10 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1916–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. | ||
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States Ex Rel. Stevens
green
2 sentences2024In Vermont Agency, the Supreme Court held “the doctrine that the assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the assignor” as an adequate basis for qui tam relator standing because “[t]he FCA can reasonably be regarded as effecting a partial assignment of the Government's damages claim.” Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 773 . 2020Scachitti, 215 Ill. 2d at 508 . - 15 - ¶ 64 The United States Supreme Court in Vermont Agency held “the doctrine that the assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the assignor” was an adequate basis for qui tam-relator standing because “[t]he [False Claims Act] can reasonably be regarded as effecting a partial assignment of the Government’s damages claim.” Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 773 . | 7 | 2005–2024 |
Stauffer v. Brooks Brothers, Inc.
green
2 sentences2020The court reasoned that the “qui tam provision operates as a statutory assignment of the United States’ rights, and ‘the assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the assignor.’ ” Stauffer, 619 F.3d at 1325 (quoting Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 773 ). 2020The court reasoned that the “qui tam provision operates as a statutory assignment of the United States’ rights, and ‘the assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the assignor.’ ” Stauffer, 619 F.3d at 1325 (quoting Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 773 ). | 4 | 2019–2020 |
Scachitti v. UBS Financial Services
green
2 sentences2020Scachitti, 215 Ill. 2d at 508 . - 15 - ¶ 64 The United States Supreme Court in Vermont Agency held “the doctrine that the assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the assignor” was an adequate basis for qui tam-relator standing because “[t]he [False Claims Act] can reasonably be regarded as effecting a partial assignment of the Government’s damages claim.” Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 773 . 2020Scachitti, 215 Ill. 2d at 508 . - 15 - ¶ 64 The United States Supreme Court in Vermont Agency held “the doctrine that the assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the assignor” was an adequate basis for qui tam-relator standing because “[t]he [False Claims Act] can reasonably be regarded as effecting a partial assignment of the Government’s damages claim.” Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 773 . | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Cincinnati Insurance v. American Hardware Manufacturers Ass'n
green
2 sentences2011It may very well be that defendants defended Binks in error, especially if, as plaintiff asserts, Binks never requested such defense. ¶ 26 Second, an assignee can claim no greater right or interest than the assignor possessed ( Cincinnati Insurance Co., 387 Ill.App.3d at 100 , 325 Ill.Dec. 483 , 898 N.E.2d 216 ) and nothing in the pleadings shows that plaintiff seeks anything from defendants that is beyond the scope of Binks' rights under the policies, i.e., anything more than a defense for occurrences during the policy coverage periods. 2011It may very well be that defendants defended Binks in error, especially if, as plaintiff asserts, Binks never requested such defense. ¶ 26 Second, an assignee can claim no greater right or interest than the assignor possessed ( Cincinnati Insurance Co., 387 Ill.App.3d at 100 , 325 Ill.Dec. 483 , 898 N.E.2d 216 ) and nothing in the pleadings shows that plaintiff seeks anything from defendants that is beyond the scope of Binks' rights under the policies, i.e., anything more than a defense for occurrences during the policy coverage periods. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Crosby v. Loop
neutral
1 sentence1916The principle that an entire contract cannot be apportioned, and performance enforced in fragments, would have presented an unsuperable bar to a recovery.” (Crosby v. Loop, 13 Ill. 625 .) Under section 18 of the Practice Act (J. & A. if 8555), the assignee of a claim or demand of this character may sue in his own name to recover the amount due, but the assignees’ rights are otherwise no greater than or more extended under this statute than they were at common law. | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.