chemical alcohol test in Hawaii

2019In support of his contention, Ponce relies on State v. Wilson , 92 Hawai'i 45 , 49, 987 P.2d 268 , 272 (1999), where the Hawai'i Supreme Court held that "Hawai'i's implied consent scheme mandates accurate warnings to enable a driver to knowingly and intelligently consent to or refuse a chemical alcohol test." (Emphasis in original.) In Wilson , the supreme court held that an arrestee did not make a knowing or intelligent decision to consent to testing where the arresting officer stated only that a "three month revocation ... would apply if you chose to take the test and failed it," when in fac

2019In support of his contention, Ponce relies on State v. Wilson , 92 Hawai'i 45 , 49, 987 P.2d 268 , 272 (1999), where the Hawai'i Supreme Court held that "Hawai'i's implied consent scheme mandates accurate warnings to enable a driver to knowingly and intelligently consent to or refuse a chemical alcohol test." (Emphasis in original.) In Wilson , the supreme court held that an arrestee did not make a knowing or intelligent decision to consent to testing where the arresting officer stated only that a "three month revocation ... would apply if you chose to take the test and failed it," when in fac

2005In State v. Rodgers, 99 Hawai'i 70, 70-71 , 53 P.3d 209, 209-10 (2002), we rejected a motorist’s argument that her consent to the chemical alcohol test was not knowing or intelligent because the form did not define “prior alcohol enforcement contact.” We noted that nothing before the court “explains why or how ... [the petitioner] could have been misled into attributing the various interpretations she offers to the relevant term.” Id. at 75 , 53 P.3d at 214 .

2005In State v. Rodgers, 99 Hawai'i 70, 70-71 , 53 P.3d 209, 209-10 (2002), we rejected a motorist’s argument that her consent to the chemical alcohol test was not knowing or intelligent because the form did not define “prior alcohol enforcement contact.” We noted that nothing before the court “explains why or how ... [the petitioner] could have been misled into attributing the various interpretations she offers to the relevant term.” Id. at 75 , 53 P.3d at 214 .

2005(Citing Kernan, 75 Haw. at 30 , 856 P.2d at 1222 .) Dunaway also relies on Wilson, 92 Hawai'i at 49 , 987 P.2d at 272 (holding that “Hawaii’s implied consent scheme mandates accurate warnings to enable a driver to knowingly and intelligently consent to or refuse a chemical alcohol test”) and State v. Feldhacker, 76 Hawai'i 354, 357 , 878 P.2d 169, 172 (1994) (holding that an older version of the Respondent’s notice was void because it contained statements of defendant’s rights that conflicted with the then existing implied consent statute, HRS § 286-253).

2005(Citing Kernan, 75 Haw. at 30 , 856 P.2d at 1222 .) Dunaway also relies on Wilson, 92 Hawai'i at 49 , 987 P.2d at 272 (holding that “Hawaii’s implied consent scheme mandates accurate warnings to enable a driver to knowingly and intelligently consent to or refuse a chemical alcohol test”) and State v. Feldhacker, 76 Hawai'i 354, 357 , 878 P.2d 169, 172 (1994) (holding that an older version of the Respondent’s notice was void because it contained statements of defendant’s rights that conflicted with the then existing implied consent statute, HRS § 286-253).

2005Dir. of the Courts, 96 Hawai'i 190, 192-94 , 29 P.3d 380, 382-84 (2001) (upholding license revocation despite suppression of breath test results based upon the hearing officer’s separate findings of being under the influence); State v. Wilson, 92 Hawai'i 45 , 53-54 n. 14, 987 P.2d 268 , 276-77 n. 14 (1999) (suppressing test results because the consequences of consenting to or refusing to take the chemical alcohol test was not properly conveyed to the motorist but allowing that “there is nothing to prevent the prosecution from relying on other relevant evidence of intoxication”).

2005Dir. of the Courts, 96 Hawai'i 190, 192-94 , 29 P.3d 380, 382-84 (2001) (upholding license revocation despite suppression of breath test results based upon the hearing officer’s separate findings of being under the influence); State v. Wilson, 92 Hawai'i 45 , 53-54 n. 14, 987 P.2d 268 , 276-77 n. 14 (1999) (suppressing test results because the consequences of consenting to or refusing to take the chemical alcohol test was not properly conveyed to the motorist but allowing that “there is nothing to prevent the prosecution from relying on other relevant evidence of intoxication”).

2005See State v. Garcia, 96 Hawai'i 200, 208 , 29 P.3d 919, 927 (2001) (Nakayama, J. dissenting, joined by Ramil, J.) (reiterating the exclusionary rule that remedy for violation of implied consent rule was exclusion of intoxi-lyzer test); State v. Wilson, 92 Hawai'i 45, 49 , 987 P.2d 268, 272 (1999) (Nakayama, J. dissenting, joined by Ramil, J.) (announcing exclusionary rule and holding that implied consent law was intending to protect the rights of the driver “to enable the driver to knowingly and intelligently consent to or refuse a chemical alcohol test”).

2005See State v. Garcia, 96 Hawai`i 200, 208, 29 P.3d 919, 927 (2001) (Nakayama, J. dissenting, joined by Ramil, J.) (reiterating the exclusionary rule that remedy for violation of implied consent rule was exclusion of intoxilyzer test); State v. Wilson, 92 Hawai`i 45, 49, 987 P.2d 268, 272 (1999) (Nakayama, J. dissenting, joined by Ramil, J.) (announcing exclusionary rule and holding that implied consent law was intending to protect the rights of the driver "to enable the driver to knowingly and intelligently consent to or refuse a chemical alcohol test").

1999See also Keefe v. Dept. of Licensing, 46 Wash.App. 627 , 731 P.2d 1161, 1164 (1987) ("The underlying purpose of the implied consent statute [is to provide] the automobile operator the opportunity of exercising an intelligent judgment concerning whether to exercise the statutory right of refusal.") (Quoting State v. Whitman County Dist.

1999See also Keefe v. Dept. of Licensing, 46 Wash.App. 627 , 731 P.2d 1161, 1164 (1987) ("The underlying purpose of the implied consent statute [is to provide] the automobile operator the opportunity of exercising an intelligent judgment concerning whether to exercise the statutory right of refusal.") (Quoting State v. Whitman County Dist.

1999To this end, Hawai`i's implied consent scheme mandates accurate warnings to enable the driver to knowingly and intelligently consent to or refuse a chemical alcohol test. [7] See Miller v. Tanaka, 80 Hawai`i 358, 368, 910 P.2d 129, 139 (App.1995) ("The ADLRO has a duty to provide clear information regarding both the administrative and criminal proceedings faced by a defendant.") (Quoting State v. Feldhacker, 76 Hawai`i 354, 357, 878 P.2d 169, 172 (1994) (citing HRS § 286-254(a)(2)-(3)).).

1999To this end, Hawaii’s implied consent scheme mandates accurate warnings to enable the driver to knowingly and intelligently consent to or refuse a chemical alcohol test. 7 See Miller v. Tanaka, 80 Hawai'i 358, 368 , 910 P.2d 129, 139 (App.1995) (“The ADLRO has a duty to provide clear information regarding both the administrative and criminal proceedings faced by a defendant.”) (Quoting State v. Feldhacker, 76 Hawai'i 354, 357 , 878 P.2d 169, 172 (1994) (citing HRS § 286-254(a)(2)-(3)).).