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12 California opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Distefano v. Hallgreen2 sentences2013(Id. at p. 384.) The Distefano court affirmed, emphasizing the contractual nature of the statutory settlement and compromise process and the general contract rule that “any new offer communicated prior to a valid acceptance of a previous offer, extinguishes and replaces the prior one.” (Distefano, supra, 263 Cal.App.2d at p. 385 .) Discerning a legislative intent to give “full effect to the parties’ reappraisals of the merits” of their cases, Distefano concluded that parties should be encouraged to make and consider multiple settlement offers and that the policy in favor of settlements would b 1984For example, in Distefano v. Hall (1968) 263 Cal. App.2d 380, 385 [ 69 Cal. Rptr. 691 ], defendants' second statutory offer was held to have extinguished their first statutory offer in accord with the general contract rule that a subsequent offer made prior to acceptance extinguishes and replaces a prior offer. [6] The Court of Appeal reasoned that "the theory of section 997[ [7] ] is that the process of settlement and compromise is a contractual one, and the applicable principles are those relating to contracts in general [citation]." ( Id., at p. 385.) And, in Ward v. Superior Court (1973) 3 | 1 | 2 |
Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Morenogreen1 sentence2025(Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1160 [cleaned up].) Fifth, we disagree with Plaintiffs that applying the general contract principle that allows an offer to contain multiple options conflicts with or defeats section 998’s purpose. | 1 | 1 |
Bank of the West v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2024(See Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1264 [“The fundamental goal of contractual interpretation is to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties. | 1 | 1 |
Oto, L. L.C. v. Khogreen1 sentence2022(OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 126 (OTO).) B. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Sheltongreen1 sentence2020(Id. at p. 57; see also People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 767 [“A negotiated plea agreement is a form of contract, and it is interpreted according to general contract principles”].) The Hurlic court also concluded the underlying purposes of the certificate of probable cause requirement—to encourage and facilitate plea agreements, and to “ ‘weed out frivolous or vexatious appeals’ ”—were not served by requiring the defendant to obtain a certificate in cases where the defendant’s entitlement to retroactive application of a new law was undisputed. | 1 | 1 |
Marcey v. Romerogreen2 sentences2007Cobb Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 280 ; Marcey v. Romero (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1215-1216 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 402 ].) Our Supreme Court has held that the general contract principle that settlement offers are revocable until accepted serves rather than defeats the purpose of section 998. 2007Cobb Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 280 ; Marcey v. Romero (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1215-1216 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 402 ].) Our Supreme Court has held that the general contract principle that settlement offers are revocable until accepted serves rather than defeats the purpose of section 998. | 1 | 1 |
Ward v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1984For example, in Distefano v. Hall (1968) 263 Cal. App.2d 380, 385 [ 69 Cal. Rptr. 691 ], defendants' second statutory offer was held to have extinguished their first statutory offer in accord with the general contract rule that a subsequent offer made prior to acceptance extinguishes and replaces a prior offer. [6] The Court of Appeal reasoned that "the theory of section 997[ [7] ] is that the process of settlement and compromise is a contractual one, and the applicable principles are those relating to contracts in general [citation]." ( Id., at p. 385.) And, in Ward v. Superior Court (1973) 3 1984For example, in Distefano v. Hall (1968) 263 Cal. App.2d 380, 385 [ 69 Cal. Rptr. 691 ], defendants' second statutory offer was held to have extinguished their first statutory offer in accord with the general contract rule that a subsequent offer made prior to acceptance extinguishes and replaces a prior offer. [6] The Court of Appeal reasoned that "the theory of section 997[ [7] ] is that the process of settlement and compromise is a contractual one, and the applicable principles are those relating to contracts in general [citation]." ( Id., at p. 385.) And, in Ward v. Superior Court (1973) 3 | 1 | 1 |
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shieldgreen2 sentences1981Aviation Corp. (1955) 138 Cal.App.2d 98 [ 291 P.2d 91 ]; Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich. (1980) 408 Mich. 579, 600 [ 292 N.W.2d 880, 885 ].) Moreover, while it has sometimes been said that a promise for continued employment subject to limitation upon the employer’s power of termination must be supported by some “independent consideration,” i.e., consideration other than the services to be rendered, 18 such a rule is contrary to the general contract principle that courts should not inquire into the adequacy of consideration. 1981Aviation Corp. (1955) 138 Cal.App.2d 98 [ 291 P.2d 91 ]; Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich. (1980) 408 Mich. 579, 600 [ 292 N.W.2d 880, 885 ].) Moreover, while it has sometimes been said that a promise for continued employment subject to limitation upon the employer’s power of termination must be supported by some “independent consideration,” i.e., consideration other than the services to be rendered, 18 such a rule is contrary to the general contract principle that courts should not inquire into the adequacy of consideration. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Poster v. Southern California Rapid Transit District
green
2 sentences2013(See Poster, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 272 .) Not only do the chances of settlement increase with multiple offers (T. 1999The court concluded that if the general contract principle were applied, it would act to discourage settlements. ( 52 Cal.3d at p. 271 .) The Poster court further noted that, if a counteroffer operated to revoke the statutory offer, there would be a significant and undesirable uncertainty *1376 introduced into the section 998 procedure. | 2 | 1999–2013 |
Barrington v. A. H. Robins Co.
green
1 sentence2023Robins Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 146, 151 .) Although Samjungcast, in amending its complaint, restyled its oral contract claim as a more general contract claim, it appears 10 Samjungcast points in its briefing to another theory of breach—that Expway, through Jeong, breached the implied covenant by insisting that Samjungcast “ ‘pay to play’ ” by giving Jeong kickbacks from its revenues. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Rosenthal v. Great Western Financial Securities Corp.
green
1 sentence2022(Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 413 .) “The unconscionability defense has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court as a general contract defense in California, and therefore a defense to an agreement to arbitrate.” (Fisher v. MoneyGram International, Inc. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1084 , 1093, citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333 , 341–343; De La Torre v. CashCall, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 966 , 978–979.) In other words, the party challenging the arbitration agreement bears the burden to prove its unconscionability. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
De La Torre v. CashCall, Inc.
green
1 sentence2022(Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 413 .) “The unconscionability defense has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court as a general contract defense in California, and therefore a defense to an agreement to arbitrate.” (Fisher v. MoneyGram International, Inc. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1084 , 1093, citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333 , 341–343; De La Torre v. CashCall, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 966 , 978–979.) In other words, the party challenging the arbitration agreement bears the burden to prove its unconscionability. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
At&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
green
1 sentence2022(Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 413 .) “The unconscionability defense has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court as a general contract defense in California, and therefore a defense to an agreement to arbitrate.” (Fisher v. MoneyGram International, Inc. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1084 , 1093, citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333 , 341–343; De La Torre v. CashCall, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 966 , 978–979.) In other words, the party challenging the arbitration agreement bears the burden to prove its unconscionability. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
T. M. Cobb Co. v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2007Cobb Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 280 ; Marcey v. Romero (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1215-1216 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 402 ].) Our Supreme Court has held that the general contract principle that settlement offers are revocable until accepted serves rather than defeats the purpose of section 998. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Palmer v. Schindler Elevator Corp.
green
2 sentences2006(Distefano, at pp. 384-385.) More specifically, we “applied to the statutory offers of compromise the general contract principle that any new offer made prior to a valid acceptance of the prior offer, extinguished the prior one.” (Wilson, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 390 , summarizing our holding in Distefano.) The Wilson and Distefano holdings were cited and relied upon most recently in Palmer v. Schindler Elevator Corp. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 154 [ 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 339 ] (Palmer). 2006(Distefano, at pp. 384-385.) More specifically, we “applied to the statutory offers of compromise the general contract principle that any new offer made prior to a valid acceptance of the prior offer, extinguished the prior one.” (Wilson, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 390 , summarizing our holding in Distefano.) The Wilson and Distefano holdings were cited and relied upon most recently in Palmer v. Schindler Elevator Corp. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 154 [ 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 339 ] (Palmer). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Wilson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
green
1 sentence2006(Distefano, at pp. 384-385.) More specifically, we “applied to the statutory offers of compromise the general contract principle that any new offer made prior to a valid acceptance of the prior offer, extinguished the prior one.” (Wilson, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 390 , summarizing our holding in Distefano.) The Wilson and Distefano holdings were cited and relied upon most recently in Palmer v. Schindler Elevator Corp. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 154 [ 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 339 ] (Palmer). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc.
green
1 sentence1988(Pugh I, supra, 116 Cal.App.3d at p. 325 .) The theory that an employer’s promise for continued employment is terminable at will unless supported by an independent consideration other than services rendered or to be rendered is contrary to the general contract principle that courts should not inquire into adequacy of consideration. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Chinn v. China National Aviation Corp.
green
2 sentences1981Aviation Corp. (1955) 138 Cal.App.2d 98 [ 291 P.2d 91 ]; Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich. (1980) 408 Mich. 579, 600 [ 292 N.W.2d 880, 885 ].) Moreover, while it has sometimes been said that a promise for continued employment subject to limitation upon the employer’s power of termination must be supported by some “independent consideration,” i.e., consideration other than the services to be rendered, 18 such a rule is contrary to the general contract principle that courts should not inquire into the adequacy of consideration. 1981Aviation Corp. (1955) 138 Cal.App.2d 98 [ 291 P.2d 91 ]; Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich. (1980) 408 Mich. 579, 600 [ 292 N.W.2d 880, 885 ].) Moreover, while it has sometimes been said that a promise for continued employment subject to limitation upon the employer’s power of termination must be supported by some “independent consideration,” i.e., consideration other than the services to be rendered, 18 such a rule is contrary to the general contract principle that courts should not inquire into the adequacy of consideration. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.