assignee claim in Texas

2025The Stevens Court held that a qui tam relator under the federal False Claims Act can have Article III standing as a partial assignee of 3 the government’s damages claim, because “the assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the assignor.” Id. at 773 (emphasis added); accord id. at 771–74 (reiterating that this holding was conditioned on an “injury in fact,” not merely on some violation of law).

2025Employing that reasoning, the Court found an “adequate basis for the relator’s suit . . . in the doctrine that the assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the assignor.” Id. at 772-73 .

2025HSG may find some support in Stevens, to whatever extent Texas’s standing doctrine “parallels the federal test for Article III standing.” Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 154 (Tex. 2012); cf. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs. v. Grassroots Leadership, Inc., 717 S.W.3d 854 , 866–73 (Tex. 2025).

2025HSG may find some support in Stevens, to whatever extent Texas’s standing doctrine “parallels the federal test for Article III standing.” Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 154 (Tex. 2012); cf. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs. v. Grassroots Leadership, Inc., 717 S.W.3d 854, 866–73 (Tex. 2025).

2015Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 773 (2000) (“an assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the assignor”); see also in re Bogdan, 414 F.3d 507 , 512 (4th Cir. 2005) (unconditional assignments gave bankruptcy trustee standing to prosecute creditors’ claims).

2015Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 773 (2000) (“an assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the assignor”); see also in re Bogdan, 414 F.3d 507 , 512 (4th Cir. 2005) (unconditional assignments gave bankruptcy trustee standing to prosecute creditors’ claims).

2025But the TMFPA cannot “reasonably be regarded as effecting a partial assignment of the [State’s] damages claim,” id., because the Texas Supreme Court has held that the TMFPA “is not an ‘action for the recovery of damages.’” In re Xerox Corp., 555 S.W.3d 518, 534 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (emphasis added; citation omitted).

2025The State’s argument also cannot be squared with the Court’s reasoning in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez: [I]f the law of Article III did not require plaintiffs to demonstrate a “concrete harm,” Congress could authorize virtually any citizen to bring a statutory damages suit against virtually any defendant who 5 That the Court meant what it said is also clear from subsequent decisions observing that Stevens “justif[ied] qui tam actions based on a partial assignment of the Government’s damages claim and a ‘well nigh conclusive’ tradition of such actions in English and American courts dating back to

2015See Priesmeyer v. Pacific Southwest Bank, F.S.B., 917 S.W.2d 937 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996).

2015Co., 523 S.W.2d 426, 430 (Tex. Civ.

2000Id. at 697 ; see also Zuniga v. Groce, Locke & Hebdon, 878 S.W.2d 313 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1994, writ ref'd).