assignee claim in New York

1893It was held in the case of Peck v. Yorks, 75 N. Y. 421 , that an assignment of a cause of action, made simply as collateral to an indebtedness of the assignor to the assignee, is not such a transfer as makes the assignee liable for costs, under the provisions of the old Code of Practice (section 321,) and this rule has been adhered to ever since.

1893It was held in the case of Peck v. Yorks (75 N. Y. 421 ), that an assignment of a cause of action made simply as collateral to an indebtedness of the assignor to the assignee is not such a transfer as makes the assignee liable for costs under the provisions of the old Code of Practice,, section 321, and this rule has been adhered to ever since.

1927(Twombly v. Cassidy, 82 N. Y. 155 ; Patterson v. Birdsall, 64 id. 294 .) ” The case of Magilton v. Holbert ( 52 Hun, 444 ) is not at all in conflict with tMs doctrine.

1927(Twombly v. Cassidy, 82 N. Y. 155 ; Patterson v. Birdsall, 64 id. 294 .) ” The case of Magilton v. Holbert ( 52 Hun, 444 ) is not at all in conflict with tMs doctrine.

1913That was knowledge within the sense of the statute. * * * With the documents in his possession he can properly depose upon knowledge and plead upon knowledge.” Proceeding upon negotiable instruments, especially on such a paper as a certified check, which in the business world has almost the currency of legal tender, a plaintiff who holds and owns the paper by assignment is in a vastly different position, for he is acting upon the paper itself, than one who is the assignee of a claim for the price of goods sold and delivered in a far-off city, as was the case in Hoormann v. Climax Cycle Co. ( 9

1897The case, therefore, comes within the ruling made in Hoormann v. Climax Cycle Co. ( 9 App. Div. 579 ), and the order should be affirmed, with costs.

1888F. Daly, J. — [After stating the facts as above.] — It is undoubtedly the settled law of this state, as contended by defendant, that no cause of action against a trustee or director of a corporation founded upon neglect to file the annual report, can accrue to a co-trustee, upon a debt of the corporation to him if he held office at the time of the default; and that the assignee of the claim of such delinquent co-trustee against the corporation cannot hold the other trustee (Briggs v. Easterly, 62 Barb. 51 ; Bronson v. Dimmock, 4 Hun 614 ; Knox v. Baldwin, 80 N. Y. 610 ; McClave v. Thompson, 36

1888Briggs v. Easterly, 62 Barb., 51 ; Bronson v. Dimock, 4 Hun, 614 ; Knox v. Baldwin, 80 N. Y., 610 ; McClave v. Thompson, 36 Hun, 365 .

1888F. Daly, J. — [After stating the facts as above.] — It is undoubtedly the settled law of this state, as contended by defendant, that no cause of action against a trustee or director of a corporation founded upon neglect to file the annual report, can accrue to a co-trustee, upon a debt of the corporation to him if he held office at the time of the default; and that the assignee of the claim of such delinquent co-trustee against the corporation cannot hold the other trustee (Briggs v. Easterly, 62 Barb. 51 ; Bronson v. Dimmock, 4 Hun 614 ; Knox v. Baldwin, 80 N. Y. 610 ; McClave v. Thompson, 36

1888Briggs v. Easterly, 62 Barb., 51 ; Bronson v. Dimock, 4 Hun, 614 ; Knox v. Baldwin, 80 N. Y., 610 ; McClave v. Thompson, 36 Hun, 365 .

2002Bank of Boston, 183 NY 379, 386 ).

2000Although plaintiff was not a holder of the promissory note, which remained in Citibank’s possession (see, UCC 3-301), “a suit for money only by a partial assignee of a claim may be brought at law, provided the plaintiff bring in his co-assignees” (Blake v Weiden, 291 NY 134, 140 ).

1996Jur. 2d, Assignments, Sec. 71).” In Pro Cardiaco Pronto Socorro Cardiologica v Trussell ( 863 F Supp 135 [SD NY 1994]) the court found that a simple statement contained in an affidavit which instructed the insurance carrier to pay medical insurance benefits directly to the health care provider was sufficient to create an assignment where the proceeds of the fund were identified and notice of the instruction delivered to the carrier.

1972Generally, a counterclaim may be asserted against an assignee of a claim at least up to the amount of any benefit derived by the assignee (see Seibert v. Dunn, 216 N. Y. 237 ; CPLR 3019).

1963The case of Ogden v. Alexander ( 140 N. Y. 356 ), at first glance, seems to be contrary to the holding in Rollin v. Gross-, but the court very carefully pointed out the distinction between that case and the Rollin case where it is said (p. 361): “ We may grant that Oliver [a former partner] lost all ownership of the claim and retained no equity against or interest in, the partnership assets, at least, after all its debts had been paid, but that fact does not make Ogden a mere assignee, or put him outside of the intended purpose and scope of the statute.” (Italics added.) There is no question t

1963Since 1871, when Rollin v. Cross ( 45 N. Y. 766 ) was decided, it has been the law of this State that the assignee of a claim may not file a lien.

1963(Mach v. Colleran, 136 N. Y. 617 , 620.) ” Unless an assignee of a claim arising out of a public improvement has rights under the language of section 5, not available to an assignee under section 3, the plaintiff’s contentions must fail.

1956Co. v. Gibson Realty Corp., 173 Misc. 239 .) Further the assignee of a claim is bound by the arbitration clause in the assignor’s contract.

1943(Porter v. Lane Construction Corp., 212 App. Div. 528 , affd. 244 N. Y. 523 ; Grosner v. Abramson, 162 Misc. 731, 733 , affd. 248 App. Div. 575 ; Civ.

1943(Porter v. Lane Construction Corp., 212 App. Div. 528 , affd. 244 N. Y. 523 ; Grosner v. Abramson, 162 Misc. 731, 733 , affd. 248 App. Div. 575 ; Civ.

1943(Porter v. Lane Construction Corp., 212 App. Div. 528 , affd. 244 N. Y. 523 ; Grosner v. Abramson, 162 Misc. 731, 733 , affd. 248 App. Div. 575 ; Civ.

1943(Porter v. Lane Construction Corp., 212 App. Div. 528 , affd. 244 N. Y. 523 ; Grosner v. Abramson, 162 Misc. 731, 733 , affd. 248 App. Div. 575 ; Civ.

1936Conversely, it was said in Matter of Lewis (supra), “ The courts, therefore, cannot direct him to pay a debt of the assignor, or give it preference, in violation of the terms of the assignment.” Hynes v. Alexander (2 App. D v. 109), in which equitable relief by way of an accounting was sought, is not controlling.

1931(McCauley v. Georgia Railroad Bank, 239 N. Y. 514 .) The remaining question for consideration is whether or not the exercise of jurisdiction by this court is in violation of the commerce clause in the Federal Constitution (Art. 1, § 8, subd. 3).

1928(Cf. Sheridan v. Mayor, 68 N. Y. 30 ; Goodman v. State Bank, 203 N. Y.

1927In Hawkins, v. Maxwell ( 156 App. Div. 31, 34 ; affd., 215 N. Y. 673 ) the court in referring to a similar situation held that “A junior incumbrancer was entitled to pay the interest due upon the prior mortgage for Ms protection, and, having done so, to be treated as the assignee of the claim.

1927In Hawkins, v. Maxwell ( 156 App. Div. 31, 34 ; affd., 215 N. Y. 673 ) the court in referring to a similar situation held that “A junior incumbrancer was entitled to pay the interest due upon the prior mortgage for Ms protection, and, having done so, to be treated as the assignee of the claim.

1927(Twombly v. Cassidy, 82 N. Y. 155 ; Patterson v. Birdsall, 64 id. 294 .) ” The case of Magilton v. Holbert ( 52 Hun, 444 ) is not at all in conflict with tMs doctrine.

1926(See, also, Clarke Company v. Plass & Bro., Inc., 107 Misc. 722 ; affd., on opinion below, 187 App. Div. 904 , and Maneely v. City of New York, 119 id. 376, cases in which rights of assignees were not involved.) Having held that the assignee has no claim on the fund in question those authorities are applicable here.

1926(See, also, Clarke Company v. Plass & Bro., Inc., 107 Misc. 722 ; affd., on opinion below, 187 App. Div. 904 , and Maneely v. City of New York, 119 id. 376, cases in which rights of assignees were not involved.) Having held that the assignee has no claim on the fund in question those authorities are applicable here.

1917It did not contain any statement in reference to security, nor was it verified, nor was it in the form prescribed; but it certainly notified the assignee and, when it was by him turned over to the receiver, notified the latter that Heine & Co. claimed that the estate of Kessler & Co. owed the stated sum of money as a result of transactions therein set forth.” So, too, in Hutchinson v. Otis, 190 U. S. 552, 555 , the court said: “ The proof of debt originally filed is admitted to have been defective.

1904I can see no essential difference between the facts in this cáse and those in Dolbeer v. Stout ( 139 N. Y. 486 ) in which the court said (p. 489): “ We find no authority justifying the staying of proceedings in one cause until the determination of another cause pending in another court where the party against' whom the stay is sought is neither a party nor privy to such other action and would not be bound by any adjudication therein.” In that action the plaintiff ■was the assignee of a claim for storage charges under a contract.

1903But if, before .this has been done, other creditors, pursuing the usual remedies for the collection of debts, have acquired a legal or equitable right to have the debt applied in satisfaction of their claims, the right is not overreached by liens subsequently filed under the act, unless priority is given by the provisions of the act itself; ” and that an assignee of a claim of a contractor against the defendant by a title which antedates the filing of the notices of lien acquires a title to the demand of the creditor subject to the lien; and in this decision the court followed McCorkle v. Herr

1900Einstein v. Climax Cycle Co., 18 Misc.

1897"While the statute makes all wagers and bets illegal, whether so at common law or not, and is, therefore, penal in its nature and must be strictly construed, yet the right of recovery of the money paid is not-in the nature of a penalty but of a remedy as in the case of the statute permitting a recovery of money lost in gaming, as was held in Meech v. Stoner, 19 N. Y. 26 , which case permitted a recovery by the assignee of the person authorized by the statute to sue.