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10 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Easleygreen2 sentences2014See Easley, 148 Ill. 2d at 320-21 (finding that even if it was error to allow a statement obtained in violation of the due process clause to be used for impeachment purposes, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt). ¶ 53 Defendant’s offer of proof was weak at best and is an insufficient basis upon which to conclude that the verdict would have been different had defendant’s medical experts testified. 2013See Easley, 148 Ill. 2d at 320-21 (finding that even if it was error to allow a statement obtained in violation of the due process clause to be used for impeachment purposes, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt). ¶ 53 Defendant's offer of proof was weak at best and is an insufficient basis upon which to conclude that the verdict would have been different had defendant's medical experts testified. | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Winsett
green
2 sentences2002Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d at 353 . 2000Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d at 353 . | 3 | 2000–2002 |
Oregon v. Elstad
green
2 sentences1993Ed. 2d 222 , 105 S. Ct. 1285 .) The “fruit” of a statement obtained in violation of a constitutional right, such as the fourth amendment right against unlawful search and seizure, must be suppressed (Wong Son v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 , 9 L. 1992Ed. 2d 441, 453 , 83 S. Ct. 407, 415-16 ), but the “fruit” of a statement obtained in violation of a prophylactic rule need not be excluded (Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 , 84 L. | 2 | 1992–1993 |
Wong Sun v. United States
green
2 sentences1993Ed. 2d 222 , 105 S. Ct. 1285 .) The “fruit” of a statement obtained in violation of a constitutional right, such as the fourth amendment right against unlawful search and seizure, must be suppressed (Wong Son v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 , 9 L. 1993Ed. 2d 222 , 105 S. Ct. 1285 .) The “fruit” of a statement obtained in violation of a constitutional right, such as the fourth amendment right against unlawful search and seizure, must be suppressed (Wong Son v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 , 9 L. | 2 | 1992–1993 |
Michigan v. Tucker
green
2 sentences1993Ed. 2d 441, 453 , 83 S. Ct. 407, 415-16 ), but the “fruit” of a statement obtained in violation of a prophylactic rule is not automatically subject to exclusion (Michigan v. Tucker (1974), 417 U.S. 433 , 41 L. 1993Ed. 2d 441, 453 , 83 S. Ct. 407, 415-16 ), but the “fruit” of a statement obtained in violation of a prophylactic rule is not automatically subject to exclusion (Michigan v. Tucker (1974), 417 U.S. 433 , 41 L. | 2 | 1992–1993 |
Knight v. State
green
2 sentences1994See, e.g., County of Henrico v. Ehlers (1989), 237 Va. 594 , 379 S.E.2d 457 (by its own terms, fifth amendment is not applicable in civil proceedings and, because there could not therefore be a fifth amendment violation, the protection afforded by Miranda was never called into play); Levan v. Commonwealth, Pennsylvania Game Comm’n (1981), 59 Pa. Commw. 348 , 429 A.2d 1241 (even if Levan was unfairly influenced to sign field receipts, the defect was only applicable to finding of guilt in criminal proceeding and could not subsequently be attacked in civil action to revoke hunting license); Knigh 1994See, e.g., County of Henrico v. Ehlers (1989), 237 Va. 594 , 379 S.E.2d 457 (by its own terms, fifth amendment is not applicable in civil proceedings and, because there could not therefore be a fifth amendment violation, the protection afforded by Miranda was never called into play); Levan v. Commonwealth, Pennsylvania Game Comm’n (1981), 59 Pa. Commw. 348 , 429 A.2d 1241 (even if Levan was unfairly influenced to sign field receipts, the defect was only applicable to finding of guilt in criminal proceeding and could not subsequently be attacked in civil action to revoke hunting license); Knigh | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Levan v. Commonwealth, Pennsylvania Game Commission
green
2 sentences1994See, e.g., County of Henrico v. Ehlers (1989), 237 Va. 594 , 379 S.E.2d 457 (by its own terms, fifth amendment is not applicable in civil proceedings and, because there could not therefore be a fifth amendment violation, the protection afforded by Miranda was never called into play); Levan v. Commonwealth, Pennsylvania Game Comm’n (1981), 59 Pa. Commw. 348 , 429 A.2d 1241 (even if Levan was unfairly influenced to sign field receipts, the defect was only applicable to finding of guilt in criminal proceeding and could not subsequently be attacked in civil action to revoke hunting license); Knigh 1994See, e.g., County of Henrico v. Ehlers (1989), 237 Va. 594 , 379 S.E.2d 457 (by its own terms, fifth amendment is not applicable in civil proceedings and, because there could not therefore be a fifth amendment violation, the protection afforded by Miranda was never called into play); Levan v. Commonwealth, Pennsylvania Game Comm’n (1981), 59 Pa. Commw. 348 , 429 A.2d 1241 (even if Levan was unfairly influenced to sign field receipts, the defect was only applicable to finding of guilt in criminal proceeding and could not subsequently be attacked in civil action to revoke hunting license); Knigh | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Terpstra v. Niagara Fire Insurance
green
2 sentences1994See, e.g., County of Henrico v. Ehlers (1989), 237 Va. 594 , 379 S.E.2d 457 (by its own terms, fifth amendment is not applicable in civil proceedings and, because there could not therefore be a fifth amendment violation, the protection afforded by Miranda was never called into play); Levan v. Commonwealth, Pennsylvania Game Comm’n (1981), 59 Pa. Commw. 348 , 429 A.2d 1241 (even if Levan was unfairly influenced to sign field receipts, the defect was only applicable to finding of guilt in criminal proceeding and could not subsequently be attacked in civil action to revoke hunting license); Knigh 1994See, e.g., County of Henrico v. Ehlers (1989), 237 Va. 594 , 379 S.E.2d 457 (by its own terms, fifth amendment is not applicable in civil proceedings and, because there could not therefore be a fifth amendment violation, the protection afforded by Miranda was never called into play); Levan v. Commonwealth, Pennsylvania Game Comm’n (1981), 59 Pa. Commw. 348 , 429 A.2d 1241 (even if Levan was unfairly influenced to sign field receipts, the defect was only applicable to finding of guilt in criminal proceeding and could not subsequently be attacked in civil action to revoke hunting license); Knigh | 1 | 1994–1994 |
County of Henrico v. Ehlers
green
2 sentences1994See, e.g., County of Henrico v. Ehlers (1989), 237 Va. 594 , 379 S.E.2d 457 (by its own terms, fifth amendment is not applicable in civil proceedings and, because there could not therefore be a fifth amendment violation, the protection afforded by Miranda was never called into play); Levan v. Commonwealth, Pennsylvania Game Comm’n (1981), 59 Pa. Commw. 348 , 429 A.2d 1241 (even if Levan was unfairly influenced to sign field receipts, the defect was only applicable to finding of guilt in criminal proceeding and could not subsequently be attacked in civil action to revoke hunting license); Knigh 1994See, e.g., County of Henrico v. Ehlers (1989), 237 Va. 594 , 379 S.E.2d 457 (by its own terms, fifth amendment is not applicable in civil proceedings and, because there could not therefore be a fifth amendment violation, the protection afforded by Miranda was never called into play); Levan v. Commonwealth, Pennsylvania Game Comm’n (1981), 59 Pa. Commw. 348 , 429 A.2d 1241 (even if Levan was unfairly influenced to sign field receipts, the defect was only applicable to finding of guilt in criminal proceeding and could not subsequently be attacked in civil action to revoke hunting license); Knigh | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Howard
green
1 sentence1992Ed. 2d 705 , 87 S. Ct. 824 ; Howard, 147 Ill. 2d at 148 .) If this court were to accept defendant’s argument and conclude that a statement obtained in violation of the due process clause could not be used for impeachment purposes, the next question for us would be whether this court could term “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” an error that presumptively kept defendant from testifying. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Michigan v. Harvey
green
2 sentences1992Ed. 2d at 231 , 105 S. Ct. at 1292-93 .) As support for this conclusion, we note that the Supreme Court has “mandated the exclusion of reliable and probative evidence for all purposes only when it is derived from involuntary statements.” (Emphasis in original.) Michigan v. Harvey (1990), 494 U.S. 344, 351 , 108 L. 1992Ed. 2d at 231 , 105 S. Ct. at 1292-93 .) As support for this conclusion, we note that the Supreme Court has “mandated the exclusion of reliable and probative evidence for all purposes only when it is derived from involuntary statements.” (Emphasis in original.) Michigan v. Harvey (1990), 494 U.S. 344, 351 , 108 L. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Chapman v. California
yellow
1 sentence1992Ed. 2d 705 , 87 S. Ct. 824 ; Howard, 147 Ill. 2d at 148 .) If this court were to accept defendant’s argument and conclude that a statement obtained in violation of the due process clause could not be used for impeachment purposes, the next question for us would be whether this court could term “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” an error that presumptively kept defendant from testifying. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Mincey v. Arizona
green
1 sentence1992Ed. 2d 290, 306 , 98 S. Ct. 2408, 2418-19 ), it would be “incongruous” to allow a statement obtained in violation of the due process clause to be used for impeachment purposes. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1985(Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436 , 16 L. 1985(Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436 , 16 L. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.