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10 Illinois opinions name it 1 courts 1983–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Taft v. Board of Trusteesgreen1 sentence2026For these reasons, plaintiffs ask that we reverse the Board’s decision, as being in violation of the pension protection clause, and that we remand this case to the Board with directions to reclassify plaintiffs as Tier 1 JRS members. ¶ 30 Amici repeat many of the same assertions that plaintiffs make and also point out the general contract principle that the law in existence at the time a contract is formed is considered to be part of the contract (see Taft v. Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund of Winthrop Harbor, 133 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Tepfer v. Deerfield Savings & Loan Ass'ngreen1 sentence2015They stand for the general contract principle “that in the absence of evidence of a contrary intention, where two or more instruments are executed by the same contracting parties in the course of the same transaction, the instruments will be considered together and construed with reference to one another because they are, in the eyes of the law, one contract.” (Emphasis added.) Tepfer v. Deerfield Savings & Loan Ass’n, 118 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ruth v. Benvenutti
green
2 sentences1995Finally, the appellate courts have indicated that if a major exception to generally accepted legal principles is created, or if a new public policy is established, the legislature or the supreme court should do so, not an intermediate court of review. ( Harrel v. Dillard's Department Stores, Inc., 268 Ill.App.3d 537 , 205 Ill.Dec. 892 , 644 N.E.2d 448 (1994); Ruth v. Benvenutti (1983), 114 Ill.App.3d 404 , 70 Ill.Dec. 335 , 449 N.E.2d 209 .) We consider plaintiff's prayer to this court, a request for us to hold that a governmental body is immune from suit-limitation and notice-of-loss provisio 1995App. 3d 404 , 449 N.E.2d 209 .) We consider plaintiff’s prayer to this court, a request for us to hold that a governmental body is immune from suit-limitation and notice-of-loss provisions of insurance contracts that it entered into, to be a major exception to the general contract principle that a government is bound by its agreements. | 2 | 1995–1995 |
Martin v. Federal Life Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences1992Martin, 109 Ill. 1987In extreme eases, an employer’s breach of the contract may also give rise to an independent tort, such as intentional infliction of mental distress, but we believe plaintiff’s allegations of count II fall far short of stating an independent tort action. *** Care must be taken to prevent the transmutation of every breach of contract into an independent tort action through the bootstrapping of the general contract principle of good faith and fair dealing. *** A general ‘bad faith’ tort based on breach of contract would undoubtedly be difficult to apply in most cases and superfluous in cases such | 2 | 1987–1992 |
Nationwide Insurance v. Ervin
green
2 sentences1986(Nationwide Insurance Co. v. Ervin (1967), 87 Ill. 1986In construing contracts of insurance, courts are to follow the general contract rule that the agreement should be viewed as a whole to determine the intention of the parties to the contract and the purpose which they sought to accomplish. ( Nationwide Insurance Co. v. Ervin (1967), 87 Ill. | 2 | 1986–1986 |
Harrel v. Dillards Department Stores, Inc.
green
2 sentences1995Finally, the appellate courts have indicated that if a major exception to generally accepted legal principles is created, or if a new public policy is established, the legislature or the supreme court should do so, not an intermediate court of review. ( Harrel v. Dillard's Department Stores, Inc., 268 Ill.App.3d 537 , 205 Ill.Dec. 892 , 644 N.E.2d 448 (1994); Ruth v. Benvenutti (1983), 114 Ill.App.3d 404 , 70 Ill.Dec. 335 , 449 N.E.2d 209 .) We consider plaintiff's prayer to this court, a request for us to hold that a governmental body is immune from suit-limitation and notice-of-loss provisio 1995Finally, the appellate courts have indicated that if a major exception to generally accepted legal principles is created, or if a new public policy is established, the legislature or the supreme court should do so, not an intermediate court of review. ( Harrel v. Dillard's Department Stores, Inc., 268 Ill.App.3d 537 , 205 Ill.Dec. 892 , 644 N.E.2d 448 (1994); Ruth v. Benvenutti (1983), 114 Ill.App.3d 404 , 70 Ill.Dec. 335 , 449 N.E.2d 209 .) We consider plaintiff's prayer to this court, a request for us to hold that a governmental body is immune from suit-limitation and notice-of-loss provisio | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Buehler Ltd. v. Home Life Insurance
green
1 sentence1992Ill. 1989), 722 F. Supp. 1554 .) Care must be taken to prevent the transmutation of every breach of contract into an independent tort action through the bootstrapping of the general contract principle of good faith and fair dealing. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Standard Mut. Ins. Co. v. SENTRY INS. OF ILL., INC.
green
2 sentences1987Standard Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sentry Insurance of Illinois, Inc. (1986), 146 Ill. 1987Standard Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sentry Insurance of Illinois, Inc. (1986), 146 Ill. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Hedges Manufacturing Co.
green
1 sentence1983App. 3d 173 , 414 N.E.2d 232 : (1) no obligation whatever; (2) the general contract rule that the wronged party may not sit idly by and allow damages to accumulate; and (3) no general obligation to mitigate but only a duty to accept a suitable subtenant when offered. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.