jury on the affirmative defense in New York

2015Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Supreme Court properly denied his request to charge the jury on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance (see People v Roche, 98 NY2d 70, 75 [2002]).

2010On appeal, the defendant argues that the Supreme Court erred in “refusing” to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense to murder in the second degree of “extreme emotional disturbance” (Penal Law § 125.25 [1] [a]; § 125.20 [2]; see People v Roche, 98 NY2d 70, 75-76 [2002]).

2007The trial court correctly denied the defendant’s request to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of duress (see Penal Law § 40.00), because even when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, no reasonable view of the evidence supported such a defense (see People v Butts, 72 NY2d 746, 750 [1988]; People v Watts, 57 NY2d 299, 301 [1982]).

2005Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Supreme Court properly refused to charge the jury on the affirmative defense of entrapment, since no reasonable view of the evidence could lead to the conclusion that the defendant was actively induced or encouraged to sell the drugs at issue or that he had no predisposition to do so (see Penal Law § 40.05; People v Butts, 72 NY2d 746 [1988]; People v Alwadish, 67 NY2d 973 [1986]; People v Arias, 303 AD2d 592 [2003]; People v Vina, 193 AD2d 770 [1993]; People v Pilgrim, 154 AD2d 407, 409 [1989]).

2025"In determining whether to issue a particular instruction [to the jury], the court 'must view the evidence adduced at trial in the light most favorable to the defendant' " ( People v J.L. , 36 NY3d 112 , 119 [2020], quoting People v Zona , 14 NY3d 488, 493 [2010]). "[V]iew[ing] the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant . . . [is] an exercise understood to be incompatible with weighing the evidence to resolve competing inferences" ( People v McKenzie , 19 NY3d 463, 466 [2012]; see People v Butts , 72 NY2d 746, 750 [1988]).

2025"In determining whether to issue a particular instruction [to the jury], the court 'must view the evidence adduced at trial in the light most favorable to the defendant' " ( People v J.L. , 36 NY3d 112 , 119 [2020], quoting People v Zona , 14 NY3d 488, 493 [2010]). "[V]iew[ing] the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant . . . [is] an exercise understood to be incompatible with weighing the evidence to resolve competing inferences" ( People v McKenzie , 19 NY3d 463, 466 [2012]; see People v Butts , 72 NY2d 746, 750 [1988]).

2026"A defendant who proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the homicide was committed while 'under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse' will be guilty of first-degree manslaughter rather than second-degree murder" ( People v Diaz , 15 NY3d 40, 45 , quoting Penal Law § 125.25[1][a]; see People v Gonzalez , 22 NY3d 539, 544-545 ).

2020A defendant may be entitled to a jury charge on the affirmative defense of EED based solely on the People's proof ( see People v Gonzalez , 22 NY3d 539, 545 [2014]), and thus it was error for the court to make that ruling without any consideration of the People's evidence.

2019Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, no reasonable view of the evidence supported charging the jury with this affirmative defense ( see People v Butts , 72 NY2d 746, 750 ; People v Watts , 57 NY2d 299, 301 ; People v Fraser , 134 AD3d 734, 735 ).

2007The trial court correctly denied the defendant’s request to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of duress (see Penal Law § 40.00), because even when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, no reasonable view of the evidence supported such a defense (see People v Butts, 72 NY2d 746, 750 [1988]; People v Watts, 57 NY2d 299, 301 [1982]).

2012We reject that contention (see People v Cox, 21 AD3d 1361, 1363 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 753 [2005]).

2012We reject that contention (see People v Cox, 21 AD3d 1361, 1363 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 753 [2005]).

2004“A defendant is entitled to a charge on the affirmative defense to robbery in the first degree when there is presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the elements of the defense are satisfied, i.e., that the object displayed was not a loaded weapon capable of producing death or other serious physical injury” (People v Gilliard, 72 NY2d 877, 878 [1988]).

1989Initially, defendant contends that County Court erred in refusing defendant’s request to charge the jury on the affirmative defense to robbery in the first degree that the object displayed was not a loaded weapon "readily capable of producing death or other serious physical injury” (Penal Law § 160.15 [4]; see, People v Gilliard, 72 NY2d 877, 878 ).

2013The record does not establish that the court “expressly decided” the issue “in re[s]ponse to a protest by a party” (CPL 470.05 [2]; see People v Turriago, 90 NY2d 77, 83-84 [1997]; People v Colon, 46 AD3d 260, 263 [1st Dept 2007]).

2013The record does not establish that the court “expressly decided” the issue “in re[s]ponse to a protest by a party” (CPL 470.05 [2]; see People v Turriago, 90 NY2d 77, 83-84 [1997]; People v Colon, 46 AD3d 260, 263 [1st Dept 2007]).

2013The record does not establish that the court “expressly decided” the issue “in re[s]ponse to a protest by a party” (CPL 470.05 [2]; see People v Turriago, 90 NY2d 77, 83-84 [1997]; People v Colon, 46 AD3d 260, 263 [1st Dept 2007]).

2013The record does not establish that the court “expressly decided” the issue “in re[s]ponse to a protest by a party” (CPL 470.05 [2]; see People v Turriago, 90 NY2d 77, 83-84 [1997]; People v Colon, 46 AD3d 260, 263 [1st Dept 2007]).

2005The testimony of the undercover officers demonstrated that they merely afforded the defendant an opportunity to commit the offenses which, standing alone, was insufficient to warrant an entrapment charge (see People v Brown, 82 NY2d 869, 871-872 [1993]; People v Moultrie, 5 AD3d 241, 242 [2004]; People v Delaney, 309 AD2d 968 [2003]).

2005A trial court must charge the affirmative defense of entrapment when “the evidence adduced at trial reasonably and sufficiently supports an inference that ‘(1) he [or she] was actively induced or encouraged to commit the offense by a public official; and (2) such inducement or encouragement created a “substantial risk” that the offense would be committed by defendant who was not otherwise disposed to commit it’ ” (People v Delaney, 309 AD2d 968, 970 [2003], quoting People v Brown, 82 NY2d 869, 871 [1993]; see Penal Law § 40.05).

2005The testimony of the undercover officers demonstrated that they merely afforded the defendant an opportunity to commit the offenses which, standing alone, was insufficient to warrant an entrapment charge (see People v Brown, 82 NY2d 869, 871-872 [1993]; People v Moultrie, 5 AD3d 241, 242 [2004]; People v Delaney, 309 AD2d 968 [2003]).

2005A trial court must charge the affirmative defense of entrapment when “the evidence adduced at trial reasonably and sufficiently supports an inference that ‘(1) he [or she] was actively induced or encouraged to commit the offense by a public official; and (2) such inducement or encouragement created a “substantial risk” that the offense would be committed by defendant who was not otherwise disposed to commit it’ ” (People v Delaney, 309 AD2d 968, 970 [2003], quoting People v Brown, 82 NY2d 869, 871 [1993]; see Penal Law § 40.05).

2025"In determining whether to issue a particular instruction [to the jury], the court 'must view the evidence adduced at trial in the light most favorable to the defendant' " ( People v J.L. , 36 NY3d 112 , 119 [2020], quoting People v Zona , 14 NY3d 488, 493 [2010]). "[V]iew[ing] the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant . . . [is] an exercise understood to be incompatible with weighing the evidence to resolve competing inferences" ( People v McKenzie , 19 NY3d 463, 466 [2012]; see People v Butts , 72 NY2d 746, 750 [1988]).

2025"In determining whether to issue a particular instruction [to the jury], the court 'must view the evidence adduced at trial in the light most favorable to the defendant' " ( People v J.L. , 36 NY3d 112 , 119 [2020], quoting People v Zona , 14 NY3d 488, 493 [2010]). "[V]iew[ing] the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant . . . [is] an exercise understood to be incompatible with weighing the evidence to resolve competing inferences" ( People v McKenzie , 19 NY3d 463, 466 [2012]; see People v Butts , 72 NY2d 746, 750 [1988]).

2019Defendant was not entitled to a duress charge based on threats allegedly made by an undercover police officer days or weeks before defendant repeatedly made sales of cocaine, because defendant "did not show that the threat of harm was imminent, nor did he promptly seek the assistance of law enforcement authorities" ( People v Moreno , 58 AD3d 516, 518 [1st Dept 2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 819 [2009]).

2015In particular, the evidence did not “demonstrate, first, that he . . . acted under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance and, second, that there was a reasonable explanation or excuse for that disturbance” (People v Roche, 98 NY2d at 76 ; see People v Piquion, 283 AD2d 233 [2001]; cf. People v Sepe, 111 AD3d 75 [2013]).