law creates a strong presumption in California

2024In doing so, the law creates a strong presumption that any sentence that conforms to these sentencing norms is both rational and proper.’ ” (In re Large (2007) 41 Cal.4th 538, 550 .) Collier notes correctly that the trial court never formally ruled on his Romero request at his sentencing.

2023(People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378 (Carmony).) However, “no similar requirement applies when a court declines to strike a prior [strike conviction].” (In re Large (2007) 41 Cal.4th 538, 550 .) “In doing so, the law creates a strong presumption that any sentence that conforms to these sentencing norms is both rational and proper.” (Carmony, at p. 378.) The lower court must determine “whether in light of the nature and circumstances of [the defendant’s] present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects

2022(People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378 (Carmony).) “In doing so, the law creates a strong presumption that any sentence that conforms to these sentencing norms is both rational and proper.” (Ibid.) However, under the Three Strikes sentencing scheme the trial court retains jurisdiction to dismiss or strike one or more of a defendant’s prior strike convictions, “subject, however, to strict compliance with the provisions of section 1385 and to review for abuse of discretion.” ( Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497 at p. 504 .) Section 1385 grants trial courts limited discretion to strike prior st

2022(People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378 (Carmony).) “In doing so, the law creates a strong presumption that any sentence that conforms to these sentencing norms is both rational and proper.” (Ibid.) However, under the Three Strikes sentencing scheme the trial court retains jurisdiction to dismiss or strike one or more of a defendant’s prior strike convictions, “subject, however, to strict compliance with the provisions of section 1385 and to review for abuse of discretion.” ( Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497 at p. 504 .) Section 1385 grants trial courts limited discretion to strike prior st

2016In doing so, the law creates a strong presumption that any sentence that conforms to these sentencing norms is both rational and proper." ( Id. at p. 378, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 880 , 92 P.3d 369 .) As the Fifth Appellate District explained in People v. Blakely (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1042 , 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 70 ( Blakely ), "[t]he purpose of the three strikes law has been variously stated as being ' "to ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment for those who commit a felony and have been previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony offenses" ' [citation] and 'to promote the state's

2016In doing so, the law creates a strong presumption that any sentence that conforms to these sentencing norms is both rational and proper." ( Id. at p. 378, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 880 , 92 P.3d 369 .) As the Fifth Appellate District explained in People v. Blakely (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1042 , 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 70 ( Blakely ), "[t]he purpose of the three strikes law has been variously stated as being ' "to ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment for those who commit a felony and have been previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony offenses" ' [citation] and 'to promote the state's

2025(Id. at pp. 530- 531.) In People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161 (Williams), our Supreme Court 8 held that when considering a Romero motion, “the court in question must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.” Only “extraordinary”

2023The purpose of the Three Strikes law is “to ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment for those who commit a felony and have been previously convicted of one or more serious or violent felony offenses.” (§ 667, subd. (b).) It “establishes a 6 sentencing norm” of longer sentences for repeat offenders and “carefully circumscribes the trial court’s power to depart from this norm and requires the court to explicitly justify its decision to do so.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378 (Carmony).) “In doing so, the law creates a strong presumption that any sentence that conforms

2024(Ibid.) “In light of this presumption, a trial court will only abuse its discretion in failing to strike a prior felony conviction allegation in limited circumstances.” (Ibid.) These include “where the trial court was not ‘aware of 16. its discretion’ to dismiss (People v. Langevin (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 520, 524 ), or where the court considered impermissible factors in declining to dismiss ([People v.] Gillispie [(1997)] 60 Cal.App.4th [429,] 434)” or where the sentencing norms produce an “ ‘ “arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd” result’ under the specific facts of a particular case.” (Ib

2013In ruling on a defendant‟s Romero motion, the trial court “must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the . . . spirit [of the Three Strikes law], in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161 .) Because the Three Strikes law 15 “establishes a sentencing

2023(People v. Gaston (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 310, 315 .) Also, the extent of a defendant’s criminal record is “undeniably relevant” to the factors outlined in Williams.

2022(People v. Gaston (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 310, 315 .) Accordingly, “ ‘[W]here the record demonstrates that the trial court balanced the relevant facts and reached an impartial decision in conformity with the spirit of the law, we shall affirm the trial court’s ruling, even if we might have ruled differently in the first instance’ [Citation.] Because the circumstances must be ‘extraordinary … by which a career criminal can be deemed to fall outside the spirit of the very scheme within which he squarely falls once he commits a strike as part of a long and continuous criminal record, the continuati

2022In doing so, the law creates a strong presumption that any sentence that conforms to these sentencing norms is both rational and proper.” Reflecting that deference to the Legislature’s power to define crimes and punishments, our cases hold that reducing a sentence “is a solemn power to be exercised sparingly only when, as a matter of law, the Constitution forbids what the sentencing law compels.” (People v. Mora (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 607, 616 .) In deciding whether a sentence is cruel or unusual, a reviewing court must determine whether the punishment “is so disproportionate to the crime for w

2022In doing so, the law creates a strong presumption that any sentence that confirms to these sentencing norms is both rational and proper.” (People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378 .) Thus, reducing a sentence “is a solemn power to be exercised sparingly only when, as a matter of law, the Constitution forbids what the sentencing law compels.” (People v. Mora (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 607, 616 .) In deciding whether a sentence is cruel or unusual, we must determine whether the punishment “is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fu

2022In doing so, the law creates a strong presumption that any sentence that conforms to these sentencing norms is both rational and proper.” Reflecting that deference to the Legislature’s power to define crimes and punishments, our cases hold that reducing a sentence “is a solemn power to be exercised sparingly only when, as a matter of law, the Constitution forbids what the sentencing law compels.” (People v. Mora (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 607, 616 .) In deciding whether a sentence is cruel or unusual, a reviewing court must determine whether the punishment “is so disproportionate to the crime for w

2022In doing so, the law creates a strong presumption that any sentence that confirms to these sentencing norms is both rational and proper.” (People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378 .) Thus, reducing a sentence “is a solemn power to be exercised sparingly only when, as a matter of law, the Constitution forbids what the sentencing law compels.” (People v. Mora (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 607, 616 .) In deciding whether a sentence is cruel or unusual, we must determine whether the punishment “is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fu

2016In doing so, the law creates a strong presumption that any sentence that conforms to these sentencing norms is both rational and proper.” (People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378 .) In particular, “[i]f, after having suffered two qualifying felony convictions, an offender commits a third qualifying felony, the Three Strikes law presumes he or she is incorrigible and requires a life sentence.” (People v. Vargas (2014) 59 Cal.4th 635, 638 .) This is because the offender has “been afforded two previous chances to reform his or her antisocial behavior.” (Ibid.) B.

2014In doing so, the law creates a strong presumption that any sentence that conforms to these sentencing norms is both rational and proper.’ [Citation.]” (In re Large, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 550-551.) “‘[I]t is not enough to show that reasonable people might disagree about whether to strike one or more’ prior conviction allegations. [Citation.]” ( Carmony, supra, at p. 378 .) “‘[B]ecause the circumstances must be “extraordinary . . . by which a career criminal can be deemed to fall outside the spirit of the very scheme within which he squarely falls once he commits a strike as part of a long an

2024(Ibid.) “In light of this presumption, a trial court will only abuse its discretion in failing to strike a prior felony conviction allegation in limited circumstances.” (Ibid.) These include “where the trial court was not ‘aware of 16. its discretion’ to dismiss (People v. Langevin (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 520, 524 ), or where the court considered impermissible factors in declining to dismiss ([People v.] Gillispie [(1997)] 60 Cal.App.4th [429,] 434)” or where the sentencing norms produce an “ ‘ “arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd” result’ under the specific facts of a particular case.” (Ib