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10 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1943–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Diaz v. Home Federal Savings & Loan Ass'ngreen2 sentences2021Accordingly, the defendants contend that the clause applies to all 83 parcels in Pierce Deed A. ¶ 49 A. Principles of Deed Construction ¶ 50 “In construing a deed, our primary goal is to ascertain the intent of the parties.” Diaz v. Home Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n of Elgin, 337 Ill. 2020Accordingly, the defendants contend that the clause applies to all 83 parcels in Pierce Deed A. 14 ¶ 49 A. Principles of Deed Construction ¶ 50 “In construing a deed, our primary goal is to ascertain the intent of the parties.” Diaz v. Home Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n of Elgin, 337 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Matthews v. Chicago Transit Authoritygreen2 sentences2019The defendants contend that the clause prevents a court from ever diminishing the retirees’ pensions, even if doing so was done only to eliminate an excess illegal payment and reduce the pensions to the level authorized by law. - 20 - ¶ 82 Our supreme court has observed that it “has consistently held that the contractual relationship protected by section 5 of article XIII is governed by the actual terms of the contract or pension plan in effect at the time the employee becomes a member of the retirement system.” Matthews v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2016 IL 117638, ¶ 59 (citing cases). 2018The defendants contend that the clause prevents a court from ever diminishing the retirees' pensions, even if doing so was done only to eliminate an excess illegal payment and reduce the pensions to the level authorized by law. ¶ 82 Our supreme court has observed that it "has consistently held that the contractual relationship protected by section 5 of article XIII is governed by the actual terms of the contract or pension plan in effect at the time the employee becomes a member of the retirement system." Matthews v. Chicago Transit Authority , 2016 IL 117638 , ¶ 59, 402 Ill.Dec. 1 , 51 N.E.3d | 1 | 2 |
Gerrity v. Beattygreen2 sentences2002In the defendants’ view, “the parental immunity doctrine follows the child.” The parental immunity doctrine, which blocks mere negligence claims, but not willful and wanton misconduct claims (see Gerrity v. Beatty , 71 Ill. 2d 47, 49 (1978), citing Nudd v. Matsoukas , 7 Ill. 2d 608 (1956)), was recognized in Illinois in Foley v. Foley , 61 Ill. 2002In the defendants’ view, “the parental immunity doctrine follows the child.” The parental immunity doctrine, which blocks mere negligence claims, but not willful and wanton misconduct claims (see Gerrity v. Beatty, 71 Ill. 2d 47, 49 (1978), citing Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608 (1956)), was recognized in Illinois in Foley v. Foley, 61 Ill. | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Nudd v. Matsoukas
green
2 sentences2002In the defendants’ view, “the parental immunity doctrine follows the child.” The parental immunity doctrine, which blocks mere negligence claims, but not willful and wanton misconduct claims (see Gerrity v. Beatty , 71 Ill. 2d 47, 49 (1978), citing Nudd v. Matsoukas , 7 Ill. 2d 608 (1956)), was recognized in Illinois in Foley v. Foley , 61 Ill. 2002In the defendants’ view, “the parental immunity doctrine follows the child.” The parental immunity doctrine, which blocks mere negligence claims, but not willful and wanton misconduct claims (see Gerrity v. Beatty, 71 Ill. 2d 47, 49 (1978), citing Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608 (1956)), was recognized in Illinois in Foley v. Foley, 61 Ill. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Foley v. Foley
neutral
2 sentences2002In the defendants’ view, “the parental immunity doctrine follows the child.” The parental immunity doctrine, which blocks mere negligence claims, but not willful and wanton misconduct claims (see Gerrity v. Beatty , 71 Ill. 2d 47, 49 (1978), citing Nudd v. Matsoukas , 7 Ill. 2d 608 (1956)), was recognized in Illinois in Foley v. Foley , 61 Ill. 2002In the defendants’ view, “the parental immunity doctrine follows the child.” The parental immunity doctrine, which blocks mere negligence claims, but not willful and wanton misconduct claims (see Gerrity v. Beatty, 71 Ill. 2d 47, 49 (1978), citing Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608 (1956)), was recognized in Illinois in Foley v. Foley, 61 Ill. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Board of Education of Community Unit School District No. 4 Champaign County v. Champaign Education Ass'n
green
1 sentence1974However, in the case of Board of Education v. Champaign Education Association (1973), 15 Ill.App.3d 335, 340 , the court stated that section' 11 could not be relied upon: “We find the Association’s reliance upon the grounds for vacating arbitration awards contained in the 1971 Act, which was explicitly repealed by the enaction of the Uniform Arbitration Act in 1961, without merit. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Campion v. Chicago Landscape Co.
green
1 sentence1968As basis for their authority, the defendants have cited Campion v. Chicago Landscape Co., 295 Ill App 225, 240, 14 NE2d 879 (1938), which holds that the doctrine of assumed risk is not limited to the relation of master and servant, but applies equally to any relationship voluntarily assumed, contractual or not. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Ravenscroft v. Stull
neutral
1 sentence1961(See Speirer v. Curtis, 312 Ill. 152, 159 ; Ravenscroft v. Stull, 280 Ill. 406, 410 .) No objection was made to this instruction in the trial court, however, and the question sought to be raised is therefore not open for consideration. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Speirer v. Curtis
neutral
1 sentence1961(See Speirer v. Curtis, 312 Ill. 152, 159 ; Ravenscroft v. Stull, 280 Ill. 406, 410 .) No objection was made to this instruction in the trial court, however, and the question sought to be raised is therefore not open for consideration. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Chicago City Railway Co. v. Anderson
neutral
1 sentence1943Co. v. Anderson, 182 Ill. 298 . | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.