Adams motion in Mississippi

2021Like Franklin, the Adams defendant proposed that his “more detailed” instruction on constructive possession better suited his defense theory because it “required the State to prove additional incriminating circumstances other than mere proximity.” Id. at 837 (¶15) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2021But we looked to precedent and found that the possession instruction in Adams—which was the exact instruction used in Franklin’s case—was a valid “model jury instruction” since it “state[d] the law of the case and create[d] no injustice.” Id. at (¶16) (quoting Watkins v. State, 101 So. 3d 628, 635 (¶22) (Miss. 2012)). 1 There is a conflict in fact regarding what Franklin was referring to when he made the above statement.

2021But we looked to precedent and found that the possession instruction in Adams—which was the exact instruction used in Franklin’s case—was a valid “model jury instruction” since it “state[d] the law of the case and create[d] no injustice.” Id. at (¶16) (quoting Watkins v. State, 101 So. 3d 628, 635 (¶22) (Miss. 2012)). 1 There is a conflict in fact regarding what Franklin was referring to when he made the above statement.

2019See, e.g., Heard, 937 So. 2d at 944 (¶21).6 6 In its order, the county court stated that “after considering [Adams’s] motion, [the court] finds that it is well taken and should be granted.” The majority believes this constitutes a finding of “good cause” because Adams’s motion stated that his process server used “diligent efforts” to attempt service.

2019Although it is preferred that a plaintiff petition the court for an extension of time prior to, rather than after, the expiration of the 120-day period, this failure is not fatal to the action 3 Adams’s motion was filed one day after 120 days had passed. 5 because “a motion for extension of time may be filed after the 120-day time period has expired.” Darville v. Mejia, 184 So. 3d 312, 317 (¶16) (Miss.

2015However, on October 15, 2010, Adams filed a motion for reconsideration in light of the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision in Copiah County v. Oliver, 51 So.3d 205, 207 (¶ 12) (Miss.2011). ¶4.

2015However, on October 15, 2010, Adams filed a motion for reconsideration in light of the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision in Copiah County v. Oliver, 51 So. 3d 205, 207 (¶12) (Miss. 2011). ¶4.

2007In Ford v. State, 708 So.2d 73, 76 (¶ 13) (Miss.1998), the Mississippi Supreme Court noted that a petitioner's motion should be returned to him when "the appellant can survive summary dismissal under § 99-39-11(2)." Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-11(2) (Rev.2000) states: "If it plainly appears from the face of the motion, any annexed exhibits and the prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to any relief, the judge may make an order for its dismissal. . . ." In this case, it plainly appeared from the face of Adams' motion that he was not entitled to any relief.

1986Additionally, this Court recently commented on the Adams standard in saying, "Although the United States Supreme Court has refined the Witherspoon decision in Adams , the issue remains the ability of the prospective juror to follow the instructions and the jurors oath." Gray v. State, 472 So.2d 409, 421 (Miss. 1985).

1986Additionally, this Court recently commented on the Adams standard in saying, "Although the United States Supreme Court has refined the Witherspoon decision in Adams , the issue remains the ability of the prospective juror to follow the instructions and the jurors oath." Gray v. State, 472 So.2d 409, 421 (Miss. 1985).