrusions, we are not presented here with the issue illustrated by Kobeck v. Nabisco, Inc., 166 Ga. App. 652, 654 (2) ( 305 SE2d 183 ) (1983), in which this Court stated that in order to proceed under the theory of intrusion into plaintiff’s solitude, Georgia law requires that the intrusion be “physical, analogous to a trespass.” (Punctuation o | 1 | 1 |
Kanzler v. Rennergreen1 sentence1999See also Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P2d 1337, 1345 (Wyo. 1997) (Thomas, J., concurring specially), which recognizes the problems in carefully crafting the parameters of this potentially volatile tort. 3 Because of the physical nature of some of Troncalli’s intrusions, we are not presented here with the issue illustrated by Kobeck v. Nabisco, Inc., 166 Ga. App. 652, 654 (2) ( 305 SE2d 183 ) (1983), in which this Court stated that in order to proceed under the theory of intrusion into plaintiff’s solitude, Georgia law requires that the intrusion be “physical, analogous to a trespass.” (Punctuation o | 1 | 1 |
Sun v. Langstongreen2 sentences1992See Sun v. Langston, 170 Ga. App. 60 ( 316 SE2d 172 ). 1992See Sun v. Langston, 170 Ga. App. 60 ( 316 SE2d 172 ). | 1 | 1 |
Troy v. Interfinancial, Inc.green2 sentences1990Troy v. Interfinancial, 171 Ga. App. 763, 769 (3) ( 320 SE2d 872 ). 1990Troy v. Interfinancial, 171 Ga. App. 763, 769 (3) ( 320 SE2d 872 ). | 1 | 1 |
Jenkins v. Stategreen2 sentences1980Although appellants contend the issue of unconstitutionality because the statute is an invasion of privacy in violation of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U. S. Constitution (Code Ann. § 1-101 et seq.) has never been passed on by the Supreme Court of Georgia and this court, this issue was decided adversely to appellants by the Supreme Court in Division 2 of Gornto v. State, supra, and Jenkins v. State, 230 Ga. 726, 728 ( 199 SE2d 183 ) (1973); this court has so held in Walter v. State, 131 Ga. App. 667, 672 ( 206 SE2d 662 ) (1974). 1980Although appellants contend the issue of unconstitutionality because the statute is an invasion of privacy in violation of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U. S. Constitution (Code Ann. § 1-101 et seq.) has never been passed on by the Supreme Court of Georgia and this court, this issue was decided adversely to appellants by the Supreme Court in Division 2 of Gornto v. State, supra, and Jenkins v. State, 230 Ga. 726, 728 ( 199 SE2d 183 ) (1973); this court has so held in Walter v. State, 131 Ga. App. 667, 672 ( 206 SE2d 662 ) (1974). | 1 | 1 |
Walter v. Stategreen2 sentences1980Although appellants contend the issue of unconstitutionality because the statute is an invasion of privacy in violation of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U. S. Constitution (Code Ann. § 1-101 et seq.) has never been passed on by the Supreme Court of Georgia and this court, this issue was decided adversely to appellants by the Supreme Court in Division 2 of Gornto v. State, supra, and Jenkins v. State, 230 Ga. 726, 728 ( 199 SE2d 183 ) (1973); this court has so held in Walter v. State, 131 Ga. App. 667, 672 ( 206 SE2d 662 ) (1974). 1980Although appellants contend the issue of unconstitutionality because the statute is an invasion of privacy in violation of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U. S. Constitution (Code Ann. § 1-101 et seq.) has never been passed on by the Supreme Court of Georgia and this court, this issue was decided adversely to appellants by the Supreme Court in Division 2 of Gornto v. State, supra, and Jenkins v. State, 230 Ga. 726, 728 ( 199 SE2d 183 ) (1973); this court has so held in Walter v. State, 131 Ga. App. 667, 672 ( 206 SE2d 662 ) (1974). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Meadow Springs Recovery, LLC v. Wofford
green
2 sentences2019Although Rogers couched Count 2 as an invasion of privacy claim, "we look to the substance and not the style of a particular claim to determine whether it amounts to a claim for abusive litigation." *829 Meadow Springs Recovery v. Wofford , 319 Ga. App. 79 , 82 (1), 734 S.E.2d 100 (2012). 2019Although Rogers couched Count 2 as an invasion of privacy claim, "we look to the substance and not the style of a particular claim to determine whether it amounts to a claim for abusive litigation." *829 Meadow Springs Recovery v. Wofford , 319 Ga. App. 79 , 82 (1), 734 S.E.2d 100 (2012). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Prophecy Corp. v. Charles Rossignol, Inc.
green
2 sentences2001Because the contradictory testimony rule set out in Prophecy Corp. v. Charles Rossignol, Inc., 256 Ga. 27 ( 343 SE2d 680 ) (1986), does not apply in this case, we affirm the jury’s verdict on the breach of confidentiality claim. 2001Because the contradictory testimony rule set out in Prophecy Corp. v. Charles Rossignol, Inc., 256 Ga. 27 ( 343 SE2d 680 ) (1986), does not apply in this case, we affirm the jury’s verdict on the breach of confidentiality claim. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Rumbauskas v. Cantor
green
1 sentence1999In Rumbauskas v. Cantor, 649 A2d 853 (N. J. 1994), the court discussed stalking as constituting the “intrusion on seclusion” type of an invasion of privacy claim. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Zielinski v. Clorox Co.
green
2 sentences1999Zielinski v. Clorox Co., 227 Ga. App. 760 ( 490 SE2d 448 ) (1997). 1999Zielinski v. Clorox Co., 227 Ga. App. 760 ( 490 SE2d 448 ) (1997). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Stanley v. Georgia
green
1 sentence1980In Gornto the Supreme Court held: “Code Ann. § 26-2101, supra, is not violative of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution on the ground that the constitutional right to mere possession of obscene material, recognized in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 (89 SC 1243, 22 LE2d 542), necessarily implies the right to purchase such material and, hence, the right of others, including appellant, to distribute it. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.