jury on the affirmative defense in Illinois

2016Where, as here, a defendant is found in possession of a weapon while incarcerated, our supreme court has been explicit that a specific and immediate threat constitutes the very nature of a necessity defense and, thus, proof of that factor "is a threshold requirement for its establishment." Kite, 153 Ill. 2d at 45 . ¶ 52 In sum, because defendant failed to provide even some evidence warranting the issuance of a necessity instruction, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of necessity. ¶ 53 B.

1995Citing Ryan, this court remarked in passing that "[b]ecause culpability is not an element of the offense, it can be considered a strict liability offense.” (Kite, 153 Ill. 2d at 44 .) The sole question in Kite was whether the evidence at the defendant’s trial warranted instructing the jury on the affirmative defense of necessity; the court was not called upon to determine what mental state was applicable to the underlying offense.

2026Section 3-2 of the Criminal Code defines “affirmative defense” and provides: - 30 - “If the issue involved in an affirmative defense *** is raised then the State must sustain the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as to that issue together with all the other elements of the offense.” Id. § 3-2(b). ¶ 94 Section 3-2(b) establishes the circuit court’s nondiscretionary duty to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense whenever the record includes “ ‘some evidence’ ” supporting the defense.

2026Everette, 141 Ill. 2d at 157 ; Carter, 32 Ill. 2d at 281 . ¶ 118 Thus, although the Hari court purported to find an abuse of discretion, the ruling on whether the record includes some evidence supporting the affirmative defense presents an issue of law subject to de novo review, and if the record includes some such evidence, the circuit court has no discretion to refuse to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense. ¶ 119 Everette and Washington stated the correct, applicable standard of review.

2026Macias, 2025 IL App (1st) 230678, ¶ 20 . ¶ 32 We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of necessity.

2026Everette, 141 Ill. 2d at 157 ; Carter, 32 Ill. 2d at 281 . ¶ 118 Thus, although the Hari court purported to find an abuse of discretion, the ruling on whether the record includes some evidence supporting the affirmative defense presents an issue of law subject to de novo review, and if the record includes some such evidence, the circuit court has no discretion to refuse to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense. ¶ 119 Everette and Washington stated the correct, applicable standard of review.

2012In People v. Couch, 387 Ill.

1991On this issue, the Illinois Supreme Court has stated that “[a] trial judge has the discretion to refuse to tender a defense instruction on intoxication where there is insufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably find that the defendant was so intoxicated at the time of the crime that he lacked the requisite mental state for the crime.” (People v. Arnold (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 209, 214 , citing People v. Williams (1973), 14 Ill.

1991On this issue, the Illinois Supreme Court has stated that “[a] trial judge has the discretion to refuse to tender a defense instruction on intoxication where there is insufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably find that the defendant was so intoxicated at the time of the crime that he lacked the requisite mental state for the crime.” (People v. Arnold (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 209, 214 , citing People v. Williams (1973), 14 Ill.

1981App. 3d 919 , 356 N.E.2d 979 .) Therefore, we find that the evidence offered by defendant was insufficient to overcome the presumption of sanity, and the refusal of the trial court to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of insanity was not error.