parental tort immunity in Illinois

1990(Schenk v. Schenk (1968), 100 Ill.

1989(See Schenk v. Schenk (1968), 100 Ill.

1990(Nudd v. Matsoukas (1956), 7 Ill. 2d 608 .) In Setinc v. Masny (1989), 185 Ill.

1990(Nudd v. Matsoukas (1956), 7 Ill. 2d 608 .) In Setinc v. Masny (1989), 185 Ill.

1987Following these cases, most States adopted the doctrine of parental tort immunity (e.g., Foley v. Foley (1895), 61 Ill. App. 577 ), holding that an unemancipated minor child may not maintain a personal tort action against a parent.

1987Following these cases, most States adopted the doctrine of parental tort immunity (e.g., Foley v. Foley (1895), 61 Ill. App. 577 ), holding that an unemancipated minor child may not maintain a personal tort action against a parent.

1990The plaintiff argues that this case comes within an exception to the parental tort immunity doctrine that was set forth in Johnson v. Myers (1972), 2 Ill.

1980Our finding, which we consider to be the better rule, has support, albeit in dicta, in the case of Johnson v. Myers (1972), 2 Ill.

1989Most recently, an appellate court ruling which would have abrogated the parental tort immunity doctrine was nullified by the supreme court in Stallman v. Youngquist (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 267 , 531 N.E.2d 355 .

1989Most recently, an appellate court ruling which would have abrogated the parental tort immunity doctrine was nullified by the supreme court in Stallman v. Youngquist (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 267 , 531 N.E.2d 355 .

1989(Chamness v. Fairtrace (1987), 158 Ill.

1989(E.g., Nudd v. Matsoukas (1956), 7 Ill. 2d 608 , 131 N.E.2d 525 ; Chamness v. Fairtrace (1987), 158 Ill.

1988App.2d 165 , 262 N.E.2d 826 . • 3 In the instant case we are confronted with a somewhat unique factual situation, one that presents the question as to the status of a noncustodial parent under the parental tort immunity doctrine.

1980Although the court did not specifically find that the negligent maintenance of a stairway rug in a home was a duty considered to be “within the family relationship,” it may be inferred that that was indeed what it felt, since it explicitly subscribed to the Schenk court’s view that: “ 9 9 there are no impelling reasons for eroding or emasculating the family immunity rule for conduct * 9 9 arising out of the family relationship and directly connected with the family purposes and objectives 9 9 *.’ ” 128 Ill.

1980The first case making reference to the common law doctrine of parental tort immunity was the 1891 case of Hewlett v. George (1891), 68 Miss. 703 , 9 So. 885 .

1980The first case making reference to the common law doctrine of parental tort immunity was the 1891 case of Hewlett v. George (1891), 68 Miss. 703 , 9 So. 885 .

1990This court recently addressed this issue as one of first impression in Ackley v. Ackley (1988), 165 Ill.

1990(Nudd v. Matsoukas (1956), 7 Ill. 2d 608 .) In Setinc v. Masny (1989), 185 Ill.

1990(Nudd v. Matsoukas (1956), 7 Ill. 2d 608 .) In Setinc v. Masny (1989), 185 Ill.

1990(Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Turner (1980), 83 Ill.

1987American courts relied on public policy to justify the parental tort immunity rule, giving various policy reasons. ( 227 Kan. 758, 761 , 611 P.2d 135, 137 ; Beal, “Can I Sue Mommy?” An Analysis of a Woman’s Tort Liability for Prenatal Injuries to Her Child Born Alive, 21 San Diego L. Rev. 325 , 334-35.) The majority of courts, however, have relied consistently on three justifications; that allowing a child to sue a parent for a personal tort would (1) disrupt family harmony, (2) encourage collusion, perjury, and fraud between family members, and (3) impair parental authority and discipline.

1987American courts relied on public policy to justify the parental tort immunity rule, giving various policy reasons. ( 227 Kan. 758, 761 , 611 P.2d 135, 137 ; Beal, “Can I Sue Mommy?” An Analysis of a Woman’s Tort Liability for Prenatal Injuries to Her Child Born Alive, 21 San Diego L. Rev. 325 , 334-35.) The majority of courts, however, have relied consistently on three justifications; that allowing a child to sue a parent for a personal tort would (1) disrupt family harmony, (2) encourage collusion, perjury, and fraud between family members, and (3) impair parental authority and discipline.

1987E.g., Gibson v. Gibson (1971), 3 Cal. 3d 914, 919 , 479 P.2d 648, 651 , 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 291 .

1987E.g., Gibson v. Gibson (1971), 3 Cal. 3d 914, 919 , 479 P.2d 648, 651 , 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 291 .

1987Although the doctrine has been held to apply to a parent’s suit against his or her minor child, the court in Stallman focused on the unfairness of a “rule of law which in one sweep disqualified an entire class of injured minors” and the need to afford children the “same right to protection and to legal redress for wrongs done them as others enjoy.” ( 152 Ill.

1987In Stallman v. Youngquist (1987), 152 Ill.

1987In Hewlett v. George (1891), 68 Miss. 703 , 9 So. 885 , the court, citing no authority, held simply that a child’s personal tort action against a parent would disturb the “peace of society, and of the families, composing society;, and a sound public policy designed to subserve the repose of families and the best interest of society.” ( 68 Miss. 703, 711 , 9 So. 885 , 887, quoted in Nocktonick v. Nocktonick (1980), 227 Kan. 758, 760 , 611 P.2d 135, 136-37 .) Hewlett was soon followed by McKelvey v. McKelvey (1903), 111 Tenn. 388 , 77 S.W. 664 , and by Roller v. Roller (1905), 37 Wash. 242 , 79

1987In Hewlett v. George (1891), 68 Miss. 703 , 9 So. 885 , the court, citing no authority, held simply that a child’s personal tort action against a parent would disturb the “peace of society, and of the families, composing society;, and a sound public policy designed to subserve the repose of families and the best interest of society.” ( 68 Miss. 703, 711 , 9 So. 885 , 887, quoted in Nocktonick v. Nocktonick (1980), 227 Kan. 758, 760 , 611 P.2d 135, 136-37 .) Hewlett was soon followed by McKelvey v. McKelvey (1903), 111 Tenn. 388 , 77 S.W. 664 , and by Roller v. Roller (1905), 37 Wash. 242 , 79

1987In Hewlett v. George (1891), 68 Miss. 703 , 9 So. 885 , the court, citing no authority, held simply that a child’s personal tort action against a parent would disturb the “peace of society, and of the families, composing society;, and a sound public policy designed to subserve the repose of families and the best interest of society.” ( 68 Miss. 703, 711 , 9 So. 885 , 887, quoted in Nocktonick v. Nocktonick (1980), 227 Kan. 758, 760 , 611 P.2d 135, 136-37 .) Hewlett was soon followed by McKelvey v. McKelvey (1903), 111 Tenn. 388 , 77 S.W. 664 , and by Roller v. Roller (1905), 37 Wash. 242 , 79

1987In Hewlett v. George (1891), 68 Miss. 703 , 9 So. 885 , the court, citing no authority, held simply that a child’s personal tort action against a parent would disturb the “peace of society, and of the families, composing society;, and a sound public policy designed to subserve the repose of families and the best interest of society.” ( 68 Miss. 703, 711 , 9 So. 885 , 887, quoted in Nocktonick v. Nocktonick (1980), 227 Kan. 758, 760 , 611 P.2d 135, 136-37 .) Hewlett was soon followed by McKelvey v. McKelvey (1903), 111 Tenn. 388 , 77 S.W. 664 , and by Roller v. Roller (1905), 37 Wash. 242 , 79

1984Similarly, in Cummings v. Jackson (1978), 57 Ill.

1984The parents argued that parental supervision is “a personal and private aspect of the family unit which falls squarely within the confines of the parental tort immunity doctrine” and that, in the context of a contribution action based on negligent supervision, “a parent’s authority, discretion and control in rearing his child should prevail over any conflicting provisions of the Contribution Act.” (Moon v. Thompson (1984), 127 Ill.

1980Ten years later, in Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education (1976), 63 Ill.2d 165 , three justices, including the chief justice, dissented from the majority opinion and commented that contrary to the apparent belief of the majority and the parties to the appeal, the question of whether a parent is liable to his child for injuries absent willful and wanton misconduct has never been decided by the supreme court and should not, therefore, be considered "settled law." ( 63 Ill.2d 165, 178-79 .) However, subsequent supreme court cases have restated the parental tort immunity rule for mere negligen

1980(Gerrity v. Beatty (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 47 ; Thomas v. Chicago Board of Education (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 165 .) It would appear, then, that the doctrine announced in Nudd is, in fact, the rule in Illinois.

1980Ten years later, in Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 165 , three justices, including the chief justice, dissented from the majority opinion and commented that contrary to the apparent belief of the majority and the parties to the appeal, the question of whether a parent is liable to his child for injuries absent willful and wanton misconduct has never been decided by the supreme court and should not, therefore, be considered “settled law.” ( 63 Ill. 2d 165,178-79 .) However, subsequent supreme court cases have restated the parental tort immunity rule for mere neglige

1980Ten years later, in Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 165 , three justices, including the chief justice, dissented from the majority opinion and commented that contrary to the apparent belief of the majority and the parties to the appeal, the question of whether a parent is liable to his child for injuries absent willful and wanton misconduct has never been decided by the supreme court and should not, therefore, be considered “settled law.” ( 63 Ill. 2d 165,178-79 .) However, subsequent supreme court cases have restated the parental tort immunity rule for mere neglige

1980Ten years later, in Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education (1976), 63 Ill.2d 165 , three justices, including the chief justice, dissented from the majority opinion and commented that contrary to the apparent belief of the majority and the parties to the appeal, the question of whether a parent is liable to his child for injuries absent willful and wanton misconduct has never been decided by the supreme court and should not, therefore, be considered "settled law." ( 63 Ill.2d 165, 178-79 .) However, subsequent supreme court cases have restated the parental tort immunity rule for mere negligen

1980(Gerrity v. Beatty (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 47 ; Thomas v. Chicago Board of Education (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 165 .) It would appear, then, that the doctrine announced in Nudd is, in fact, the rule in Illinois.

1978(Nudd v. Matsoukas (1956), 7 Ill. 2d 608 , 131 N.E.2d 525 ; Aurora National Bank v. Anderson (2nd Dist. 1971), 132 Ill.

1978Mroczynski v. McGrath (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 451 , 216 N.E.2d 137 ; Schenk v. Schenk (4th Dist. 1968), 100 Ill.

1978Mroczynski v. McGrath (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 451 , 216 N.E.2d 137 ; Schenk v. Schenk (4th Dist. 1968), 100 Ill.