Adams analysis in Illinois

2021Id. at 413 . ¶ 43 In rejecting that argument, this court emphasized that the amendment did not change the case number of the predicate conviction.

2006See Adams, 338 Ill.App.3d at 747-50 , 273 Ill.Dec. 536 , 789 N.E.2d at 439-41 , citing Flint v. Court Appointed Special Advocates of Du Page County, Inc., 285 Ill.App.3d 152, 169 , 221 Ill.Dec. 38 , 674 N.E.2d 831, 834 (finding "[defendant] NCASAA's contacts within Illinois are sufficiently related to the cause of action against them and, at least in part, gave rise to it"); Allerion, Inc. v. Nueva Icacos, S.A. de C.V., 283 Ill.App.3d 40, 52 , 218 Ill.Dec. 632 , 669 N.E.2d 1158, 1166 (1996) (finding it was "not unfair to bring [the defendant] `into an Illinois court to enforce the [contractual

2006See Adams, 338 Ill.App.3d at 747-50 , 273 Ill.Dec. 536 , 789 N.E.2d at 439-41 , citing Flint v. Court Appointed Special Advocates of Du Page County, Inc., 285 Ill.App.3d 152, 169 , 221 Ill.Dec. 38 , 674 N.E.2d 831, 834 (finding "[defendant] NCASAA's contacts within Illinois are sufficiently related to the cause of action against them and, at least in part, gave rise to it"); Allerion, Inc. v. Nueva Icacos, S.A. de C.V., 283 Ill.App.3d 40, 52 , 218 Ill.Dec. 632 , 669 N.E.2d 1158, 1166 (1996) (finding it was "not unfair to bring [the defendant] `into an Illinois court to enforce the [contractual

1998Similarly, Adams’ claim that he was terminated in violation of the collective bargaining agreement and his statutory claim of discrimination under the Human Rights Act are not the “same apple.” This is because the source and nature of each right are different (see Kraft, Inc., Dairy Group v. City of Peoria, 177 Ill.

1998App. 3d 197 , 531 N.E.2d 1106 (1988) (claim of discrimination has its origins in public policy of Illinois and does not depend on the existence of a collective bargaining agreement)) and because adjudication of those rights involves separate inquiries (see Alexander, 415 U.S. at 53 , 39 L.

1998(West 1996)), which provides a comprehensive scheme to secure freedom from discrimination for all individuals within Illinois (Baker v. Miller, 159 Ill. 2d 249 , 636 N.E.2d 551 (1994)).

1998(West 1996)), which provides a comprehensive scheme to secure freedom from discrimination for all individuals within Illinois (Baker v. Miller, 159 Ill. 2d 249 , 636 N.E.2d 551 (1994)).

1998App. 3d 197 , 531 N.E.2d 1106 (1988) (claim of discrimination has its origins in public policy of Illinois and does not depend on the existence of a collective bargaining agreement)) and because adjudication of those rights involves separate inquiries (see Alexander, 415 U.S. at 53 , 39 L.

1998App. 3d 197 , 531 N.E.2d 1106 (1988) (claim of discrimination has its origins in public policy of Illinois and does not depend on the existence of a collective bargaining agreement)) and because adjudication of those rights involves separate inquiries (see Alexander, 415 U.S. at 53 , 39 L.

1991Rather than making its own analysis of the underlying law (see Flex v. Department of Labor, Board of Review (1984), 125 Ill.App.3d 1021, 1024 , 81 Ill.Dec. 248 , 466 N.E.2d 1050 ), or focusing on the Board's factual analysis, the Adams majority inappropriately relied apparently on the sufficiency of the record to support the trial court's finding of no harm.

1991Rather than making its own analysis of the underlying law (see Flex v. Department of Labor, Board of Review (1984), 125 Ill.

1989The State argued in its reply brief that should the court find that there was no probable cause for the stop, then the stop should be considered a valid “Terry stop.” (See Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1 , 20 L.

1989Ed. 2d 889 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 .) Adams’ motion to strike that portion of the brief arguing the alternative theory, to which the State filed objections, was taken with the case.

1985(People v. Kubat (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 437, 497-98 ; People v. Beller (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 514, 526 ; People v. Blakes (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 354, 358-60 .) Adams’ defense consisted of his claim that he simply had been a customer in the store about the time of the robbery; that he purchased a bottle of vitamin E and later left it at McClaine’s home.

1985(People v. Kubat (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 437, 497-98 ; People v. Beller (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 514, 526 ; People v. Blakes (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 354, 358-60 .) Adams’ defense consisted of his claim that he simply had been a customer in the store about the time of the robbery; that he purchased a bottle of vitamin E and later left it at McClaine’s home.

1985(People v. Kubat (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 437, 497-98 ; People v. Beller (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 514, 526 ; People v. Blakes (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 354, 358-60 .) Adams’ defense consisted of his claim that he simply had been a customer in the store about the time of the robbery; that he purchased a bottle of vitamin E and later left it at McClaine’s home.

1984In Stubblefield v. City of Chicago (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 267, 270 , the supreme court restated the principle “that valid classifications for purposes of municipal tort liability may be created but they must relate to the types of municipal functions involved and may not rest upon the differences between the governmental agencies which perform the same function.” Mr. and Mrs. Adams claim the difference between the two exceptions creates an unconstitutional classification based upon the governmental body involved, rather than the type of function, since both types of firemen fight fires but are pro